













I	 certify	 that	 the	 thesis	 I	 have	presented	 for	 examination	 for	 the	PhD	degree	of	 the	 London	












If	 I	 take	my	umbrella,	having	 seen	 that	 it’s	 raining	outside,	we	might	 say	 that	my	 reason	 for	
taking	my	umbrella	was	that	it	was	raining.	However,	if	I’d	believed	that	it	was	raining	when	it	





I	 argue	 that	 there	 is	 a	 theory	 of	 reasons	 that	 can	 reconcile	 these	 two	 accounts	 of	what	my	
reason	for	acting	was	without	entailing	such	awkward	claims.	I	argue	that	what	the	fact	that	it	
is	raining	and	the	fact	that	I	believe	that	it	is	raining	have	in	common	is	that,	in	their	respective	
cases,	 they	 each	 explain	why	 it	was	 rational	 for	me	 to	 take	my	 umbrella	 and	why	 I	 took	 it.	
More	generally,	I	argue	that	there	is	at	least	a	sense	in	which	all	practical	reasons	explain	why	
it	is,	in	some	respect,	rational	for	the	agent	to	do	the	actions	for	which	they	are	reasons.	
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If	 I	 take	my	umbrella,	having	 seen	 that	 it’s	 raining	outside,	we	might	 say	 that	my	 reason	 for	




it	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 feature	 of	 my	 psychology.	 Can	 these	 two	 different	 accounts	 of	 what	 my	
reason	for	acting	was	be	reconciled	within	a	single	theory	of	what	 it	 is	to	be	a	reason?	Most	




reason	 for	 taking	 my	 umbrella	 was	 that	 I	 believed	 that	 it	 was	 raining	 (and	 not	 that	 it	 was	
raining).	Theorists	of	this	sort,	so-called	‘psychologists’,	suggest	that	our	reasons	for	acting	can	
only	be	features	of	our	psychology.	
Second,	 and	 in	 contrast,	 there	 are	 those	 theorists	 who	 take	 what	 happens	 when	 I’m	 not	
mistaken	 to	 be	 indicative	 of	 what	 happens	 when	 I	 am.	 They	 insist	 that,	 in	 both	 cases	 (i.e.	
regardless	of	whether	or	not	it	was	raining),	my	reason	for	taking	my	umbrella	was	that	it	was	










for	 taking	my	umbrella	was	can	be	 reconciled	within	a	 single	 theory	of	 reasons.	 I	 argue	 that	
what	the	fact	that	 it	 is	raining	and	the	fact	that	 I	believe	that	 it	 is	raining	have	 in	common	is	
that,	 in	 their	 respective	 cases,	 they	 each	 explain	 why	 it	 was	 rational	 for	 me	 to	 take	 my	























that	 for	each	of	 these	theories	 there	 is	a	price	 that	must	be	paid,	and	that	 the	price	of	each	
theory	is	sufficient	to	motivate	the	search	for	less	costly	alternatives.	As	Maria	Alvarez	puts	it:	








an	 account,	 if	 I	 take	my	 umbrella	 because	 I	 mistakenly	 believe	 that	 it	 is	 raining,	 there	 is	 a	
(psychologistic)	 sense	 in	which	 I	 take	 it	 for	a	 reason	and	a	 (favourist)	 sense	 in	which	 I	don’t;	
	 12	
likewise	 (to	pick	a	different	expression),	 there	 is	a	 sense	 in	which	 I	had	 a	 reason	 to	 take	my	
umbrella	 and	 a	 sense	 in	 which	 I	 didn’t.	 According	 to	 this	 pluralist	 theory	 of	 reasons,	 the	







particular,	 it	 is	 not	 at	 all	 clear	 to	me	 that	whenever	 a	 univocal	 theory	 ends	 up	 entailing	 an	
awkward	claim	it	is	because	it	has	conflated	two	different	senses	of	a	single	expression.	And,	in	















I	 will	 eventually	 argue	 that	 explanatory	 rationalism	 avoids	 all	 the	 problems	 that	 face	 other	
theories	 because	 it	 is	 able	 to	 reconcile	 the	 idea	 that	 agents	 always	 act	 for	 psychological	
reasons	with	 the	 idea	 that	 they	may	 sometimes	 also	 act	 for	 non-psychological	 reasons.	 But	
																																								 																				
1	Two	points	are	worth	noting:	First,	I	say	that	an	action	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	A	if	and	only	if	A	takes	it	
to	 be,	 in	 some	 respect,	 worth	 doing.	 See	 §	(VI)1	 for	 further	 discussion.	 Second,	 the	 categorisation	
schema	used	in	Table	1	is	unusual	in	so	far	as	it	allows	for	the	possibility	of	distinguishing	between	each	








that	 it	was	raining	my	reason	for	taking	my	umbrella	was	that	 it	was	raining	(as	I	 intend	it	to	
be),	 then	 it	must	 be	 possible	 for	 the	 fact	 that	 it	was	 raining	 to	 explain	both	why	 I	 took	my	
umbrella	and	why	it	was	rational	for	me	to	take	my	umbrella.		
There	is,	however,	a	well-rehearsed	argument	against	this	possibility.	This	argument	says	that	
facts	 about	 things	 that	 are	 external	 to	 an	 agent’s	mind	 (e.g.	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 raining)	 can’t	
explain	why	they	did	something	or	why	it	was	rational	for	them	to	do	it,	since	what	an	agent	
does,	or	what	it	is	rational	for	them	to	do,	only	depends	on	their	mind.		
For	 instance,	notice	that	even	if	 it	 isn’t	raining,	so	 long	as	 I	believe	that	 it	 is	raining	I	will	still	
take	my	 umbrella;	 and	 I	will	 take	 it	because	 I	 believe	 that	 it	 is	 raining.	 Further,	 notice	 that,	
given	 that	 I	need	 to	believe	 that	 it	 is	 raining	 in	order	 to	 take	my	umbrella,	even	 if	 I	 take	my	
umbrella	 when	 it	 is	 raining	 I	must	 still	 take	 it	 because	 I	 believe	 that	 it	 is	 raining.	 Thus,	 the	














2	This	 argument	 can	 likewise	 be	 applied	 to	 the	 explanation	 of	why	 it	was	 rational	 for	me	 to	 take	my	
umbrella.	
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However,	explanatory	 relations	are	not	always	 transitive.	For	example,	 if	 I	mistake	 the	spray	
from	 a	 sprinkler	 for	 rain,	 then	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 sprinkler	 is	 spraying	 in	 front	 of	my	window	





actually	 see	 rain?	 That	 is,	 given	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 sprinkler	was	 spraying	 in	 front	 of	my	
window	and	the	fact	that	it	was	raining	both	(in	their	respective	cases)	explain	why	I	believed	






rational	 for	 me	 to	 take	 my	 umbrella	 because	 it	 is	mysteriously	 related	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 I	
believed	 that	 it	 was	 raining	 (which	 in	 turn	 explains	 why	 it	 was	 rational	 for	 me	 to	 take	 my	
umbrella).	And	I	argue	that,	conversely,	in	the	case	in	which	I	was	mistaken,	the	fact	that	the	
sprinkler	was	spraying	 in	 front	of	my	window	does	not	explain	why	 it	was	rational	 for	me	to	
take	my	umbrella	because	it	 is	not	mysteriously	related	to	the	fact	that	I	believed	that	it	was	
raining	(it	 is	merely	causally	related	to	 it).	 	Moreover,	 I	argue,	 in	both	of	these	cases	the	fact	
that	 it	 appeared	 to	 me	 as	 though	 it	 was	 raining	 is	 mysteriously	 related	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 I	
believed	that	 it	was	raining,	so	that	 in	both	of	these	cases	the	fact	that	 it	appeared	to	me	as	




Thus,	 according	 to	 explanatory	 rationalism,	 when	 I	 saw	 that	 it	 was	 raining,	 my	 reasons	 for	
taking	my	 umbrella	 include	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 was	 raining,	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 appeared	 to	me	 as	
though	it	was	raining,	and	the	fact	that	I	believed	that	it	was	raining.	In	contrast,	when	I	merely	
saw	the	spray	of	the	sprinkler,	my	reasons	for	taking	my	umbrella	do	not	include	the	‘fact’	that	
it	 was	 raining	 (not	 least	 because	 it	 wasn’t	 raining)	 nor	 do	 they	 include	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
sprinkler	was	 spraying	 in	 front	 of	my	window,	 but	 they	 nonetheless	 include	 the	 fact	 that	 it	
appeared	to	me	as	though	it	was	raining,	and	the	fact	that	I	believed	that	it	was	raining.	
Unlike	 any	other	 univocal	 theory	of	 reasons,	 explanatory	 rationalism	 is	 thus	 consistent	 both	
with	 the	claim	that	agents	always	act	 for	psychological	 reasons	and	with	 the	claim	that	 they	
sometimes	act	for	non-psychological	reasons.	And,	indeed,	it	is	precisely	this	that	means	that	
explanatory	 rationalism	 avoids	 the	 particular	 awkward	 claims	 that	 other	 theories	 face,	 and	
which,	more	generally,	makes	it	 immune	to	many	of	the	challenges	one	would	normally	 level	
against	 such	 theories.	 Thus,	 I	 argue,	 explanatory	 rationalism	 is	 the	 best	 univocal	 theory	 of	
reasons.		
However,	 since,	 as	 I	 noted,	 I	 am	 persuaded	 that	 there	may	 be	 two	 distinct	 senses	 to	 each	
reason	expression,	my	own	theory	of	reasons	is	what	I	call	‘new	pluralism’.	New	pluralism	says	
that	one	sense	of	every	reason	expression	 is	explanatory	rationalist,	while	the	other	sense	 is	
favourist;	 and	 this	 allows	me	 to	 say	 that,	 for	 instance,	 when	 I	 take	my	 umbrella	 because	 I	
mistakenly	believe	that	it	is	raining,	there	is	a	sense	in	which	my	reason	for	taking	my	umbrella	
is	that	I	believe	that	it	is	raining,	and	there	is	a	sense	in	which	I	take	my	umbrella	for	no	reason.	
The	 virtue	 of	 new	 pluralism	 over	 existing	 pluralist	 theories	 is	 that	 it	 does	 not	 rely	 on	 the	
plurality	 of	 senses	 to	 avoid	 the	 awkwardness	 that	 univocal	 theories	 face	 –	 explanatory	
rationalism	already	avoids	that	awkwardness	on	its	own.	
5 That	which	I	pass	over	in	silence	
There	are	 a	 few	 topics	 about	which	 this	 discussion	makes	no	 claim.	 The	 first	 of	 these	 is	 the	
ontology	 of	 reasons.	 For	 the	most	 part	 I	will	 talk	 as	 though	 reasons	 are	 propositions,	 if	 not	
facts,	however,	 this	 is	mostly	 for	 convenience.	Whilst	 there	has	been	some	debate	between	
those	 who	 take	 reasons	 to	 be	 facts	 (or	 states	 of	 affairs)	 and	 those	 who	 take	 them	 to	 be	
psychological	 states,	 I	 make	 no	 particular	 claim	 about	 that.	 My	 theory	 is	 not	 about	 what	









some	 accounts	 of	 explanation.	 To	 my	 knowledge,	 there	 are	 no	 instances	 of	 this	 kind	 that	
would	be	of	serious	concern	for	my	argument,	and	it	is	my	belief	that	an	alternative	construal	
of	 my	 argument	 could	 be	 made	 whatever	 one’s	 theory	 of	 explanation.	 However,	 I	 may	 be	
wrong;	there	may	be	accounts	of	explanation	that	are	inconsistent	with	what	I	want	from	my	
theory	of	reasons,	in	which	case,	so	be	it.	
Thirdly,	 I	 will	 also	 leave	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 or	 not	 desires	 are	 reasons	 well	 alone.	 Of	
course,	we	regularly	say	things	like:	‘my	reason	for	going	to	the	gym	is	that	I	want	to	get	fit’;	
and,	 ‘my	 reason	 for	 going	 to	 the	 shops	 is	 to	 buy	 eggs’.	 Whilst	 I	 think	 that	 explanatory	
rationalism	has	something	 to	say	about	how	we	 interpret	 these	sentences,	 I	won’t	discuss	 it	
here,	and	I	won’t	mention	such	sentences	further.	
Finally,	 I	 will	 not	 discuss	 reasons	 for	 belief.	 Many	 hold	 that	 reasons	 for	 belief	 should	 be	
analysable	in	the	same	sort	of	way	as	practical	reasons,	and	this	is	a	view	that	I	share.	It	would	
be	 tempting,	 then,	 to	 extend	 explanatory	 rationalism	 into	 an	 analysis	 of	 what	 it	 is	 to	 be	 a	
reason	to	believe	something,	and,	 indeed,	 I	think	that	such	an	account	could	be	 illuminating.	
However,	I	don’t	discuss	that	here.	
6 An	overview	of	this	discussion	
The	 structure	of	 this	discussion	 is	 as	 follows.	 In	§	(I),	 I	 set	out	my	approach	 to	 talking	about	
theories	of	reasons.	In	particular	I	categorise	theories	of	reasons	according	to	the	claims	they	
make	 about	 each	 of	 the	 following	 expressions:	 ‘the	 reasons	 there	 are	 for	 one	 to	 act’;	 ‘the	
reasons	for	or	against	acting’;	‘the	reasons	one	has	to	act’;	and	‘one’s	reason	for	acting’.	This	is	
at	 odds	 with	 the	 prevailing	 tendency	 to	 sort	 reasons	 into	 ‘normative’	 and	 ‘motivating’;	












In	§§	(II),	 (III)	and	(IV),	 respectively,	 I	show	that	each	of	 these	accounts	 is	 inconsistent	with	a	
number	of	prima	facie	reasonable	claims.	The	problems	set	out	 in	these	chapters	are	mostly	




univocal	 theories.	 I	conclude	that	we	should	not:	pluralism,	at	 least	of	the	conventional	sort,	
falls	short	of	what	we	need	from	a	new	theory	of	reasons.	
In	 §	(VI),	 I	 set	 the	 agenda	 for	 the	 remainder	 of	 the	 discussion.	 I	 introduce	 explanatory	
rationalism,	 and	 I	 give	an	overview	of	 the	main	problem	 for	 it	 (highlighted	 in	 the	discussion	
above),	which	I	call	‘The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem’.	I	provide	an	outline	of	my	approach	
to	discussing,	and,	ultimately,	solving	this	problem,	which	is	as	follows.	


















based	 on	 a	 false	 principle	 of	 explanation,	 the	 exclusion	 principle.	 The	 exclusion	 principle	
implies	 that	 only	 the	most	proximal	 explanations	 of	 some	 explananda	 explain	 it;	 but	 this	 is	
mistaken	 –	 I	 argue	 that	most	 of	 the	 explanations	we	 are	 interested	 in	 are,	 to	 some	 extent,	
distal	explanations.	Then,	 in	§	(XII),	 I	show	how	that	 insight	helps	 inform	the	account	of	how	
the	fact	that	it	is	raining	can	explain	why	I	took	my	umbrella.	Specifically,	I	suggest	that	the	fact	
that	 it	 is	 raining	 is	 a	distal	 explanation	 of	my	 action;	 it	 explains	why	 I	 took	my	 umbrella	 by	








it	 is	 rational	 for	 them	 to	 do	 that	 action.	 That	 is,	 I	 note,	 not	 all	 explanatory	 relations	 are	
transitive.	I	then	set	the	stage	for	the	remainder	of	the	discussion,	which	seeks	to	provide	an	
account	of	when	the	explanatory	relations	involved	are,	and	when	they	aren’t,	transitive.	












Finally,	 in	 §	(XVI),	 I	 revisit	 explanatory	 rationalism.	 I	 show	 how	 it	 responds	 to	 the	 problems	
faced	 by	 other	 theories.	 I	 suggest	 that	 it	 is	 to	 some	 extent	 immune	 from	 the	 conventional	
procedures	for	generating	problems	for	theories	of	reasons	because	it	is	consistent	both	with	
the	 claim	 that	 agents	 always	 act	 for	 psychological	 reasons	 and	 with	 the	 claim	 that	 they	
sometimes	 act	 for	 non-psychological	 reasons.	 In	 light	 of	 these	 arguments,	 I	 suggest	 that	
explanatory	rationalism	is	the	best	univocal	account	of	what	it	is	to	be	a	reason.	
I	conclude	by	returning	to	the	 intuition	that,	when	someone	acts	on	a	 false	belief,	 there	 is	a	










schema	 is	 to	 capture	 at	 least	 the	main	 theories	 of	 reasons,	 then	 it	 should	 by	 allow	 for	 the	
possibility	 of	 as	many	 kinds	 of	 reason	 as	 there	 are	 reason	 expressions.	 I	 say	 that	 instead	 of	
distinguishing	 between	 psychological	 and	 anti-psychological	 theories	 we	 should	 categorise	
theories	of	reasons	according	to	what	they	say,	for	each	reason	expression,	about	the	relation	
between	the	reasons	picked	out	by	that	expression	and	the	actions	for	which	they	are	reasons.	
And	 I	 say	 that	we	should	eschew	the	 terminology	of	 ‘normative’	and	 ‘motivating’	 reasons	 in	
our	categorisation	schema	and	in	our	theorising,	because,	as	they	are	standardly	defined,	they	
make	substantive	claims	about	what	 it	 is	 to	be	a	 reason	 that	 it	 is	properly	 the	business	of	a	
theory	of	reasons	to	determine,	and	that,	moreover,	those	claims	systematically	disadvantage	




In	which	 I	 show	what	 it	 costs	 to	 think	 that	 if	 there	 is	 a	 reason	 to	do	 some	action	 then	 that	
action	 is,	 in	 some	respect,	worth	doing.	 I	 show	how	 ‘favourism	about	 reasons	 to	act’	 (which	
entails	 that	 reasons	 to	 act	 make	 actions	 worth	 doing)	 clashes	 with	 some	 prima	 facie	
reasonable	claims	about	a	case	in	which	someone	acts	on	a	false	belief.	I	set	out	which	claims	
the	 proponent	 of	 this	 view	 must	 choose	 between	 rejecting	 and	 I	 categorise	 the	 common	
choices	from	the	literature.	
(III)	ACTING	FOR	PSYCHOLOGICAL	REASONS	
In	 which	 I	 show	what	 it	 costs	 to	 think	 that	 the	 reason	 for	 which	 an	 agent	 acts	 is	 always	 a	






the	 belief	 they	 acted	 on.	 I	 show	 how	 ‘deliberativism	 about	 the	 reasons	 for	 which	 we	 act’	
clashes	 with	 some	 prima	 facie	 reasonable	 claims	 about	 the	 factivity	 of	 reasons,	 the	
explanatory	power	of	 the	reasons	 for	which	we	act,	 the	factivity	of	explanation	and	what	an	













it.	 I	define	 ‘pro	 tanto	 rational’	actions	as	actions	 that	an	agent	 takes	 to	be,	 in	 some	respect,	
worth	doing.	 I	 set	 out	 a	 new	 family	 of	 claims	 about	 reasons,	 explanatory	 rationalism,	which	
says	that	all	practical	reasons	explain	why	the	actions	for	which	they	are	reasons	are	pro	tanto	
rational.	I	introduce	the	major	challenge	for	explanatory	rationalism,	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	
Problem,	which	argues	 that	only	 features	of	 an	 agent’s	 psychology	 could	explain	either	why	
they	 do	 something	 or	 why	 it	 was	 rational	 for	 them	 to	 do	 it.	 I	 set	 out	 the	 program	 for	 the	
forthcoming	chapters.	
(VII)	WE	NEED	TO	TALK	ABOUT	EXPLANATION	
In	which	 I	make	 some	assumptions	 about	explanation.	 I	 say	what	 I	mean	by	 ‘explains’	 and	 I	
state	that	I	will	talk	as	though	explananda	are	facts	and	explanantia	are	propositions	(whether	
or	not	 they	are).	 I	 distinguish	 two	 sorts	of	 explanatory	 relation,	 ‘fully	 explains’	 and	 ‘partially	
explains’,	where	a	 full	explanation	 is	sufficient	 for	 the	truth	of	 the	 fact	 that	 it	explains	and	a	
partial	 explanation	 is	 an	 element	 (or	 subset)	 of	 a	 full	 explanation,	 and	 I	 make	 some	





Problem,	 showing	 how	 it	 results	 from	 two	 seemingly	 trivial	 claims	 about	 what	 explains	 an	















when	 I	 say	 that	 I	 took	 it	 because	 it	 was	 raining?	 I	 suggest	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 was	 raining	
explains	why	I	took	my	umbrella	either	‘elliptically’,	 ‘directly’	or	‘indirectly’.	 I	note	that	which	
answer	 one	 accepts	 will	 depend	 on	 one’s	 response	 to	 The	 Explanatory	 Exclusion	 Problem:	
elliptical	 theorists	 accept	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 Problem,	 direct	 theorists	 reject	 the	 first	
premise,	 and	 indirect	 theorists	 reject	 the	 second.	 I	 set	 out	 the	 problems	with	 elliptical	 and	
direct	theories.	
(XI)	THE	EXCLUSION	PRINCIPLE	IS	FALSE	
In	 which	 I	 show	 that	 the	 exclusion	 principle	 is	 false.	 I	 provide	 two	 counterexamples	 to	 the	
exclusion	 principle,	 one	 involving	 causal	 explanation	 and	 another	 involving	 non-causal	
explanation.	 I	 suggest	 that	 they	 are	 counterexamples	 because	 in	 each	 case	 the	 purportedly	
excluded	 fact	 explains	 the	 explanandum	 by	 explaining	 something	 that,	 in	 turn,	 explains	 the	
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explanandum.	 I	 suggest	 that	 the	problem	with	 the	exclusion	principle	 is	 that	 it	discriminates	
against	 all	 but	 the	 most	 proximal	 explanations	 of	 any	 given	 explanandum,	 and	 that	 this	 is	
problematic	 at	 least	partly	because	we	are	 typically	 interested	 in	more	distal	 explanations.	 I	
explain	where	our	 reasoning	went	wrong	and	which	 full	 explanation	an	apparently	excluded	
fact	is	part	of.	
(XII)	EXPLAINING	WHY	WE	ACT	
In	which	 I	 say	 how	 normative	 reasons	 (and	 the	 appearance	 of	 them)	 explain	why	we	 act.	 I	






that	 normative	 reasons	 or	 appearances	 explain	why	 it	 is	 rational	 to	 act	 only	 if	 they	 explain	
those	beliefs	that	in	turn	explain	why	it	is	rational	to	act.	I	note	that	it	is	tempting	to	infer	that	
if	 an	 agent’s	 belief	 explains	 why	 it	 is	 rational	 for	 them	 to	 do	 some	 action	 then	 whatever	
explains	that	belief	also	explains	why	it	is	rational	for	them	to	do	that	action.	I	show	how	that	
inference	 leads	 to	 an	 apparent	 dilemma	 for	 explanatory	 rationalism.	 I	 counsel	 against	 that	
inference,	 by	 noting	 that	 different	 kinds	 of	 explanatory	 relations	may	 not	 be	 transitive	with	
each	other.	 I	 then	set	out	 the	 task	ahead:	 showing	 that	 the	explanatory	 relations	concerned	
are	transitive	when,	and	only	when,	explanatory	rationalism	needs	them	to	be.	
(XIV)	THE	MYSTERY	RELATION	
In	 which	 I	 introduce	 the	 mystery	 relation.	 I	 suggest	 that	 a	 mysterious,	 non-causal	 relation	
obtains	between	a	belief	and	the	justification	that	it	is	based	on	when	that	belief	is	justified.	I	
argue	 that	 the	 mystery	 relation	 must	 be	 non-causal,	 because,	 as	 deviant	 causal	 chains	
demonstrate,	 a	 merely	 causal	 relation	 between	 a	 belief	 and	 some	 justification	 for	 it	 is	 not	
sufficient	 for	 that	 belief	 to	 be	 justified.	 I	 suggest	 that	 this	 exact	 same	 mysterious	 relation	
relates:	 the	 belief	 that	 p	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 p	 when	 the	 belief	 that	 p	 is	 knowledgeable;	 a	













is	 raining.	 I	show	how	explanatory	rationalism	solves	the	problems	faced	by	other	theories.	 I	
suggest	 that	 the	 best	 theory	 of	 reasons	 is	 a	 pluralist	 theory	 of	 reason	 that	 combines	
explanatory	 rationalism	 and	 favourism;	 I	 call	 this	 theory	 ‘new	 pluralism’.	 I	 show	 how	






it	 should	 by	 allow	 for	 the	 possibility	 of	 as	many	 kinds	 of	 reason	 as	 there	 are	
reason	expressions.	 I	 say	 that	 instead	of	 distinguishing	between	psychological	
and	 anti-psychological	 theories	 we	 should	 categorise	 theories	 of	 reasons	
according	 to	 what	 they	 say,	 for	 each	 reason	 expression,	 about	 the	 relation	
between	 the	 reasons	 picked	 out	 by	 that	 expression	 and	 the	 actions	 for	which	
they	 are	 reasons.	 And	 I	 say	 that	 we	 should	 eschew	 the	 terminology	 of	
‘normative’	 and	 ‘motivating’	 reasons	 in	 our	 categorisation	 schema	and	 in	 our	
theorising,	 because,	 as	 they	 are	 standardly	 defined,	 they	 make	 substantive	
claims	about	what	it	is	to	be	a	reason	that	it	is	properly	the	business	of	a	theory	
of	 reasons	 to	 determine,	 and	 that,	 moreover,	 those	 claims	 systematically	
disadvantage	 ‘psychological’	 theories	 of	 reasons.	 To	 frame	 the	 discussion	 of	
practical	reasons	 in	terms	‘normative’	and	‘motivating’	reasons	 is,	 I	suggest,	a	
Trojan	horse	that	earnest	theorising	ought	to	reject.	
Within	 the	 domain	 of	 practical	 reasons,	 it	 is	 common	 to	 distinguish	 two	 kinds	 of	 reason:	
normative	 and	 motivating.	 It	 is	 typical1	to	 then	 categorise	 theories	 of	 reasons	 according	 to	
whether	 or	 not	 they	 take	 reasons	 of	 each	 kind	 to	 be	 (exclusively)	 features	 of	 the	 agent’s	
psychology.	If	we	say	that	a	theory	is	‘psychological’	with	respect	to	a	given	kind	of	reason	if	it	
says	 that	 a	 reason	 of	 that	 kind	 is	 always	 a	 feature	 of	 the	 agent’s	 psychology,	 and	 ‘anti-

















reasons	 from	one	another,	because:	 (i)	 it	only	allows	for	 two	kinds	of	practical	 reason,	while	
some	prominent	theories	allow	for	more;	(ii)	the	categorisation	of	theories	into	psychological	
and	 anti-psychological	 cannot	 discriminate	 between	 distinct	 anti-psychological	 theories;	 and	
(iii)	 given	 the	 way	 that	 ‘normative’	 and	 ‘motivating’	 reasons	 are	 now	 standardly	 defined,	
assuming	 that	 they	 are	 picked	 out	 by	 any	 given	 reason	 expression	 involves	 a	 theoretical	
commitment	that	at	least	some	theories	of	reasons	would	and	should	reject.	
In	criticising	this	categorisation	schema	I	mean	to	criticise	no	work	in	particular.	It	may	be	that	
the	 schema,	 so	 represented,	 is	a	 straw	man	 in	 so	 far	as	no	one	holds	 it	 in	 its	entirety	 (or	at	
least	not	 for	 the	purpose	of	sorting	different	theories	of	 reasons).	Nonetheless,	 I	 take	 it	 that	
everything	that	I	critique	is	held	by	at	least	some,	and	some	of	that	which	I	critique	is	held	by	
many	–	so,	since	my	discussion	is	of	the	constituent	parts	of	the	schema,	whether	or	not	the	























what	I	will	take	to	be	the	main	ones:	- Reasons	there	are	to	act;	- Reasons	for	and	reasons	against	acting;	- Reasons	one	has	to	act;	- One’s	reason	for	acting;	and	- Reasons	why.	






out	more	 than	one	kind	of	 reason,	but	 that	should	be	a	conclusion	of	our	 theorising,	not	an	
assumption	with	which	we	begin.	So,	since	we	have	five	different	reason	expressions,	we	have	




differ	 from	 the	 conditions	 for	 being	 a	 reason	 of	 kind	 B.	 Secondly,	 saying	 that	 there	 are	
different	kinds	of	 reason	does	not	mean	that	one	and	the	same	thing	cannot	be	a	reason	of	





wish	 to	 criticise	 in	 this	 section.	 The	 standard	 schema	 also	 makes	 assumptions	 about	 the	




there	 are	 only	 two	 kinds	 of	 reason,	 the	 standard	 schema	must	 assume	 that	 several	 of	 the	
reason	expressions	considered	pick	out	 reasons	of	 the	same	kind.	And	that	 is	 indeed	so:	 the	
standard	 schema	 typically	 assumes	 (either	 implicitly	 or	 explicitly)	 that	 the	 first	 three	 reason	
expressions	 (‘reasons	 there	are	 to	act’;	 ‘reasons	 for/against	 acting’;	 and	 ‘reasons	one	has	 to	
act’)	all	pick	out	reasons	of	one	kind,	while	the	latter	two	expressions	(‘one’s	reason	for	acting’	
and	‘reasons	why	one	acts’)	pick	out	reasons	of	the	other	kind.	
The	 standard	 schema	 may	 well	 be	 correct	 about	 the	 co-extensivity	 of	 some	 of	 these	






















5	These	 remarks	 are	 obviously	 intended	 to	 generalise	 beyond	 me	 and	 my	 swimming.	 But,	 for	 the	
avoidance	of	doubt,	 I	 take	 the	statement	 that	 ‘something	 is	 reason	there	 is	 for	A	 to	φ’	 to	be	 logically	
equivalent	 to	 ‘that	 same	 thing	 is	 a	 reason	 for	A	 to	φ’	 and	 ‘there	 is	 a	 reason	 for	A	 to	φ’.	 I	 take	 the	













are	 independent	 of	 the	 actions	 for	 which	 they	 are	 reasons:	 something	 can	 be	 a	 reason	 for	
swimming	(or	a	reason	against	swimming)	even	if	I	don’t	(or	do)	swim.		
While	 they	 differ	 in	 their	 form,	 I	 have	 grouped	 ‘reasons	 for’	 and	 ‘reasons	 against’	 because	
there	seems	to	be	a	clear	sense	in	which	their	meanings	are	inter-related	–	they	are	opposites.	
So	whatever	we	learn	about	the	kind	of	reason	picked	out	by	one	will	tell	us	something	about	
the	 kind	 picked	 out	 by	 the	 other.	 As	 is	 typical	 in	 the	 literature,	 I	 will	 mostly	 restrict	 my	
discussion	to	the	‘reasons	for’	expression.	
As	we	noted	 in	 §	1.1,	 it	 is	 typically	 assumed	 that	 ‘reasons	 there	 are	 to	 act’	 and	 ‘reasons	 for	
acting’	are	co-extensive	expressions	(it	 is	also	typical	 to	assume	that	 ‘reasons	not	to	act’	and	







																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																	
categorisation	 schema	 need	 not	 distinguish	 between	 them.	 Nonetheless,	 I	 state	 these	 assumed	
equivalences	with	a	view	to	making	my	assumptions	clear.	
6 	This	 will	 contrast	 them	 with	 those	 kinds	 of	 reason	 (introduced	 in	 §	1.5)	 whose	 reason-hood	 is	
dependent	on	the	occurrence	of	the	action	for	which	they	are	reasons,	which	I	call	‘dependent’	reasons.	




form	 of	 these	 reason	 expressions	 gives	 a	 prima	 facie	 basis	 for	 thinking	 that	 they	 pick	 out	
different	 kinds	 of	 reason.	Moreover,	 since	 I	 eventually	want	 to	 advocate	 a	 theory	 that	does	
distinguish	 between	 the	 reasons	 picked	 out	 by	 these	 expressions,	 if	 my	 theory	 is	 to	 be	







As	we	 have	 seen,	 it	 is	 typical	 to	 take	 the	 expressions	 ‘the	 reasons	 one	 has	 to	 act’	 and	 ‘the	
reasons	 there	 are	 to	 act’	 to	 be	 co-extensive.	 As	 it	 happens,	 I	 share	 this	 view,	 but	 we	




categorisation	 schema	 does)	 by	 assuming	 that	 they	 don’t.	 Secondly,	 and	more	 importantly,	
several	authors	(e.g.	Hornsby	2008;	Schroeder	2008;	Comesaña	and	McGrath	2014)	reject	the	
view	 that	 these	 expressions	 are	 co-extensive;	 and	 their	 theories	 consequently	 escape	
categorisation	within	the	standard	schema.	And	thirdly,	as	we	shall	see,	assuming	that	there	is	


















Some,	 hopefully,	 un-contentious	 equivalences:	 I	 swam	 for	 a	 reason	 if	 and	 only	 if	 something	






that	 does	 (so	 the	 equivalence	 is	 seemingly	 uncontentious)	 and	 so,	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 brevity,	 I	
assume	no	distinction	 from	the	outset.	Perhaps	 I	am	not	 following	my	own	 instruction	–	but	
my	 assumption	 is	 at	 least	 plain,	 so	 that	 those	 who	 disagree	 with	 it	 may	 revise	my	 schema	
knowing	as	much.	
While	 the	 standard	 categorisation	 schema	 draws	 no	 distinction	 between	 the	 reason	
expressions	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 three	 sections,	 it	 does,	 as	 I	 have	 noted,	 distinguish	
between	those	reason	expressions	and	‘the	agent’s	reason	for	acting’.	Now,	while	I	want	us	to	
abandon	 the	 standard	 categorisation	 schema,	 I	 agree	with	 its	 implicit	 verdict	 that	 there	 are	
unequivocal	grounds	for	differentiating	the	kinds	of	reason	picked	out	by	‘the	reason	for	which	
the	 agent	 acts’	 from	 the	 kinds	 picked	 out	 by	 the	 expressions	 already	 considered,	 which	 go	
beyond	a	mere	difference	in	form.12	What	do	I	take	those	grounds	to	be?	
Consider	this:	something	cannot	be	one’s	reason	for	φing	unless	one	φs.	That	is,	I	can’t	swim	
for	 a	 reason	unless	 I	 swim,	 so	 something	 can’t	 be	 the	 reason	 for	which	 I	 swam	unless	 I	 did	
indeed	swim.	And	this	is	true	even	if	the	action	is	in	the	future:	something	might	now	be	the	
reason	for	which	I	will	swim,	but	it	is	only	so	if	I	do	indeed	swim	(if	I	don’t	go	on	to	swim	then	it	
isn’t	 now	 the	 reason	 for	 which	 I	 will	 swim).	 So,	 unlike	 the	 reason	 expressions	 already	
considered,	the	reason-hood	of	the	reasons	picked	out	by	this	expression	are	not	independent	
																																								 																				
10	In	 particular,	 the	 story	 of	 my	 deliberative	 process	 need	 lead	 us	 to	 no	 conclusions	 about	 what	 my	
reason	for	swimming	was.	















of	 reasons	 should	 also	make	 clear	 that	 this	 expression	does	 pick	 out	 a	 reason	of	 a	different	
kind.	1.6 Reasons	why	




of	 reason	picked	out	by	 ‘the	 reason	why	someone	acts’	and	 ‘the	 reason	 for	which	 they	act.’	
Nonetheless,	the	difference	in	their	forms	still	gives	us	a	prima	facie	basis	for	distinguishing	the	
two	expressions,	and	 this	 is	despite	 the	 fact	 that	 they	both	pick	out	a	kind	of	 reason	 that	 is	
dependent	on	that	which	it	is	a	reason	for.	Moreover,	recent	scholarship	has	forcefully	made	a	






Anthony	 was	 given	 a	 posthypnotic	 suggestion	 might	 be	 a	 reason	 why	 he	 drinks	 vinegar,	
without	being	his	 reason	 for	drinking	 it,	 and	 that	 is	 so	even	 if	he	drinks	 it	 for	a	 reason.	One	
																																								 																				





‘the	 reason	 for	 which	 they	 acted’	 and,	 for	 instance,	 ‘a	 reason	 they	 had	 to	 act’	 (and,	 at	 this	 stage,	 I	






of	 reason	 picked	 out	 by	 the	 expressions	 ‘the	 reasons	 why	 one	 acted’	 and	 ‘the	 reasons	 for	
which	one	acted,’	that	goes	beyond	a	mere	difference	in	form.	
Secondly,	and	more	generally,	the	kind	of	reason	picked	out	by	the	‘reason	why’	expression	is	
different	 to	 those	picked	out	by	all	of	 the	reason	expressions	already	considered	because	 its	
relata	 are	 different.	 While	 all	 the	 reasons	 picked	 out	 by	 the	 reason	 expressions	 already	
considered	 relate	 to	actions,	a	 reason	why	 is	 related	 to	a	 fact	 (or	proposition).	 For	 instance,	
compare	 the	 relata	 of	 these	 expressions:	 ‘my	 reason	 for	 swimming’;	 and	 ‘the	 reason	why	 I	
swam’	–	while	swimming	is	an	action,	‘I	swam’	is	a	sentence.	
The	difference	 in	 relata	 is	 also	of	 some	 relevance	 to	our	 third	observation:	because	 reasons	







This	 does	 not	 mean	 ‘reasons	 why’	 never	 relate	 to	 agent-involving	 activities,	 that	 is,	 for	
instance,	it	does	not	mean	that	there	can’t	be	reasons	why	agents	do	things;	it	just	means	that	
‘reasons	 why’	 are	 not	 exclusively	 agent-involving	 (because	 they	 sometimes	 don’t	 involve	
agents).	



















I	said	that	two	kinds	of	reason	are	different	kinds	of	reason	 if,	and	only	 if,	 the	conditions	for	
being	a	reason	of	one	kind	differ	from	being	a	reason	of	the	other	kind.18		The	discussion	of	the	
previous	sections	has	established	that	there	are	at	least	three	kinds	of	reason:	independent	&	














for	 the	possibility	of	distinguishing	between	 them,	 in	 particular,	 so	 that	we	 can	discriminate	
between	already	existing	theories.19		
																																								 																				
17	Indeed,	 it	 is	 common	 to	assume	 that	 reasons	of	 the	kind	picked	out	by	 the	expression	 ‘the	agent’s	




















Theory	of	reasons	 Claim…	 Claim…	 Claim…	 Claim…	 Claim…	
Table	I-3:	A	provisional	categorisation	schema	





they	 take	 reasons	 of	 a	 given	 kind	 to	 be	 exclusively	 psychological.	 In	 doing	 so,	 however,	 this	






the	 standard	 schema	 is	 incapable	 of	 recognising	 such	 disagreement.	 That	 is,	 of	 course,	
perfectly	 fine	 so	 long	 as	 one’s	 focus	 is	 on	 psychologism	 and	 its	 discontents,	 but	 it	 becomes	
quite	 inappropriate	when	 one	wants	 to	 categorise	 theories	 of	 reasons	 from	 a	more	 general	
perspective.		
Furthermore,	 although	 there	 are	 alternatives	 to	 the	 psychological	 vs.	 anti-psychological	




mental	 states	 and	 again	 from	 those	 that	 take	 them	 to	 be	 intentional	 objects	 (that	 is,	 the	
contents	 of	 mental	 states).	 However,	 a	 strict 20 	ontology-based	 categorisation	 is	 no	 less	




exclusively	 psychological	 (indeed,	 it’s	 common	 to	 use	 ‘factualism’	 to	 name	 the	 view	 that	 reasons	 are	
facts	 that	 favour	 actions	 that	 are	 consequently	 typically	 non-psychological).	 This,	 of	 course,	 is	 not	 a	
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Alternatively,	 Lord	 (2015),	 Alvarez	 (2016a)	 and	 Way	 and	 Whiting	 (2017)	 divide	 theories	
according	to	whether	or	not	they	take	the	existence	of	a	given	kind	of	reason	to	depend	on	an	




or	 all	 of	 these	 aspects,22	but	 I	 think	 that	 such	 a	 response	 would	 be	 to	 miss	 the	 point.	 The	
problem	with	all	of	these	approaches	is	not	that	they	each	only	capture	one	aspect	of	variation	
between	theories.	Rather,	 I	suggest,	 it	 is	that	they	put	the	cart	before	the	horse	in	the	sense	
that	 they	 classify	 theories	 of	 reasons	 according	 to	 their	 stance	 on	 a	 particular	 topic,	 rather	
than	what	determines	that	stance,	which	is,	I	suggest,	what	the	theory	actually	is	about.	
To	wit,	the	answers	to	the	questions	of	whether	or	not	reasons	are	psychological,	of	what	their	
ontology	 is	 and	of	whether	or	not	 their	 existence	depends	on	an	agent’s	perspective	 are	 all	
determined	 by	 the	 answer	 to	 this,	 more	 fundamental	 question:	 for	 a	 given	 kind	 of	 reason,	
what	is	the	relation	between	reasons	of	that	kind	and	the	actions	for	which	they	are	reasons?		
Let	us	call	 this	 relation	 the	 ‘reason-relation’:	 if	 you	 think	 that	 the	 reason-relation	 for	a	given	
kind	of	reason	is	such	that	 it	can	relate	non-psychological	things	to	actions,	then	your	theory	
will	come	out	anti-psychological	for	that	kind	of	reason,	or	if	you	think	that	the	reason-relation	
for	 a	 given	 kind	 of	 reason	 is	 such	 that	 it	 is	 not	 a	 factive	 relation,	 then	 you	 will,	 perhaps,	




then	 explain	what	 the	 reason-relation	 is	 for	 each	 kind	 of	 reason.	 The	 standard	 approach	 to	





22 	For	 instance,	 one	 could	 differentiate	 between	 theories	 that	 are	 perspectivist	 &	 psychological;	
perspectivist	&	anti-psychological;	and	objectivist	&	anti-psychological.	
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discussing	 the	 merits	 of	 psychological	 vs.	 anti-psychological	 or	 perspectivist	 vs.	 objectivist	
theories),	 but	 it	 is	 not	 fine	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 actually	 categorising	 the	 different	 theories	 of	
reasons.23	To	 do	 that,	 we	 should	 put	 the	 horse	 before	 the	 cart	 and	 categorise	 theories	 of	
reasons	according	to	what	they	say	about	the	reason-relation	for	each	reason	expression.	2.1 Families	of	claims	
So	what	do	they	say?	For	any	given	reason	expression,	most	theories	of	reasons	subscribe	to	a	
view	that	belongs	 to	one	of	 three	 families:	 ‘favourism’,	 ‘deliberativism’	and	 ‘psychologism’.24	
These	three	families	do	not	exhaust	the	available	claims	about	any	given	reason	expression,25	
however,	 they	 cover,	 between	 them,	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 claims	 made	 about	 each	 reason	




















doing.	 I	 specify	 favourist	 claims	 in	 terms	 of	 ‘making,	 in	 some	 respect,	 worth	 doing’	 rather	 than	
‘favouring’	 because	 different	 interpretations	 of	 the	 ‘counting	 in	 favour	 of’	 relation	 abound	 –	 for	
instance,	Kearns	and	Star	(2008)	interpret	what	it	is	to	‘count	in	favour’	of	acting	as	‘being	evidence	that	
one	 ought	 to	 so	 act’,	 which	 is	 clearly	 different	 from	what	makes	 an	 action	 worth	 doing.	Meanwhile	










































































the	 reasons	one	has	 to	act	–	and	 to	do	so	 is	 to	say	 that	 those	expressions	pick	out	different	
kinds	of	reason.	
																																								 																				







Finally,	note	 that	 in	Table	 I-4	 there	 is	no	disagreement	between	different	 families	about	 the	






it	 is	wrong	 to	 torture	animals	 seemingly	do	not	cause	 it	 to	be	wrong	and	 the	 reasons	why	 a	
football	player	is	offside	seemingly	do	not	cause	her	to	be	offside	–	but	they	are	reasons	why	it	
is	wrong	 or	 reasons	why	 she	 is	 offside	 all	 the	 same.	 Simply	 put:	 something	 is	 a	 reason	why	
some	other	 thing	 is	 the	 case	 if	 and	only	 if	 it	 explains	 (causally	or	otherwise)	why	 that	other	
thing	is	the	case.30		
Of	course,	 there	 is	scope	for	disagreement	about	what	the	proper	account	of	explanation	 is,	
and,	 acknowledging	 that,	we	 could	 further	 analyse	 the	 ‘explains’	 relation	 itself	 –	 this	would	
create	 the	 possibility	 of	 more	 discriminating	 categorisations.	 However,	 I	 do	 not	 think	 we	
should	 seek	 to	 categorise	 theories	 of	 reasons	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 preferred	 accounts	 of	
explanation	–	that	is	just	a	separate	subject.	
None	of	 this	 is	 to	 say	 that	explanation	 is	not	 relevant	 to	 the	discussion	of	practical	 reasons;	
indeed,	some	defend	accounts	according	to	which	reason-relations	just	are	a	particular	sort	of	
explanatory	 relation.31	My	point	 is	 only	 that	we	 can	omit	 the	 ‘reasons	why’	 expression	 from	





31	For	 instance,	 Broome	 (2006)	 argues	 that	 a	 reason	 to	 act	 is	 a	 reason	 why	 someone	 ought	 to	 do	
something	(see	§	(II)3	for	further	discussion	of	this).	And	indeed,	I	will	eventually	defend	the	view	that	
practical	reasons	are	all	reasons	why	an	action	is	pro	tanto	rational.	
32 	As	 Raz	 notes:	 ‘Whatever	 one	 can	 say	 about	 [reasons	 why]	 is	 better	 explored	 when	 studying	
explanations,	a	voluminous	philosophical	subject.’	(2009,	186)	
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distinction	 between	 any	 independent	 kinds	 of	 reason,	while	 the	 third	 and	 fourth	 distinguish	
between	‘the	reasons	there	are	to	act’	and	‘the	reasons	one	has	to	act’.	
I	have	set	out	the	reason	expressions	that	are	to	be	included	in	our	categorisation	schema	and	
I	 have	 set	 out	 the	 main	 claims	 that	 different	 theories	 of	 reasons	 make	 about	 each	 reason	
expression,	as	well	as	a	(formal)	way	of	describing	theories	of	reasons	in	terms	of	these	claims.	
Using	this	framework,	in	Table	I-6,	I	categorise	different	theories	of	reasons.	
This	 categorisation	 is	 far	 from	exhaustive.33	Moreover,	 the	 theories	 of	 some	of	 the	 theorists	
that	 I	 have	 grouped	 together	 differ	 in	 some	 of	 their	 intricacies;	 more	 discriminating	
characterisations	 of	 the	 different	 families	 of	 claims	 could,	 perhaps,	 separate	 out	 those	
intricacies	–	but	that	level	of	discrimination	does	not	alter	the	main	criticisms	that	the	theories	
are	 subject	 to.34	Since	 I	 only	 need	 the	 categorisation	 to	 be	 fine-grained	 enough	 to	 sort	





also	 omitted	 Michael	 Smith	 from	 this	 categorization,	 whose	 work	 is	 typically	 associated	 with	 ‘The	



























(F,	F,	D,	D)	 Favourism	 Favourism	 Deliberativism	 Deliberativism	









according	to	what	 they	say	about	each.	We	are	now	 in	a	position	to	see	what	 is	wrong	with	
this	terminology.		
As	 I	will	 argue,	 common	definitions	 of	 these	 terms	 covertly	 import	 a	 theory	 of	 reasons	 into	
one’s	 categorisation	 schema	 that	 leaves	 little	 scope	 for	 disagreement.	 Indeed,	 I	 argue	 that,	
from	 a	 rhetorical	 standpoint,	 we	 ought	 to	 see	 these	 definitions	 less	 as	 terminological	
housekeeping	and	more	as	a	Trojan	horse	left	by	the	anti-psychologists	for	the	psychologists.	
So,	 I	 suggest,	when	working	towards	a	theory	of	reasons	 in	earnest,	we	should	abandon	this	
terminology,	at	least	as	it	is	standardly	defined.			4.1 Terminology	or	Trojan	horse?	
The	 de	 facto	 distinction	 between	 normative	 (or	 justifying)	 reasons	 and	 motivating	 (or	
explanatory)	reasons	is	probably	as	follows:	normative	reasons	explain	why	an	agent	ought	to	
do	 something	 whereas	motivating	 reasons	 explain	why	 they	 did	 it.	While	 this	 distinction	 is	
	 40	
itself	 problematic, 35 	my	 focus	 in	 this	 section	 is	 on	 the	 following,	 increasingly	 typical	
characterisations	of	these	terms36:	- For	any	p,	p	 is	 a	normative	 reason	 for	A	 to	φ	 if	 and	only	 if	p	 counts	 in	 favour	of	A’s	
φing.	- For	any	p,	p	is	A’s	motivating	reason	for	φing	only	if	p	is	something	A	took	to	count	in	
favour	of	φing.37	
These	characterisations	are	 innocuous	as	 they	are:	one	can	define	one’s	 terms	however	one	
wishes.	However,	what	makes	their	use	in	theorising	problematic	is	that	their	definitions	aren’t	
typically	restricted	to	these	innocuous	statements,	but	also	include	the	following	claims38:	- For	any	p,	p	is	a	normative	reason	for	A	to	φ	if	and	only	if	p	is	a	reason	for	A	to	φ.	- For	any	p,	p	is	a	normative	reason	for	A	to	φ	if	and	only	if	p	is	a	reason	for	A’s	φing.	- For	any	p,	p	is	a	normative	reason	for	A	to	φ	if	and	only	if	p	is	a	reason	A	has	to	φ.	- For	any	p,	p	 is	A’s	motivating	reason	for	φing	 if	and	only	 if	p	 is	a	 reason	for	which	A	
φ’d.	
I	 call	 these	 latter	 remarks	 ‘claims’	 because,	 by	 associating	 these	 terms	 also	 with	 reason	






“normative”	 reasons	–	 that	 is,	 reasons	which,	very	 roughly,	 favour	or	 justify	an	action,	as	 judged	by	a	
well-informed,	 impartial	 observer;	 and	 “motivating”	 reasons	 –	 which,	 again	 roughly,	 are	 reasons	 the	
“agent”	(that	is,	the	person	acting)	takes	to	favour	and	justify	her	action	and	that	guides	her	in	acting.’	
(Alvarez	 2016a,	 1)	 It’s	 worth	 noting	 that	 this	 is	 not	 how	motivating	 reasons	were	 always	 defined,	 in	
particular,	Michael	Smith	(1987)	has	quite	a	different	notion	in	mind,	as	Darwall	(2003)	observes	–	see	
§	(V)4	for	further	discussion	of	this	point.	
37	Note	 that	 this	 is	 only	 a	 necessary	 condition,	 not	 a	 sufficient	 one.	As	 I	 have	noted,	 it	 is	 common	 to	











correspond	 to,	 reasons	 for	 acting.	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 in	 some	 cases,	 your	 motivating	 reasons	 are,	 or	











really	 left	 to	debate	 is	 how	 to	 interpret	 the	 relation	of	 ‘counting	 in	 favour	of’,	which,	 as	we	









When	it	 is	raining	and	I	believe	that	 it	 is	raining,	what	 is	 it	 that	counts	 in	favour	of	taking	an	
umbrella	–	 is	 it	the	fact	that	 it	 is	raining	or	the	fact	that	 I	believe	that	 it	 is	raining?	The	most	
natural	interpretation	seems	to	be	that,	in	ordinary	circumstances,	it	is	the	fact	that	it	is	raining	
that	counts	in	favour	of	taking	my	umbrella,	and	not	the	fact	that	I	believe	that	it	is	raining.		
A	 classic40	sort	 of	 example	 illustrates	 this	 well:	 suppose	 that	 Sam	 believes	 that	 the	 security	




39	It’s	worth	noting	 that	because	 this	doesn’t	provide	sufficient	conditions	 for	being	an	agent’s	 reason	










taking	an	umbrella	 are	unusual	 –	 it	 is	 typically	 features	of	 the	world	 that	 count	 in	 favour	of	








going	 to	 see	 the	 doctor	 is	 that	 she	 believes	 that	 the	 security	 services	 are	 trying	 to	 read	 her	
mind.	Sam	is	deliberating	both	about	the	way	she	takes	the	world	to	be	and	the	fact	that	she	










worth	doing	(the	fact	that	 it’s	raining	doesn’t	count	 in	 favour	of	taking	my	umbrella	 if	 taking	









- For	 any	 p,	 p	 counts	 in	 favour	 of	 A’s	 φing	 if	 and	 only	 if	 p	makes	 A’s	 φing,	 in	 some	
respect,	worth	doing.44	










theory	 for	 the	 first	 three	 reason	 expressions	 just	 are	 the	 claims	 of	 favourism	 about	 those	
reason	expressions.		
So,	my	concern	is	this:	the	terminology	of	‘normative’	and	‘motivating’	reasons	amounts	to	a	
Trojan	horse	because	once	you	accept	 it,	 the	most	natural	 interpretation	of	 the	 ‘counting	 in	
favour	of’	relation	then	fixes	your	theory	for	the	first	three	reason	expressions	(that	is,	it	forces	
you	 to	 accept	 favourism	 about	 those	 reason	 expressions).	 Having	 accepted	 the	 assumed	
theory	all	that	is	left	to	debate	is	then	whether	to	endorse	favourism	or	deliberativism	about	
the	reasons	for	which	we	act	(which	are	both	consistent	with	the	final	row	of	Table	I-845).	That	
is,	what	makes	 the	 terminology	a	Trojan	horse	 is	 that	 it	 forces	many	theorists46	to	accept	an	
account	 of	 the	 reason-relation	 for	 each	 reason	 expression	 that	 puts	 them	 at	 a	 systematic	
disadvantage	 –	 the	 only	 way	 to	 advocate	 their	 theory	 is	 for	 them	 to	 adopt	 an	 unnatural	
interpretation	of	what	it	is	to	‘count	in	favour	of’	an	action.	4.3 The	Trojan	horse	rejected	
The	Trojans	ought	to	have	left	that	damned	horse	alone,	and	so	too	should	we,	if	we	are	to	do	
our	 theorising	 in	earnest.	That	 is,	 rather	 than	accommodating	different	 theories	by	adopting	
																																								 																				
44	I	 say	 this	 without	 meaning	 to	 undermine	 the	 view	 that	 the	 relation	 of	 ‘counting	 in	 favour	 of’	 is	















it.	 ‘Counts	 in	 favor	 how?’	 one	might	 ask.	 ‘By	 providing	 a	 reason	 for	 it’	 seems	 to	 be	 the	only	
answer.	(Scanlon	1998,	17)	
If	we	are	asked	what	reasons	are,	it	is	hard	to	give	a	helpful	answer.	Facts	give	us	reasons,	we	
might	 say,	when	 they	 count	 in	 favour	of	 our	having	 some	belief	 or	desire,	 or	 acting	 in	 some	
way.	But	‘counts	in	favour	of’	means	‘is	a	reason	for’.	Like	some	other	fundamental	concepts,	
such	as	 those	of	 reality,	necessity,	 and	 time,	 the	 concept	of	 a	 reason	cannot	be	explained	 in	
other	terms.	(Parfit	2001,	18)	
The	 suggestion	 is	 that	 ‘being	 a	 reason	 for’	 and	 ‘counting	 in	 favour	 of’	 are	 interchangeable	
expressions.	Now,	were	that	view	immediately	obvious	then	what	I	have	called	a	‘Trojan	horse’	
would	 be	 less	 of	 a	 covert	 assault	 on	 psychologistic	 theories	 and	more	 just	 the	 inconvenient	






















for	 now,	 however,	 is	 not	 the	 view	 that	 ‘being	 a	 reason’	 and	 ‘counting	 in	 favour	 of’	 aren’t	
interchangeable	expressions	–	but	just	that	the	view	that	they	are	is	not	immediately	obvious.	
My	argument	 is	 this:	 it	 seems	more	 likely	 that	 the	meaning	of	 ‘counting	 in	 favour	of’	 comes	
from	the	fact	that	something	is	a	reason	for	acting	than	that	it	is	a	reason	for	acting.		
The	Oxford	English	Dictionary	defines	the	‘for’	preposition	(inter	alia)	as	follows:	
	‘In	 defence	or	 support	 of;	 in	 favour	 of,	 on	 the	 side	of.	Opposed	 to	 against.’	 (‘For,	 Prep.	 and	
Conj.’,	n.d.,	7a	emphasis	added)		
Seemingly	anything	that	is	for	something,	in	this	sense	of	the	preposition,	counts	in	favour	of	
it,	 in	virtue	of	 its	being	 for	 it	 (and	not	necessarily	anything	else	about	 it).	So,	 I	 suggest,	what	
makes	a	‘reason	for	acting’	count	in	favour	of	an	action	is	the	fact	that	it	is	for	that	action	(as	
opposed	to	against	it),	and	not	the	fact	that	it	is	a	reason.	That	is,	my	claim	is	that	we	should	
not	 necessarily	 analyse	 ‘being	 a	 reason’	 as	 ‘counting	 in	 favour	 of’,	 rather	we	 have	 stronger	
reasons	for	analysing	‘being	for	something’	as	‘counting	in	favour	of	it’.	
This	 is	 made	 clearer	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 ‘for’	 preposition	 lends	 the	 meaning	 of	 ‘counts	 in	
favour	 of’	 to	 things	 other	 than	 reasons.	 For	 instance,	 I	 can	 say:	 ‘the	 factors	 for	 and	 against	
acting’;	 ‘the	 things	 for	 and	 against	 acting’;	 ‘the	 considerations	 for	 and	 against	 acting’;	 ‘what	
there	 is	 to	 be	 said	 for	 and	 against	 acting’.	Wherever	 this	 ‘for’	 appears,	we	 can	 say	 that	 the	
thing	that	precedes	 it	counts	 in	 favour	of	 that	which	 it	 is	 for,	but	 that	doesn’t	 lead	us	to	say	









favour	 of	 actions,	 and	 it	 is	 certainly	 not	 something	 that	we	 should	 assume	 at	 the	 outset	 of	
theorising.	One’s	theory	might	end	up	arguing	that	the	reason-relations	are	best	understood	in	














I	 have	 argued	 that	 the	 standard	 schema	 is	 ill-suited	 to	 the	 task	 of	 categorising	 different	
theories	 of	 reasons	 and	 I	 have	 proposed	 an	 alternative	 categorisation.	 My	 alternative	
categorisation	 distinguishes	 theories	 according	 to	what	 they	 say	 the	 reason-relation	 is	 for	 a	
number	 of	 typical	 reason	 expressions	 and	 it	 eschews	 the	 language	 of	 ‘normative’	 and	
‘motivating’	 reasons	 because	 those	 terms	 (as	 they	 are	 standardly	 defined)	 already	 involve	
substantive	theoretical	commitments.	
In	 the	next	 three	 chapters	 I	 discuss	 the	main	 critiques	of	what	 are	 typically	 taken	 to	be	 the	
strongest	 suits	 of	 each	 of	 the	 three	 families,	 namely	 (and	 I	 discuss	 them	 in	 this	 order):	
favourism	 about	 reasons	 to	 act;	 psychologism	 about	 the	 reasons	 for	 which	 we	 act;	 and	






reasons	 to	 act’	 (which	 entails	 that	 reasons	 to	 act	make	 actions	worth	 doing)	


















Given	 that	 she	 knew	 that	 safety	 was	 nearby,	 and	 given	 that	 she	 thought	 that	 a	 bear	 was	
chasing	her	 (add	that	she	wants	to	 live,	 if	you	 like),	 it	was	plainly	rational	 for	Sally	to	run,	as	
Stout	notes:		
What	can	be	accepted	without	much	difficulty	is	that	her	having	that	belief	makes	her	running	



















someone	 that	 Sally	 ran	 for	 no	 reason,	 and	 then	 add	 that,	 by	 the	way,	 she	 ran	 because	 she	





was	 chasing	 her	 has	 an	 air	 of	 contradiction	 about	 it.	 And	 the	 reason	 it	 has	 an	 air	 of	




Why	 does	 Dancy	 choose	 the	 particular	 string	 of	 adjectives	 (‘intentional,	 deliberate,	
purposeful’)	he	does?	I	think	he	is	trying	to	anticipate	an	objection	to	the	simpler	claim	that	all	






4	For	 similar	 remarks	 on	 the	 ‘naturalness’	 of	 this	 claim,	 from	philosophers	with	 different	 views	 about	
reasons	 see	Unger	 (1978,	 200),	 Alvarez	 (2010,	 13),	 Gibbons	 (2010,	 337)	 and	 Comesaña	 and	McGrath	
(2014,	61).	
	 49	
on	 a	 whim	may	 be	 done	 for	 no	 reason,	 but	 they	 aren’t	 unintentional.	 Dancy,	 quite	 rightly,	
doesn’t	want	to	us	to	think	of	such	actions	(which	O’Shaughnessy	(1980)	calls	‘sub-intentional’	



















5	Mele	 (2007,	 99)	 considers	 another	 would-be	 counterexample	 to	 claim	 that	 all	 intentional	 action	 is	
done	for	a	reason,	which	Dancy’s	wording	is	seemingly	also	designed	to	avoid.	









8	Sally’s	 circumstances	are	extreme	but	 I	 don’t	 think	 it’s	unreasonable	 to	 suggest	 that	 she	deliberates	
about	what	to	do.	She	might	be	torn,	for	instance,	over	whether	it	would	be	better	to	‘play	dead’	–	can	
she	out	run	the	bear?	One	might	well,	 I	submit,	deliberate	even	when	the	stakes	are	high	and	time	 is	
short	 –	 such	 deliberation	 need	 not	 take	 a	 long	 time,	 or	 even	 have	much	 to	 it	 (the	matter	might	 be	
straightforward)	for	one’s	action	to	be	deliberate.	
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for	 acting.	 I	 find	 it	 as	 natural	 to	 say	 this	 as	 saying	 that	 her	 reason	 for	 running	was	 that	 she	
believed	that	a	bear	was	chasing	her,	but	 it	 is	perhaps	worth	noting	that	reasons	of	this	kind	
are	 less	 commonly	 discussed	 in	 the	 literature.9	Nonetheless,	 I	 take	 this	 claim	 to	 be,	 equally,	
prima	facie	reasonable.	
2 How	reason	expressions	relate	








Denying	 this	means,	 as	 Jennifer	 Hornsby	 notes	 (albeit,	 in	 the	 process	 of	 denying	 it),	 saying	
things	like:	‘there	was	no	reason	to	do	what	he	did,	even	though	he	did	it	for	a	reason,’	(2008,	



































what	 it	 is	 to	 ‘count	 in	 favour’	of	an	action,13	so	the	problems	for	 favourism	about	reasons	to	
act	(to	be	discussed	 in	§	4)	do	not	apply	to	everyone	who	holds	the	view	that	reasons	to	act	
count	 in	 favour	 of	 actions.	 My	 aim	 in	 characterising	 the	 view	 in	 this	 way	 is	 thus	 to	 group	
together	those	theorists	(of	which	there	are	many)	who	are	susceptible	to	the	problems	that	
																																								 																				
10	Alvarez	 (2016b,	 11)	 provides	 a	 thorough	 defence	 of	 the	 intuitiveness	 of	 this	 claim.	 It	 is	 also	worth	
noting	that	I	make	no	claim	about	the	truth	or	falsity	of	the	right-to-left	reading	here.	
11	Cf.	 Dancy’s	 (2000)	 normative	 constraint,	 which	 is	 a	weaker	 version	 of	 this	 thesis.	 It	 says	 that	 if	 an	
agent	acts	for	the	reason	that	p	then	p	could	have	been	a	reason	there	was	for	them	to	act.	
12	See	Table	I-6	for	the	list	of	those	to	whom	I	attribute	this	view.	
13	For	 instance,	 Kearns	 and	 Star	 suggest	 that	 ‘a	 fact	 counts	 in	 favor	 of	φing	 just	 in	 case	 this	 fact	 is	
evidence	 that	 one	 ought	 to	 φ.’	 (2008,	 44)	 And	 Mitova	 (2016)	 also	 rejects	 the	 conventional	
interpretation,	although	she	leaves	the	work	of	developing	an	alternative	for	another	time.	I	also	think	













it.	 ‘Counts	 in	 favor	 how?’	 one	might	 ask.	 ‘By	 providing	 a	 reason	 for	 it’	 seems	 to	 be	 the	only	
answer.	(Scanlon	1998,	17)	
If	we	are	asked	what	reasons	are,	it	is	hard	to	give	a	helpful	answer.	Facts	give	us	reasons,	we	
might	 say,	when	 they	 count	 in	 favour	of	 our	having	 some	belief	 or	desire,	 or	 acting	 in	 some	
way.	But	‘counts	in	favour	of’	means	‘is	a	reason	for’.	Like	some	other	fundamental	concepts,	
such	as	 those	of	 reality,	necessity,	 and	 time,	 the	 concept	of	 a	 reason	cannot	be	explained	 in	
other	terms.	(Parfit	2001,	18)	
I	 first	discussed	these	remarks	 in	§	(I)4.4,	when	I	drew	attention	to	the	fact	that	Scanlon	and	
Parfit	 take	 the	 ‘counting	 in	 favour	 of’	 relation	 and	 the	 ‘being	 a	 reason	 to’	 relation	 to	 be	
equivalent.	 This	 is	 something	 they	 have	 in	 common	 with,	 I	 think,	 everyone	 who	 endorses	
favourism	 about	 reasons	 to	 act.	 But	 another	 observation	 that	 we	 can	 make	 about	 these	
remarks,	 and	one	which,	 as	we	 shall	 see,	 separates	 Scanlon	 and	Parfit	 from	 some	others	 to	
















demands,	 etc.	 φing.	 But	 the	 question	 arises	 why	 a	 reason	 for	 φing	 favours,	 warrants,	 or	
demands	φing?	 I	 suggested	 that	 the	answer	 to	 this	question	 is	 that	a	 reason	 for	φing	makes	
φing	right	or	appropriate	(sometimes	merely	pro	tanto	right	or	appropriate).	(Alvarez	2010,	12–
13	emphasis	added)	
When	we	 think	 of	 such	 reasons,	 we	 think	 of	 features	 that	 speak	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 action	 (or	
against	 it)…	 they	make	 actions	 right	 or	 wrong,	 sensible	 or	 unwise.	 (Dancy	 2000,	 1	 emphasis	
added)	
I	think	that	it	is	natural	to	interpret	the	‘making’	relations	invoked	here	(reasons	make	actions	
valuable,	 right,	 sensible…)	 as	 explanatory	 relations.	 I	 find	 it	 odd	 to	 think	 that	 some	 x	 could	
make	some	y	an	F	without	(at	least	partly)	explaining	why	it	is	an	F,	so	I	likewise	find	it	odd	to	
think	 that	 some	 reason	 could	 make	 some	 action	 right	 or	 valuable	 without	 (at	 least	 partly)	
explaining	 why	 it	 was	 right	 or	 valuable.	 Thus,	 I	 take	 accounts	 that	 say	 that	 reasons	 make	
actions	 right,	 valuable	 or	 good	 to	 be,	 albeit	 implicitly,	 of	 the	 same	 explanatory	 view	 as	
Broome.14	If	they	aren’t	then	there	is	perhaps	a	third	way	of	arriving	at	what	is	ultimately	the	
same	conclusion.	
What	is	that	conclusion?	I	think	we	can	put	it,15	as	I	did	in	hopefully	un-contentiously,	thus:		- For	 any	 p,	 p	 counts	 in	 favour	 of	A’s	φing	 if	 and	 only	 if	A’s	 φing	 is,	 in	 some	 respect,	
worth	doing.	
Given	 the	 presumed	 equivalence	 of	 ‘being	 a	 reason	 to’	 and	 ‘counting	 in	 favour	 of’	 amongst	
advocates	of	 favourism	about	reasons	to	act,	we	thus	arrive	at	 the	view,	set	out	above,	 that	
there	 is	a	reason	for	an	agent	to	φ	 if,	and	only	 if,	φing	 is,	 in	some	respect,	 ‘worth	doing’	 for	
that	agent.	But	what	does	it	mean	to	be	for	an	act	to	be,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing?		3.2 What	it	is	for	an	act	to	be,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing	
I	 say	 ‘in	 some	 respect’	worth	doing,	because	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	 something	 that	 counts	 in	
favour	 of	 doing	 an	 action	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 it	 is,	 all	 things	 considered	 worth	 doing.	 For	





14	To	 the	 extent	 that	 ‘in	 virtue	 of’	 relation	 is	 an	 explanatory	 relation,	 Raz	 (perhaps	 against	 his	 own	









An	 important	 point	 to	 take	 from	 the	 last	 remark	 is	 this:	 whether	 or	 not	 an	 action	 is	 worth	
doing	(in	some	respect,	or	all	things	considered)	for	some	agent	is	an	objective	matter	of	fact	
that	 is,	 in	particular,	 independent	of	 their	perspective.	 So	an	action	 is	 still	worth	doing	 if	 an	
agent	 is	 ignorant	of	 the	 fact	 that	 it’s	worth	doing.	 For	 instance:	 it’s	worth	 taking	 a	 different	
route	home	if	there’s	traffic	on	one’s	usual	route	–	and	that’s	worth	doing	even	if	one	thinks	




the	way	 the	world	 is	 that	matters	 to	 whether	 or	 not	 some	 action	 is	 worth	 doing	 for	 some	
agent,19	not	the	way	she	takes	it	to	be.		3.3 Favourism	about	reasons	to	act	
So	far	I’ve	said	that,	according	to	this	view,	there	is	a	reason	to	act	if	and	only	if	an	action	is,	in	
some	respect,	worth	doing,	and	 I’ve	explained	what	 it	 is	 for	an	action	to	be	worth	doing.	All	
those	authors	 to	whom	I	attribute	 favourism	about	reasons	to	act	would,	 I	 think,	agree	with	
those	remarks.		
Where	my	 characterisation	 of	 favourism	 about	 reasons	 to	 act	 strays	 into	 the	 contentious	 is	
that	 it	 goes	beyond	 these	 remarks	 to	 claim	 that	 reasons	are	actually	what	makes	 the	action	
worth	doing.	This	may	be	unpalatable	to	those	who	take	the	‘counts	in	favour	of’	relation	to	be	
primitive.	 For	 those	 that	 do	 balk	 at	 it	 I	 am	 happy	 for	 them	 to	 shrug	 it	 off	 (along	 with	 my	
																																								 																				
16 	Alvarez	 gives	 what	 she	 describes	 as	 a	 ‘rough’	 characterisation,	 which,	 to	 my	 mind,	 is	 a	 neat	
representation	of	many	of	the	different	views.	She	notes	that	for	there	to	be	a	fact	that	favours	an	agent	
doing	 some	action	 that	 ‘requires	 their	having	 some	motivation	 that	would	be	 served	by	acting	 in	 the	





























This	 observation,	 combined	with	 the	prima	 facie	 reasonable	 claims	 set	 out	 above,	 results	 in	
three	 distinct	 problems	 for	 the	 favourist	 view:	 The	 Rational	 Action	 Problem;	 The	Deliberate	
Action	Problem;	and	The	Psychological	Reason	Problem	(for	Favourism).	4.1 The	Rational	Action	Problem	
The	Rational	Action	Problem	is	this:	it	is	rational	for	Sally	to	run,	so	she	has	a	reason	to	run,	so	





































her	 (as	set	out	 in	§	(I)4.2).	My	point	 is	 that	when	we	start	our	 investigation	of	what	 reasons	are	 from	






The	Experiential	Reason	Problem	(for	Favourism)	 is	 this:	Sally’s	 reason	 for	 running	was,	 inter	
alia,	that	she	heard	a	bear-like	sound,	so	that	was	a	reason	for	her	to	run,	so	her	running	was,	






















case,	 her	 belief	 that	 a	 bear	 is	 chasing	 her	would	make	 running	 (in	 some	 respect)	worth	 doing.	Why?	
Because,	given	that	she	believes	that	a	bear	is	chasing	her,	if	she	doesn’t	run	she’ll	have	a	heart	attack.	

















(F6)	 Sally’s	 reason	 for	 running	 was,	 inter	 alia,	 that	 she	 heard	 a	 bear-like	
sound.		
OR:	
(F9)	 For	any	p,	 if	A	φs	 for	 the	reason	that	p	 then	p	was	a	 reason	 for	A	 to	
φ.27	
For	 reference,	 here	 is	 a	 very	 much	 non-exhaustive	 account	 of	 which	 of	 these	 prima	 facie	
reasonable	claims	some	different	proponents	of	favourism	about	reasons	to	act	reject	(where:	
û	=	rejects):	
	 Group	1	 Group	2	 Group	3	
	 (F2)	 (F8)	 (F3)	 (F7)	 (F5)&(F6)	 (F9)	
The	Received	View	 û	 	 	 û	 	 û	
Stout	(2009),	Alvarez	(2010),	Parfit	(2011),	
Littlejohn	(2012)	 û	 	 û	 	 û	 	
Hornsby	(2008)28	 	 û	 	 û	 û	 	
Schroeder	(2008),	Comesaña	&	McGrath	(2014)	 	 û	 	 û	 û	 û	




Action	 Problem,	 and	 The	 Psychological	 Reason	 Problem	 (for	 Favourism)	 &	 The	 Experiential	 Reason	
Problem	(for	Favourism),	respectively.	




false	 it	 could	 not	 have	 been	 a	 reason	 for	 anyone	 to	 act	 because	 falsehoods	 don’t	 count	 in	 favour	 of	
anything	(that	is	not	to	say	that	negations	don’t	favour	anything	–	negations	are	facts	that	favour	some	
things,	but	falsehoods	aren’t	facts	at	all).	Hornsby’s	earlier	view	is	thus	more	closely	aligned	to	the	views	
of	Schroeder	(2008)	and	Comesaña	&	McGrath	(2014).	However	 in	her	 later	work	she	suggests	that	 ‘a	
condition	of	φing	for	the	reason	that	p,	when	one	believes	that	p,	is	that	one	knows	that	p.’	(2008,	251)	I	








to	 why	 it	 is	 acceptable	 to	 reject	 these	 prima	 facie	 reasonable	 claims.	 For	 instance,	 Alvarez	
(2010,	142)	defends	her	rejection	of	(F3)	by	noting	that	when	an	agent	acts	on	a	false	belief	we	
might	well	say	that	they	act	for	no	reason	–	someone	who	is	running	to	catch	a	train	might	say,	




meant	 to	 be	 understood	 appositionally,	 in	 a	manner	 that	 only	 qualifies	what	 is	 said,	 rather	
than	changing	the	meaning	of	it.		
I	 am	not	 seeking	 to	 refute	 these	arguments	here.	My	point	 is	 not	 that	 these	arguments	 are	






The	 purpose	 of	 this	 chapter	 was	 to	 show	 the	 costs	 involved	 in	 accepting	 favourism	 about	
























The	 purpose	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 set	 out	 a	 number	 of	 prima	 facie	 reasonable	 claims	 that	
psychologism	 about	 the	 reasons	 for	 which	 we	 act	 must	 reject.2	This	 is	 not	 meant	 to	 be	 a	
conclusive	 argument	 against	 that	 view	 –	 it	 is	 only	 meant	 to	 show	 that	 accepting	 this	 view	
comes	at	some	cost.		
1 Some	prima	facie	reasonable	claims	1.1 My	reason	for	congratulating	my	friend	
I’ve	 already	 stated	my	 first	prima	 facie	 reasonable	 claim,	 but	 it’s	worth	 re-iterating;	when	 I	
read	in	a	newspaper	of	record	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	and	I	consequently	call	her	up	
to	congratulate	her,	it	is	natural	to	say	that:	

































I	 take	 this	 to	be	an	 intuitive	view,	and	 it	provides	us	with	 the	basis	 for	our	next	prima	 facie	
reasonable	claim:	
																																								 																				
3	Markovits’	 original	 says	 ‘the	 right	 (motivating)	 reasons’	 –	 I	 omit	 the	 parenthetical	 terminological	















help	the	environment.	Likewise,	 it	 is	 right	 for	 Jonathan	to	come	to	the	woman’s	aid	because	
she	is	in	trouble,	and	that	would	be	so	even	if	he	had	no	idea	that	she	was	in	trouble.6	
Of	 course,	 sometimes	 features	 of	 our	 psychology	 might	 enter	 into	 the	 fray	 as	 moral	







However,	 it’s	 also	 quite	 possible	 that	 Jonathan’s	 act	 is	 made	 right	 only	 by	 the	 objective	
features	of	the	situation.	Even	if	you	think	that	just	believing	that	she	is	in	trouble	could	make	






5	This	 is	 entailed	 by	Markovits’	 bi-conditional.	 I	 use	 the	 weaker	 claim	 because	 it	 is	 sufficient	 for	 my	
purposes.	
6	I’m	 not	 doing	 an	 analysis	 of	 what	 it	 is	 for	 an	 action	 to	 be	 ‘right’	 and	 certainly	 not	 of	 what	 ‘ought’	
means.	Even	if	there	is	an	ambiguity	between	objective	and	subjective	‘ought’	claims,	I	think	there	is	a	










going	 to	 suppose	 that	 Jonathan	 is	 in	a	 situation	such	 that	 it	 is	only	objective	 features	of	 the	
circumstance	that	make	his	action	right.	I	take	it	as	a	given	that	that	is	at	least	possible	even	if	
it	is	also	possible	that	features	of	his	psychology	could	make	his	action	right.	












What	makes	congratulating	my	 friend	an	act	 that	 is,	 for	me,	worth	doing?	 It	 seems	that	 it	 is	










A	 note	 on	 ‘could’:	 what	 is	 the	modal	 concept	 we	 are	 working	 with	 here?	 I	 think	 there	 are	
intuitive	grounds	 for	a	quite	 restrictive	one,	however,	 all	 that	 I	 need	 for	 the	purpose	of	 this	






seemingly,	 only	when	 you	 do	 something	 for	 reasons	 that	 actually	make	 it	worth	 doing	 that	
you,	‘do	the	right	action	for	the	right	reason.’	(Lord	2008,	2)	Indeed,	the	very	idea	of	acting	‘for	










Davidson’s	 ‘Actions,	 Reasons	 and	Causes’	 (2001a)	 is	 probably	 the	progenitor	 of	 this	 view.	 In	
addition,	I	think	that	this	claim	(or	something	sufficiently	similar	to	it)	is	also	advocated	by	Turri	
(2009),	 Gibbons	 (2010)	 and	Mitova	 (2015,	 2016)	 (although	 they	 don’t	 articulate	 it	 in	 these	








for	 granted	 –	 but	 someone	who	 rejects	 that	 view	 can	 satisfy	Williams’s	 claim	without	 difficulty.	 (P9)	
entails	Williams’	 claim	 (given	 favourism	 about	 reasons	 to	 act),	 while	 providing	 a	 claim	 that	 one	who	
rejects	 the	 latter	will	 still	 also	have	 to	 reject	 in	order	 to	endorse	psychologism	about	 the	 reasons	 for	
which	we	act	(see	§	3.2).	
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Why	 would	 anyone	 hold	 this	 view?	 I	 think	 that	 most	 philosophers	 who	 endorse	 it	 do	 so	
because	they,	either	implicitly	or	explicitly,	think	that	an	agent’s	reason	for	acting	must	make	










I	 present	 three	 problems	 for	 (PSY):	 The	 Moral	 Worthiness	 Problem;	 The	 Right	 Reasons	
Problem;	and	The	Non-Psychological	Reason	Problem.	3.1 The	Moral	Worthiness	Problem	
The	 Moral	 Worthiness	 Problem	 is	 this:	 Jonathan’s	 act	 of	 helping	 the	 woman	 was	 morally	
worthy,	so	he	did	it	for	reasons	that	made	it	right,	so	features	of	his	psychology	made	it	right,	

















The	 Right	 Reasons	 Problem	 is	 this:	 the	 fact	 that	 my	 friend	 has	 won	 an	 award	 makes	
congratulating	 her	 worth	 doing,	 so	 it’s	 logically	 possible	 for	me	 to	 congratulate	 her	 for	 the	







The	Non-Psychological	 Reason	 Problem	 is	 this:	my	 reason	 for	 congratulating	my	 friend	was,	
inter	alia,	that	she	had	won	an	award,	so	that	must	have	been	a	feature	of	my	psychology,	but	
it	isn’t!	Explicitly,	the	following	claims	are	mutually	inconsistent:	




The	Experiential	Reason	Problem	(for	Psychologism)	 is	 this:	my	 reason	 for	congratulating	my	













We	 constructed	 the	 Jonathan	 example	 so	 as	 to	 ensure	 the	 truth	 of	 (P7)	 (the	 claim	 that	 no	
features	 of	 Jonathan’s	 psychology	 made	 his	 act	 right),	 so	 unless	 one	 wants	 to	 change	 the	
concept	of	 ‘making	right’,	 to	a	different	one	to	that	which	 I	am	using,	one	cannot	reject	(P7)	
(and	 if	 one	were	 to	 change	 the	 concept,	 that	would	obviously	 just	be	a	new	 (perhaps	more	
solvable)	 problem,	 it	 would	 not	 be	 a	 solution	 to	 the	 problem	 I	 am	 posing).	 Similar	 remarks	
count	against	rejecting	(P8).		
What	 about	 (P5)	 (the	 claim	 that	 Jonathan’s	 act	 is	morally	worthy)?	 Endorsing	 some	 form	of	
moral	anti-realism	could	allow	one	to	claim	that	no	acts	are	morally	worthy,	so	that	Jonathan’s	
act	isn’t	either,	thereby	rejecting	(P5).	This	avoids	having	to	reject	(P6),	but	only	by	trivialising	
it	 –	 it	 is	 true	only	because	 the	antecedent	 is	never	 satisfied	–	 so	 I	 think	 that	 a	 strategy	 that	
rejects	(P5)	is	at	least	as	prima	facie	implausible	as	just	rejecting	(P6).	
So,	 leaving	 aside	 the	 possibility	 of	 rejecting	 (P5),	 there	 are	 no	 choices	 for	 the	 proponent	 of	
psychologism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act;	they	must	reject	all	of	the	following	prima	
facie	reasonable	claims:	
















reason	 that	 makes	 it	 worth	 doing.16 	Alternatively,	 perhaps	 one	 could	 construct	 counter-
examples	to	(P6).17	






As	with	 the	previous	 chapter’s	discussion	of	 favourism	about	 reasons	 to	act,	 the	purpose	of	










will	be	admired	 for	having	done	so	 is	nonetheless	morally	worthy.	 I	would	disagree,	as,	 I	 think,	many	
others	would.	Ultimately,	 I	 think,	whether	or	not	one	rejects	 it	depends	upon	whether	or	not	one	 is	a	






the	 content	 of	 the	belief	 they	acted	on.	 I	 show	how	 ‘deliberativism	about	 the	












‘being	 a	 reason’	 is	 a	 seemingly	 factive	 property,	 that	 one’s	 reasons	 for	 acting	 explain	 one’s	
actions	 and	 that	 even	 when	 the	 considerations	 in	 light	 of	 which	 one	 acts	 are	 true,	 we	 are	
sometimes	reluctant	to	call	them	the	agent’s	reasons	for	acting.	
1 Some	prima	facie	reasonable	claims	about	reasons	1.1 The	factivity	of	reasons	
If	Sally	 is	 running	because	she	mistakenly	 thinks	 that	a	bear	 is	chasing	her,	we	don’t	 tend	to	
say,	 ‘her	reason	for	running	 is	 that	a	bear	 is	chasing	her,	even	though	one	 isn’t’.	One	reason	











and	 require	 this	 special	 interpretation	 are	 arguably	 explained	 by	 the	 thought	 that	 both	 ‘the	
reason	that’	and	‘the	fact	that’	are	factive	operators.		(Alvarez	2016b,	8)2	








We	can	explain	an	agent’s	action	by	giving	 their	 reason	 for	acting.	Moreover,	 it	 is	 seemingly	
natural	to	think	that	when	we	so	explain	an	agent’s	action,	 it	 is	the	agent’s	reason	for	acting	












A	 fairly	 standard	way	 of	 linking	 reasons	 for	 action	 and	 explanations	 of	 action…	 is	 that	when	
someone	acts	for	a	reason	then	their	reason	for	acting	that	way	explains	their	acting	that	way.	
(Stout	2009,	57	emphasis	added)	
When	 there	 is	 a	 reason	 for	 which	 an	 agent	 acted	 then	 that	 reason	 explains	 (features	 in	 an	
explanation	of)	that	action.	(Raz	2011,	14)	
																																								 																				









Consider	 the	 following	 statements:	 I	 took	 my	 umbrella	 because	 it	 was	 raining,	 although	 it	
wasn’t	raining.	The	reason	why	the	window	broke	was	that	a	brick	struck	 it,	although	a	brick	
didn’t	 strike	 it.	 That	 it’s	 unfair	 explains	why	 it’s	wrong,	 although	 it’s	 not	 unfair.	 All	 of	 these	
statements	sound	strange	to	the	point	of	unintelligibility.	What	makes	them	sound	strange	is	
that	explanatory	relations	(whether	causal	or	non-causal)	are	seemingly	factive	relations	(and	
that	 is	 so	whether	 they	are	picked	out	by	 ‘because’,	 ‘explains’	or	 ‘reason	why’)	–	 something	
cannot	explain	unless	it	is	true.		





this	discussion	because,	when	an	agent’s	 justified	belief	 is	 true	by	happy	accident,	what	 the	





that	 the	 ice	 there	was	thin	despite	having	no	view	about	whether	or	not	 it	actually	was	thin.	
Edmund,	then,	did	not	keep	to	the	edge	because	the	 ice	 in	the	middle	was	thin.	Suppose	now	
that,	 as	 it	 happened,	 the	 ice	 in	 the	middle	 of	 the	 pond	was	 thin.	 This	makes	 no	 difference.	
Edmund	still	didn’t	keep	to	 the	edge	because	the	 ice	was	 thin.	The	 fact	 that	 the	 ice	was	 thin	
does	not	explain	Edmund’s	acting,	even	though	Edmund	did	believe	that	it	was	thin,	and	even	
though	 the	 fact	 that	 it	was	 thin	 actually	was	 a	 reason	 for	 him	 to	 stay	 at	 the	 edge.	 (Hornsby	
2007,	251	emphasis	added)	
I	 think	 Hornsby’s	 claim	 is	 intuitive:	 there	 is	 no	 sense	 in	 which	 Edmund’s	 action	 was	 the	
consequence	of	the	ice	being	thin,	and,	indeed,	the	ice	could	have	been	thick	in	the	middle	of	
























So,	 a	 condition	 on	 something’s	 being	 a	 consideration	 in	 light	 of	 which	 one	 acts	 is	 that	 one	































favour	 running	 (that	 is,	 to	 make	 running,	 in	 some	 respect,	 worth	 doing)?	Well,	 Sally	 heard	
something	 that	 sounded	 like	a	bear,	and	her	 thought	process,	albeit	a	quick	one,	must	have	
been	something	like:	‘A	bear’s	coming!	The	safe-house	is	nearby	–	I	can	make	it.	 I	had	better	
run!’	 So,	 amongst	 the	 considerations	 that	 Sally	 took	 to	 favour	 running	was	 that	 a	 bear	was	









5	The	 natural	 interpretation	 of	 ‘as	 a	 result’	 here	 is	 an	 explanatory	 one	 –	 but	 I	 want	 to	 avoid	 such	 a	
commitment	 since	 some	 (e.g.	 Dancy	 2000)	 don’t	 think	 the	 ‘taking’	 is	 explanatory,	 but	 is	 merely	 an	
‘enabling	condition’	for	the	action.	
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This	 is	 a	 noteworthy	 upshot	 of	 the	 deliberative	 account:	 an	 agent	 can	 act	 in	 light	 of	 a	
consideration	that	was	false.	And	this	 is	what	Sally	does:	Sally	 takes	 that	a	bear	was	chasing	
her	to	favour	her	action,	and	acts	in	the	light	of	that	consideration.	
(D5) A	consideration	in	light	of	which	Sally	ran	was	that	a	bear	was	chasing	her.	
Was	 the	 fact	 that	 she	believed	 that	a	bear	was	chasing	her	a	consideration	 in	 light	of	which	
Sally	ran?	 It	was	not.	Sally	does	not	think	to	herself:	 ‘Hmmm,	 I	believe	that	a	bear	 is	chasing	
me.	That	I	believe	that	a	bear	is	chasing	me	makes	running	worth	doing	(regardless	of	whether	
or	not	a	bear	 is	chasing	me…),	so	 I	had	better	do	 it.’	 It	would	be	odd	for	Sally	 to	reason	this	




services	are	 trying	 to	 read	her	mind	 to	 favour	wearing	a	 foil	hat	 (she	 takes	 it	 to	be,	 in	 some	






Sally	 thought	 that	merely	 believing	 that	 a	 bear	was	 chasing	 her	would	make	 running	worth	
doing	regardless	of	whether	or	not	a	bear	was	chasing	her,	then	it	could	be	a	consideration	in	
light	 of	 which	 she	 runs.	 But,	 ex	 hypothesi,	 that	 isn’t	 what	 Sally	 thinks,	 what	 Sally	 takes	 to	
favour	running	is	that	a	bear	is	chasing	her	(even	though	no	bear	is	actually	chasing	her)	–	Sally	
is	 just	 mistaken	 about	 what	 makes	 running	 worth	 doing,	 because	 nothing	 makes	 it	 worth	
doing.		
The	point	is	that	we	should	not	infer	from	the	fact	that	Sally	runs	because	she	believes	that	a	







There	must	 be	 a	 bear	 coming!	 I	 had	 better	 run!’	 Her	 reasoning	might	 go	 like	 that.	 But	 that	
doesn’t	make	hearing	a	bear-like	sound	something	she	took	to	favour	running.		
Why	 not?	 Because	 she	 doesn’t	 think	 that	 hearing	 a	 bear-like	 sound	 makes	 running	 worth	
doing.	Sally	doesn’t	think:	‘if	I	hear	a	bear-like	sound	I	should	run,	regardless	of	whether	or	not	
a	 bear	 is	 chasing	 me.’	 Hearing	 a	 bear-like	 sound	 is	 what	 makes	 her	 believe	 that	 a	 bear	 is	












reasoning	 went,	 the	 things	 that	 Edmund	 took	 to	 favour	 his	 action,	 and	 which	 made	 the	







What	 follows	 are	 four	 distinct	 problems	 for	 the	 deliberative	 account:	 The	 False	 Reasons	
































(D4)	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 ice	 was	 thin	 does	 not	 explain	 why	 Edmund	 stayed	 by	 the	
edge	of	the	lake.	4.4 The	Psychological	Reason	Problem	(for	Deliberativism)	
The	Psychological	Reason	Problem	(for	Deliberativism)	 is	 this:	Sally’s	 reason	 for	 running	was,	

















What	 can	 the	 proponent	 of	 this	 account	 do?	 Rejecting	 (D9)	 is	 not	 an	 option:	 a	 bear	wasn’t	
chasing	Sally	–	that	much	we	know	for	sure.	Rejecting	any	of	(D5),	(D6),	(D7)	or	(D8)	(the	claims	
																																								 																				
6	This	argument	 is	often	 (e.g.	Dancy	2000,	124–25;	Alvarez	2016b,	9)	used	by	proponents	of	 (DEL2)	 to	
argue	against	the	idea	that	Sally’s	reason	for	running	was	that	she	believed	that	a	bear	was	chasing	her.	






















of	 their	prima	 facie	 reasonableness,	 nonetheless	 false.	 For	 instance,	Dancy	(2000)	 suggested	
that	rejecting	(D3),	and	insisting	that	there	is	such	a	thing	as	non-factive	explanation,	might	be	
the	appropriate	response	to	The	Explanatory	Reasons	Problem.	This	view	has	proved	to	be	less	




strategy	 for	 doing	 so	 appears	 to	 be	 this:	 given	 that	 an	 agent’s	 reason	 for	 acting	 is	 an	












explaining,	 so	 (D2)	 can’t	be	 true.	 The	problem,	 it	 seems	 to	me,	 is	 that	 this	 line	of	 argument	
reasons	 to	 its	 conclusion	 by	 taking	 (DEL1)	 as	 given,	 when	 that	 is	 precisely	 what	 is	 in	
contention.16		
Nonetheless,	as	with	the	previous	discussions,	what	 is	at	 issue	here	 is	not	whether	or	not	an	
argument	can	be	given	that	makes	rejecting	(D2)	(and	(F5),	(F6)	and	(D1))	tolerable,	my	point	is	
just	 that	 it	 counts	 against	 deliberativism	 about	 the	 reasons	 for	 which	 we	 act	 that	 such	 an	




This	 chapter	 has	 shown	 that	 the	 deliberative	 account	 must	 reject	 a	 number	 of	 prima	 facie	
reasonable	 claims,	 as	 previous	 chapters	 did	 for	 favourism	 about	 reasons	 to	 act	 and	
psychologism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act.	The	next	chapter	considers	whether	or	not	











one	 sense,	 and	 I	 show	 how	 we	 can	 accommodate	 theories	 of	 reasons	 that	
accept	that	idea,	i.e.	pluralist	theories	of	reasons,	in	our	categorisation	schema.	
I	 discuss	 some	 examples	 of	 pluralist	 theories	 from	 the	 literature.	 I	 show	 how	
pluralist	 theories	 can	 solve	 some	 of	 the	 problems	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	
chapters.	 I	 explain	why	pluralism	 is	 not,	 however,	 enough,	 and	 I	 suggest	 that	
our	investigation	should	go	beyond	favourism,	psychologism	and	deliberativism.		
The	previous	three	chapters	set	out	some	of	the	main	problems	for	the	most	popular	claims	
from	 each	 of	 the	 three	 families	 of	 claims	 about	 reasons.	 In	 doing	 so	 they	 painted	 a	 bleak	
picture	 of	 contemporary	 theories	 of	 reasons;	 as	 Dancy	 notes	 (paraphrasing	 Aristotle)	 the	




noted	 in	 §	(I)1)	 all	 assumed	 that	 a	 given	 reason	 expression	 always	 picks	 out	 reasons	 of	 the	
same	 kind.	 Homonyms,	 I	 said,	 are	 the	 exception	 and	 not	 the	 rule.	 But	 what	 if	 reason	
expressions	 are	 homonyms	 of	 some	 sort,	 picking	 out	 kinds	 of	 things	 that	 are	 confusingly	
similar,	 but	 nonetheless	 distinct?	 Perhaps,	 that	 is,	 there	 is	 a	 sense	 in	which	 Sally	 runs	 for	 a	
reason	 and	 a	 sense	 in	which	 she	doesn’t	 run	 for	 a	 reason	 (or	 runs	 for	 no	 reason).	 Similarly,	
perhaps	 if	there	 is	no	milk	at	home	but	 I	believe	that	there	 is,	then	there	 is	a	sense	 in	which	
there	is	no	reason	for	me	to	buy	milk	and	a	sense	in	which	there	is	a	reason	for	me	to	buy	milk.	
Perhaps,	 the	 same	 reason	 expression	 can	 have	 different	 senses;	 perhaps,	 that	 is,	 the	 same	
reason	expression	can	be	used	to	pick	out	different	kinds	of	reason.	
A	 theory	 that	 admits	 that	 a	 single	 reason	 expression	 can	 have	 different	 senses	 is	 a	pluralist	
theory	of	reasons.	The	purpose	of	this	chapter	is	to	explain	what	pluralist	theories	of	reasons	
are,	why	one	would	adopt	pluralism,	and	to	show	that	even	 if	we	adopt	a	pluralist	theory	of	









kind	 of	 reason.	Now,	 I	 am	 allowing	 that	 the	 same	 reason	 expression	may	 pick	 out	different	


















1	I	 haven’t	 considered	 any	 disjunctive	 conditions	 for	 being	 a	 reason	 (I	 am	not	 convinced	 that	 anyone	
holds	what	I	would	call	a	disjunctive	theory).	However,	we	would	have	a	disjunctive	claim	about	reasons	
to	act	 if,	for	 instance,	we	said:	 ‘p	 is	a	reason	for	A	to	φ	 if	and	only	if	either	p	makes	A’s	φing,	 in	some	
respect,	worth	 doing	 or	 A	 takes	p	 to	make	 A’s	 φing,	 in	 some	 respect,	worth	 doing.’	 This	would	 be	 a	



















Recall	 that	 a	 reason	 expression	 only	 picks	 out	 different	 kinds	 of	 reason	 if	 the	 conditions	
between	different	senses	of	the	expression	differ	(if	they	don’t	then	the	‘different’	senses	both	
pick	out	the	same	kinds	of	reason,	in	which	case	there	is	really	only	one	sense).	So,	a	univocal	
theory	 is	 represented	 in	Table	V-1	by	providing	 the	 same	 conditions	under	both	 senses.	 For	









reason	under	each	 ‘sense’	 in	 the	 categorisation	 schema	are	 the	 same.	We	can	enrich	our	4-
tuple	 descriptions	 to	 represent	 the	 possibility	 of	 theories	 with	 multiple	 senses	 of	 a	 given	
reason	expression	by	introducing	a	‘/’	to	denote	alternate	senses.	So:	(F,	F,	F,	P)	≡	(F/F,	F/F,	F/F,	
P/P).		
Now,	 in	 contrast	 to	 this	univocal	 theory,	 a	pluralist	 theory	of	 reasons	 is	any	 theory	 that,	 for	













that	 anyone	 advocates	 –	 I	 use	 it	 only	 to	 indicate	 what	 a	 pluralist	 theory	 looks	 like	 in	 this	
schema.	This	theory	is	pluralist	with	respect	to	reasons	there	are	to	act;	it	takes	‘a	reason	there	







about	my	 lack	of	milk	 is	 to	distinguish	between	objective	and	subjective	kinds	of	reason	(e.g.	
Stoutland	2007;	Schroeder	2007;	Markovits	2011;	Vogelstein	2012;	Whiting	2014).	An	objective	
reason	 is	something	that	 (in	my	parlance)	makes	one’s	action,	 in	some	respect,	worth	doing,	
whereas	a	subjective	reason	is	something	that	(again,	in	my	parlance)	the	agent	took	to	make	
their	action,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing.4		
So,	 to	 give	 some	 examples,	 what	 Sally	 takes	 to	 make	 running	 worth	 doing	 (that	 a	 bear	 is	
chasing	her)	 is	a	subjective	 reason	 for	her	 to	 run	but	not	an	objective	 reason	 for	her	 to	 run.	
And,	 in	 contrast,	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 am	 out	 of	 milk	 is	 an	 objective	 reason	 for	 me	 to	 buy	more	
(because	 it	 makes	 it,	 in	 some	 respect,	 worth	 doing)	 but	 not	 a	 subjective	 reason	 (because	 I	
believe	that	I	have	plenty	–	I	don’t	take	anything	to	make	buying	milk,	in	some	respect,	worth	
doing).	If,	on	the	other	hand,	it	is	raining	and	I	believe	that	it	is	raining	then	the	fact	that	it	is	
raining	 is	 both	 an	 objective	 reason	 and	 a	 subjective	 reason	 for	 me	 to	 take	 my	 umbrella	
																																								 																				





It	 should	 perhaps	 be	 clear	 that,	 given	 these	 definitions,	 an	 objective	 reason	 is	 the	 kind	 of	
reason	 that	 favourists	 take	 reason	 expressions	 to	 pick	 out	 (i.e.	 the	 sort	 of	 thing	 that	makes	
actions,	 in	 some	 respect,	 worth	 doing),	 and	 a	 subjective	 reason	 is	 the	 kind	 of	 reason	 that	




no	 single	 reason	 expression	 can	 be	 used	 to	 pick	 out	 either	 objective	 or	 subjective	 reasons.6	
However,	 some	explicitly	 invoke	 the	distinction	between	objective	and	subjective	 reasons	so	















5	If	 one	 assumes	 that	 intentional	 objects	 are	 propositions	 and	 that	 true	 propositions	 are	 facts	 –	
otherwise	 the	 ontology	 of	 subjective	 and	 objective	 reasons	 is	 different,	 so	 one	 and	 the	 same	 thing	
cannot	be	both	an	objective	and	a	subjective	reason.	That	being	so,	in	this	example	I	would	still	have	an	





of	 Schroeder’s	 view),	 so	 his	 theory	 is	 not	 pluralist,	 it	 just	 distinguishes	 between	 the	 kinds	 of	 reason	
picked	 out	 by	 these	 expressions	 (which	 are	 normally	 taken	 to	 be	 co-extensive	 (see	 §	(I)1)).	 For	 the	
classification	of	Schroeder’s	view	see	Table	I-6.	
7	Here,	 for	 reference,	 is	 Vogelstein’s	 version	 of	 this	 example:	 ‘While	 walking	 in	 a	 desert,	 you	 have	




Vogelstein	 is	 not	 alone.	 Although	 they	 don’t	 talk	 in	 terms	 of	 ‘objective’	 and	 ‘subjective’	
reasons,	both	Hyman	(2011)	and	Locke	(2015)	offer	a	pluralist	account	of	the	expression	‘the	
agent’s	reason	for	acting,’	of	precisely	this	kind.	They	both	hold	(in	my	parlance)	that	there	is	a	
sense	 of	 ‘the	 agent’s	 reason	 for	 acting’	 that	 picks	 out	 a	 consideration	 in	 light	 of	 which	 the	
agent	acted	(that	 is,	a	subjective	 reason	that	they	acted	on),	and	a	different	sense	that	picks	
out	 a	 fact	 that	makes	 their	 action,	all	 things	 considered,	worth	 doing,	 and	 explains	 it	 in	 the	
right	way	(that	 is,	an	objective	reason	that	explains	their	action	in	the	right	way).8	Thus,	both	













Michael	 Smith	 (1987,	1994)	 is	 typically	 taken	 to	hold	what	 I	have	 called	 the	 ‘Received	View’	
(see	 Table	 V-2),	 which	 is	 a	 combination	 of,	 inter	 alia,	 favourism	 about	 reasons	 to	 act	 and	
psychologism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act.	I	think	that	this	is	a	misreading	of	Smith.	In	
what	 follows	 I	 want,	 briefly,	 to	 make	 the	 case	 that	 Smith	 argues	 for	 a	 pluralist	 theory	 of	
reasons.	4.1 The	misinterpretation	of	Michael	Smith	
Firstly,	 although	 Smith’s	 definition	 of	 ‘normative	 reasons’	 in	 these	 works	 is	 loose,10	we	 can	
plausibly	 treat	what	 he	 refers	 to	 as	 ‘normative	 reasons’	 as	what	we	 have	 already	 called	 an	
																																								 																				






‘objective	 reason’	 (that	 is,	 something	 that	makes	 an	 action,	 in	 some	 respect,	 worth	 doing),	
which	 is,	 you	 will	 recall,	 what	 favourists	 take	 reasons	 to	 be.	 Smith’s	 usage	 of	 the	 term	
‘normative	reason’	is	thus	consistent	with	its	contemporary	usage.11	
In	 contrast,	 Smith’s	 usage	 of	 the	 term	 ‘motivating	 reason’	 is	 at	 odds	 with	 contemporary	
usage.12		 Smith	 argues	 that	motivating	 reasons	 are	 all	 psychological	 states	 of	 the	 agent	 that	
rationalise	 their	 action	 (that	 is,	motivating	 reasons	 are	 the	 sorts	 of	 thing	 that	 psychologism	
takes	reasons	to	be),	and	this	is	because	he	defines	motivating	reasons	such	that:	
The	distinctive	feature	of	a	motivating	reason	to	φ	is	that	in	virtue	of	having	such	a	reason	an	
agent	 is	 in	a	state	that	 is	potentially	explanatory	of	his	φing.	 (Note	the	‘potentially’.	An	agent	
may	 therefore	have	a	motivating	 reason	 to	φ	without	 that	 reason's	being	overriding.)	 (Smith	
1987,	38	emphasis	in	original)	
It	 is	 typical	 to	 interpret	 Smith’s	 remarks	 about	motivating	 reasons	 to	 be	 about	 ‘the	 agent’s	
reason	 for	acting’,	and	hence	 to	 take	Smith	 to	be	arguing	 for	a	univocal	psychologism	about	
the	agent’s	reason	for	acting13	–	this,	I	think,	is	a	mistake.	For	one,	the	fact	that	he	talks	about	
motivating	 reasons	 being	 only	 potentially	 explanatory	 should	 already	 tell	 us	 that	 he	 isn’t	
talking	about	the	agent’s	reason	for	acting	–	the	agent’s	reason	for	acting	is	something	that	is	
generally	taken	to	be	(and	Smith	certainly	takes	it	to	be)	actually	explanatory	(see	§	(IV)1.2).		
Furthermore,	 the	fact	 that	Smith	talks	about	motivating	reasons	to	φ	 should	be	 indicative	of	
the	fact	that	the	kind	of	reason	he	is	talking	about	is	such	that	reasons	of	that	kind	are	(in	the	
sense	introduced	in	§	(I)1)	 independent	of	the	actions	for	which	they	are	reasons.	That	is,	the	
‘to’	 preposition	makes	 clear	 that	 something	 could	 be	 a	motivating	 reason	 to	 do	 something	






















Smith	 is	 saying	 that	 the	expression	 ‘a	 reason	A	has	 to	φ’	 is	ambiguous	between	 two	senses:	
being	 a	 normative	 reason	 (which	 is	 the	 favourist	 kind	 of	 reason,	 on	 Smith’s	 definition)	 and	
being	a	motivating	reason	(which	is	a	psychologistic	kind	of	reason,	on	Smith’s	definition).	That	
is,	 Smith	 is	 recommending	 a	 pluralist	 account	 of	 that	 expression,	 and	 therefore,	 a	 pluralist	
theory	of	reasons.	Moreover,	I	think,	Smith’s	pluralism	extends	to	all	the	reason	expressions.16	4.2 Another	kind	of	pluralism	
That	having	been	said,	Smith’s	actual	theory	 is	 largely	 irrelevant	to	our	primary	concern.	The	
remarks	 above	 are	mainly	 intended	as	 context	 (if	 somewhat	polemical);	 all	 that	we	need	 to	
take	 from	 this	 discussion	 is	 that	 the	 materials	 for	 another	 pluralist	 theory	 of	 reasons	 are	
already	out	there	–	one	which	takes	all	reason	expressions	to	have	two	senses,	one	favourist	









We	have	 considered	 two	distinct	pluralist	 theories	of	 reasons,	which	 I	 have	 called	 ‘pure	F/D	
pluralism’	and	‘pure	F/P	pluralism’.	But	why	would	you	want	to	be	a	pluralist	in	the	first	place?	
																																								 																				
16	Consider	his	use	of	 the	expression	 ‘the	agent’s	normative	 reason	 for	 acting.’	 (Smith	1994,	131–32).	
Consider	 also	 the	 following:	 ‘The	 distinction	 is	 that	 between	 psychological	 states	 that	 teleologically	
explain	[i.e.	motivating	reasons]	and	considerations	that	justify	[i.e.	normative	reasons].	The	importance	
of	making	this	distinction	in	this	way	becomes	clear	when	we	ask	whether	all	actions	must	be	done	for	










intuition	 (which	 you	 might,	 if	 it	 is	 an	 intuition	 you	 share)	 then	 you	 have	 to	 adopt	 a	 plural	
theory	of	reasons.	5.2 Pluralism	may	solve	the	problems	that	univocal	theories	face	
A	second	appealing	 feature	of	pluralist	 theories	of	 reasons	 is	 that	 they	 seem	to	provide	one	












brings	 to	 light	which	 sense	 of	 each	 reason	 expression	 the	 claim	 is	 being	 made	 about.	 So,	
denoting	the	different	senses	of	each	reason	expression	as	‘reasonA’	(favourist)	and	‘reasonB’,	











By	 adding	 (UNI),	 this	 re-formulation	 makes	 a	 premise	 of	 the	 problem	 that	 is	 implicit	 in	 its	
original	 formulation,	explicit:	 that	 ‘the	 reason	 for	which	one	acts’	 is	a	univocal	expression.	A	
pluralist	theory	of	reasons	then	solves	The	Deliberate	Action	Problem	by	rejecting	(UNI),	which	
thus	avoids	the	need	to	reject	the	other	prima	facie	reasonable	claims.		
And,	 indeed,	 pluralist	 theories	 of	 reasons	 can	 solve	 most	 of	 the	 problems	 considered	 in	






pluralist	 theories	 (i.e.	 those	made	 up	 of	 only	 favourist,	 psychologist	 or	 deliberativist	 claims)	
cannot	solve	all	of	 the	problems	considered	 in	previous	chapters.	And	secondly,	 the	pluralist	
solution	to	any	given	problem	relies	on	there	being	an	implicit	univocality	assumption	in	that	
problem	 –	 but	 since	 it	 is	 not	 at	 all	 clear	 that	 all	 of	 the	 problems	 considered	 in	 previous	




are	 other	 ways	 to	 formulate	 this	 problem	 that	 change	 which	 reason	 expression	 the	 univocality	










There	 is	 a	 problem	 that	 a	 pluralist	 theory	 that	 only	 consists	 of	 favourist,	 psychologist	 or	








The	 Psychological	 Reasons	 Problem,	 any	 pluralist	 theory	 that	 only	 consists	 of	 favourist	 or	
deliberativist	 claims	 (such	 as	 pure	 F/D	 pluralism),	 will	 also	 face	 The	 Psychological	 Reasons	
Problem.	
The	 point	 of	 these	 remarks	 is	 this:	 even	 if	 we	 adopt	 a	 (conventional)	 pluralist	 theory	 of	
reasons,	that	still	will	not	help	us	solve	all	the	problems	considered	in	the	previous	chapters.	If	
we	are	to	do	that,	we	need	a	new	family	of	claims	about	reasons.	6.2 Just	because	you	could	doesn’t	mean	you	can	
Secondly,	 we	 should	 be	 sceptical	 about	 the	 pluralist’s	 approach	 to	 solving	 the	 problems	






Rather,	 I	 am	 claiming	 that	 senses	 are	 already	multiple—the	 phrase	 ‘S’s	 reason	 [for	 acting]’	
already	has	two	distinct	senses.	(Locke	2015,	218)	
To	re-interpret	Locke’s	argument	in	my	own	terms:	if	you	have	the	‘two	senses’	intuition	it	 is	
that	 intuition	 that	makes	you	 think	 that	 reasons	are	plural,	which	 then	 forms	 the	basis	 for	a	
plural	theory	of	reasons.	That	is,	 it’s	not	that	you	are	multiplying	senses	in	order	to	solve	the	
problems,	it’s	that	(at	least	if	you	have	the	‘two	senses’	intuition)	the	senses	just	are	multiple,	





puzzlement	 has	 arisen	 only	 because	 we	 haven’t	 recognised	 that	 the	 senses	 already	 are	
multiple.	
However,	 a	 more	 nuanced	 interpretation	 of	 Dancy’s	 objection	 is	 harder	 for	 the	 pluralist	 to	
avoid.	I	think	that	Dancy	can	reasonably	be	interpreted	as	having	meant	that	even	if	the	senses	
















reason,	 ‘reasonA’,	 the	univocality	assumption	does	no	work.	So,	a	pluralist	 theory	of	 reasons	
would	thus	still	have	to	find	some	claim,	in	addition	to	(UNI),	to	reject	–	the	problem	returns.	
A	pluralist	solution	to	any	given	problem	relies	on	that	problem	being	the	result	of	a	conflation	
of	 different	 senses	 of	 the	 same	 reason	 expression	 –	 that	 is,	 it	 relies	 on	 a	 univocality	
assumption	being	a	part	of	every	problem.	The	difficulty	for	pluralist	solutions	to	the	problems	






It	 is	 generally19	agreed	 that	 whenever	 we	 give	 an	 agent’s	 reason	 for	 acting	 we	 explain	 the	






particular	sense	of	the	 ‘agent’s	reason	for	acting’	expression.	That	 is,	 it	seems	as	though,	we	
may	add	a	further	prima	facie	reasonable	claim	to	those	already	considered:	
(S1)	 Whenever	 we	 give	 an	 agent’s	 reason	 for	 acting,	whatever	 the	 sense	 of	 the	





(P1)	 My	 reason	 for	 congratulating	my	 friend	was,	 inter	alia,	 that	 she	had	won	an	
award.	
Only	 pure	 F/P	 pluralism21	can	 accommodate	 the	 truth	 of	 both	 (F5)	 and	 (P1);	 it	 does	 so	 by	
insisting	 that	 a	 different	 sense	 of	 the	 expression,	 ‘the	 agent’s	 reason	 for	 acting’,	 is	 being	
invoked	 in	 each	 case	 (psychologistic	 in	 the	 former,	 favourist	 in	 the	 latter).	 This	 view	 is	
problematic	because,	 if	 it	were	 true,	 it	would	be	hard	 to	see	why	our	 respective	 reasons	 for	
acting	can	both	be	cited	in	an	explanation	of	our	actions	that	makes	us	each	seem	rational.	
Consider:	according	to	pure	F/P	pluralism,	the	relations	between	(i)	Sally’s	belief	and	her	action	
and	 (ii)	 the	 fact	 that	my	 friend	 won	 an	 award	 and	my	 action	 are	 different.	 And	 yet,	 giving	
either	explains	our	respective	actions	 in	a	way	that	makes	us	seem	rational.	So	the	pure	F/P	
pluralist	 is	 seemingly	 forced	 to	 say	 that	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 reason-relations	 being	 different,	 by	




























challenge	 to	 it.	 I	 define	 ‘pro	 tanto	 rational’	 actions	 as	 actions	 that	 an	 agent	
takes	to	be,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing.	I	set	out	a	new	family	of	claims	about	
reasons,	explanatory	 rationalism,	which	 says	 that	all	 practical	 reasons	explain	
why	 the	actions	 for	which	 they	are	 reasons	are	pro	 tanto	 rational.	 I	 introduce	
the	 major	 challenge	 for	 explanatory	 rationalism,	 The	 Explanatory	 Exclusion	




claims:	 favourism	 about	 reasons	 to	 act,	 psychologism	 about	 the	 reasons	 for	 which	 we	 act	
and/or	 deliberativism	 about	 the	 reasons	 for	 which	 we	 act	 (see	 Table	 I-6).	 In	 §§	(II)-(IV),	 I	
showed	that	each	of	these	accounts	is	inconsistent	with	several	prima	facie	reasonable	claims.		
In	§	(V),	I	argued	that,	even	if	the	senses	of	any	given	reason	expression	are	plural,	pluralism	is	
no	panacea:	 that	 is,	we	cannot	 just	 rely	on	the	plurality	of	senses	as	 the	way	to	make	those	
prima	 facie	 reasonable	 claims	 consistent	 with	 our	 theory	 of	 reasons.	 In	 short,	 I	 argued,	 we	
must	look	beyond	favourism,	psychologism	and	deliberativism:	we	need	a	new	family	of	claims	
about	reasons.		
In	 this	 chapter	 I	 introduce	 a	 new	 family	 of	 claims	 about	 reasons:	 explanatory	 rationalism.	
According	 to	 explanatory	 rationalism,	 the	 fundamental	 reason-relation	 is	 that	 of	 explaining	









Fevzi	 is	waiting	 to	board	a	 flight	 to	 Japan.	 It’s	early	 so	he	had	 to	miss	his	morning	 swim.	He	
looks	 forlornly	out	of	 the	window,	 yearning	 to	 go	 swimming.	He	 could	abandon	his	 trip	 and	
	 95	







There	 are	 clear	 differences	 between	 these	 three	 actions	 (flying,	 swimming,	wandering)	 that	
are,	I	submit,	of	relevance	to	their	rational	standing.	First,	I	will	introduce	some	terminology	to	
characterise	those	differences	and	then	I	will	argue	that	what	differentiates	the	three	actions	
is	 relevant	 to	 their	 rational	 standing.	 In	 particular,	 I	 will	 suggest	 that	 even	 though	 it	 is	 not	
rational	for	Fevzi	to	go	swimming,	it	is	nonetheless	more	rational	for	him	to	go	swimming	than	






If	 we	 leave	 aside	 the	 question	 as	 to	 what	 makes	 an	 action	 worth	 doing,1	I	 think	 we	 can	
(hopefully	uncontroversially)	characterise	a	familiar	sense	of	rational	action	as	follows:	
Assumption It	 is	 rational	 for	A	 to	φ	 if	 and	 only	 if	 A	 takes	φing	 to	 be,	 all	 things	
considered,	worth	doing.2	
This	 is	 an	 assumption,	 it	 is	 not	 a	 definition	 or	 an	 analysis	 of	 what	 it	 is	 for	 an	 action	 to	 be	
rational,	nor	is	it	a	claim	about	why	an	action	is	rational	(we	will	come	to	that	shortly).	This	is	
meant	to	be	a	fairly	bland	assumption	about	what	obtains	when	it	is	rational	for	some	agent	to	





would	 be	 good,	 or	 right,	 or	 something	 of	 the	 sort.	 Nothing	 that	 I	 have	 to	 say	 is	meant	 to	 express	 a	
commitment	to	either	of	these	views.	See	§	(II)3.2	for	related	caveats.	





rationality.	 I	 state	 it	 here	 only	 so	 that	 we	may	 better	 understand	 the	 concept	 of	 pro	 tanto	
rationality,	which	I	will	introduce	forthwith.	
What	 separates	Fevzi’s	boarding	 the	 flight	 from	both	his	going	 swimming	and	his	wandering	
aimlessly	around	the	airport	 is	that	 it	 is	rational	for	him	to	do	the	former,	but	not	the	 latter.	
However	 it	 is	nonetheless	 common	 to	distinguish	acts	 like	Fevzi’s	going	 swimming	 from	acts	
like	his	wandering	aimlessly,	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	they	are	both	irrational.	While	it	would	be	








is	 of	 relevance	 to	 the	 rational	 standing	 of	 those	 actions,	 then,	 I	 suggest,	 we	 need	 an	
intermediate	concept	of	rationality	that	allows	us	to	recognise	the	former	as	somehow	more	
rational	than	the	other.	To	that	end,	let	us	define	‘pro	tanto	rational	actions’	thus:	






that	 says	 that	 it	 is	 to	 any	 extent	 rational	 for	 Fevzi	 to	 go	 swimming,	 then	please	 feel	 free	 to	









5	I	believe	that	a	pro	tanto	 rational	action	 is	an	action	that	on	Smith’s	(1987)	terminology	the	agent	 is	
motivated	to	do	(note:	the	state	of	being	motivated	is	defeasible,	on	Smith’s	account),	so	I	could	have	











tanto	 rational	allows	us	to	recognise	that	there	 is	a	difference	 in	the	rational	standing	of	the	




actions	 for	 which	 they	 are	 reasons	 are	 pro	 tanto	 rational.	 Because	 this	 family	 of	 claims	
emphasises	 the	explanatory	 character	of	 the	 reason-relation,	 and	because	a	 reason	explains	










According	 to	 explanatory	 rationalism,	 there	 are	 three	 kinds	 of	 reason:	 the	 expressions	 ‘a	
reason	 for	A	 to	φ’	 and	 ‘a	 reason	A	has	 to	φ’	pick	out	one	kind,	 the	expression	 ‘a	 reason	 for	
φing’	picks	out	another7	and	‘A’s	reason	for	φing’	picks	out	a	final	kind.	
																																								 																				
6	Any	all	 things	considered	rational	action	 is	automatically	a	pro	tanto	rational	action	since	 if	an	agent	




§§	(II)-(V)	 and	 that,	 indeed,	 explanatory	 rationalism	characterises	 the	de	 facto	 sense	of	each	
reason	expression.	However,	 in	 line	with	the	two	senses	 intuition,	 I	will	 suggest	 that	there	 is	
another	sense	to	each	reason	expression,	which	is	favourist.	Before	we	get	there,	though,	I	will	
need	 to	demonstrate	how	 it	 is	 that	 explanatory	 rationalism	 could	be	 true	 in	 the	 face	of	 the	
major	objection	to	it,	which	I	will	call	‘The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem’.	
3 A	problem	for	explanatory	rationalism	




Now,	according	 to	explanatory	 rationalism,	an	agent’s	 reason	 for	acting	both	explains	why	 it	
was	pro	tanto	rational	for	them	to	do	what	they	did	and	explains	why	they	did	it.	Therefore,	if	















what	 explanatory	 work	 can	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 raining	 do?	 None,	 the	 argument	 concludes	 –	
which	must	mean	that	only	features	of	an	agent’s	psychology	can	explain	their	actions	–	that	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																	









insists	 that	 only	 features	 of	 an	 agent’s	 psychology	 can	 explain	 their	 actions,	 and	 therefore	
(given	 that	 an	 agent’s	 reason	 for	 acting	must	 explain	 their	 action),	 that	 only	 features	 of	 an	
agent’s	psychology	could	be	amongst	their	reasons	for	acting.	
4 An	outline	of	what	follows	
To	 the	 extent	 that	 the	 argument	 considered	 in	 the	 previous	 section	 is	 right,	 explanatory	
rationalism	 cannot	 solve	 the	 problems	 considered	 in	 §§	(II)-(IV)	 –	 indeed,	 to	 the	 extent	 that	
that	 argument	 is	 right,	 explanatory	 rationalism	 just	 collapses	 into	 psychologism.	 The	 rest	 of	
this	discussion	is	thus,	for	the	most	part,	a	response	to	the	argument	of	the	previous	section.	
In	 §	(VII),	 I	make	 some	 assumptions	 about	 the	 structural	 principles	 and	 logical	 properties	 of	
explanatory	 relations,	 which	 I	 will	 use	 throughout	 my	 discussion.	 In	 §	(VIII),	 I	 use	 this	
framework	 to	 provide	 a	 formal	 construal	 of	 The	 Explanatory	 Exclusion	 Problem.	 In	 §	 (IX),	 I	
show	 how	 the	 Problem	 also	 precludes	 perceptual	 experiences	 from	 explaining	 why	 we	 act,	
thereby	 counting	 against	 (R2);	 and,	 further,	 how	 it	 applies	 to	 the	 explanation	 of	 why	 it	 is	
rational	to	act,	thereby	also	counting	against	(R3)	and	(R4).		
The	de	 facto	 response	 to	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	 is	 to	accept	 the	conclusion	and	
say	 that	 the	purported	 explanans	 in	 (R1),	 i.e.	 the	 fact	 that	my	 friend	 had	won	 an	 award,	 is	
merely	elliptical	for	the	real	explanans,	which	is	the	fact	that	I	believed	that	my	friend	had	won	
an	award.	Because	this	 is	a	claim	about	how	it	 is	that	a	normative	reason9	to	do	some	action	
could	 explain	 why	 someone	 does	 it,	 I	 call	 this	 ‘the	 elliptical	 theory	 of	 normative	 reason	
explanation’.	
An	 alternative	 and	 increasingly	 popular	 theory,	 which	 seeks	 to	 preserve	 the	 bona	 fide	
explanatory	 role	 of	 normative	 reasons	 in	 action	 explanation,	 rejects	 the	 conclusion	 of	 The	
Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	and	says	that	the	fact	that	my	friend	won	an	award	explains	my	
action	directly.	This	is	the	direct	theory	of	normative	reason	explanation.	






In	 §§	(XI)	 &	 (XII),	 I	 develop	 that	 alternative:	 the	 indirect	 theory	 of	 normative	 reason	
explanation.	 This	 theory	 argues	 that	 a	 normative	 reason	 explains	 an	 agent’s	 action	 by	
explaining	the	features	of	the	agent’s	psychology	that,	in	turn,	explain	their	action.		
My	 argument	 for	 the	 indirect	 theory	 proceeds	 in	 two	 stages:	 first,	 in	 §	(XI),	 I	 argue	 that	we	
should	 reject	 the	 conclusion	 of	 The	 Explanatory	 Exclusion	 Problem	because	 it	 is	 based	 on	 a	
false	 principle	 of	 explanation,	 which	 I	 call	 ‘the	 exclusion	 principle’.	 The	 exclusion	 principle	
requires	 that	only	 the	most	proximal	 explanations	of	 some	explananda	 explain	 it;	but	 this	 is	
mistaken	 –	 most	 of	 the	 explanations	 we	 are	 interested	 in	 are,	 to	 some	 extent,	 distal	
explanations.		
Then,	 in	§	(XII),	 I	 show	how	 that	 insight	helps	 inform	 the	account	of	how	normative	 reasons	
explain	 actions.	 I	 argue	 that	 normative	 reasons	 are	 distal	 explanations	 of	 our	 actions;	 they	
explain	those	features	of	our	psychology	that,	in	turn,	explain	our	actions.	I	then	show	how	the	
indirect	theory	can	be	used	to	show	that	both	(R1)	and	(R2)	are	true.	
In	 §	(XIII),	 I	 suggest	 that	 the	 same	 reasoning	 accounts	 for	 the	 truth	 of	 (R3)	 and	 (R4).	 For	
instance,	I	argue	that	the	fact	that	I	read	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	explains	why	it	 is	
pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	congratulate	her	because	it	explains	why	I	believed	that	she	had	
won	an	award,	which,	 in	 turn,	explains	why	 it	was	pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	me	 to	congratulate	
her.		
However,	I	note,	the	transitivity	of	explanation	fails	on	some	occasions,	in	particular	when	the	
explanatory	 chain	 is	 a	deviant	 causal	 chain.	 So,	we	need	 some	account	of	why	 it	 is	 that	 the	
explanatory	chain	up	to	the	fact	that	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	an	agent	to	act	is	transitive	if	it	
isn’t	deviant,	but	isn’t	transitive	if	it	is	deviant.	In	§§	(XIV)	&	(XV),	I	provide	such	an	account.	
First,	 in	 §	(XIV),	 I	 introduce	 the	mystery	 relation.	 I	 argue	 that	 the	mystery	 relation	 is	 a	 non-
causal,	transitive,	explanatory	relation	that	relates:	the	belief	that	p	to	some	justification	for	it	
when	 that	 belief	 is	 justified;	 the	 belief	 that	 p	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 p	 when	 the	 belief	 that	 p	 is	
knowledgeable;	 a	 justification	 for	 the	 belief	 that	p	 to	 the	 fact	 that	p	when	 that	 justification	
affords	 the	opportunity	 for	 knowledge;	 and	 an	 action	 to	 some	belief	 that	 explains	why	 that	
action	is	pro	tanto	rational	when	that	action	is	done	intentionally.	
In	 §	(XV),	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 mystery	 relation	 is	 transitive	 with	 the	 non-causal	 explanatory	
relation	involved	in	explaining	why	some	action	is	rational,	whereas	merely	causal	relations	are	
not.	 This	 allows	me	 to	 distinguish	 between	 deviant	 cases	 (which	 lack	 the	 required	 chain	 of	














In	 which	 I	make	 some	 assumptions	 about	 explanation.	 I	 say	 what	 I	mean	 by	
‘explains’	 and	 I	 state	 that	 I	 will	 talk	 as	 though	 explananda	 are	 facts	 and	
explanantia	are	propositions	(whether	or	not	they	are).	I	distinguish	two	sorts	of	
explanatory	 relation,	 ‘fully	 explains’	 and	 ‘partially	 explains’,	 where	 a	 full	
explanation	 is	 sufficient	 for	 the	 truth	of	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 explains	and	a	partial	
explanation	 is	 an	 element	 (or	 subset)	 of	 a	 full	 explanation,	 and	 I	make	 some	
assumptions	 about	 the	 logical	 properties	 of	 these	 relations.	 Lastly,	 I	 say	 that	
some	 fact	 is	 ‘overexplained’	 just	 in	 case	 there	are	 two	genuinely	different	 full	
explanations	of	that	fact.	
In	this	chapter	I	make	some	assumptions	about	the	structural	principles	and	logical	properties	
of	 explanatory	 relations.	 This	 is	with	 a	 view	 to	 having	 a	 technical	 framework	with	which	 to	
more	formally	characterise	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem,	which	will	be	discussed	in	the	
















2	That	 said,	 in	 §	 (X),	 when	 I	 come	 to	 talk	 of	 normative	 reason	 explanation,	 I	 will	 mean	 something	
different	(and	more	akin	to	the	second	sense).		
3	Kim	 suggests	 that	 there	may	 be	 a	 fourth	 kind	 of	 ‘explains’	 relation:	 ‘The	 explanans	 relation	 relates	
propositions	 or	 statements;	 the	 explanatory	 relation	 relates	 events	 or	 facts	 in	 the	 world.	 The	








raining	 if	 it	 is	 raining,	 but	 one	 cannot	 explain	why	 it	 is	 raining	 if	 it	 is	 not	 raining.	 A	 second	
consequence	is	that	when	I	talk	of	something	explaining,	for	instance,	an	action	or	a	belief	this	
is	not	meant	to	imply	anything	about	the	ontology	of	those	explananda.		2.2 On	the	ontology	of	explanantia	
Throughout	 this	 discussion	 I	 will	 mostly	 treat	 explanantia	 as	 propositions	 (or	 sets	 of	
propositions).	4	Importantly,	 I	 do	 not	 assume,	 in	 my	 exposition	 that	 explanantia	 are	 true	







However,	 although	 I	 will	 talk	 as	 though	 explanantia	 and	 reasons	 are	 propositions,	 I	 am	 not	
arguing	 that	 they	are.	My	 theory	 is	neither	about	what	explanantia	are	nor	 is	 it	 about	what	
reasons	are;	 it	 is	about	the	relation	 in	which	reasons	stand	to	the	actions	for	which	they	are	
reasons.	So,	if	your	preferred	theory	of	explanation	says	that	mental	states	or	states	of	affairs	
can	be	explanantia	then	it	is	compatible	with	my	theory	that	reasons	could	be	mental	states	or	
states	of	affairs	also;	my	point	 is	not	that	reasons	are	propositions,	my	point	 is	only	that	 it	 is	






5 	Given	 the	 assumption	 that	 explanation	 is	 factive	 (i.e.	 all	 explanantia	 are	 true),	 and	 that	 true	








When	 I	 say	 that	 Joanne’s	 carpet	 is	 wet	 because	 her	 roof	 leaks	 and	 she	 says	 that	 it	 is	 wet	
because	it	rained	last	night,	although	we	each	cite	different	facts	by	way	of	explanation	of	why	
the	carpet	is	wet,	 it	seems	clear	that,	as	Broome	puts	it,	 ‘our	explanations	are	not	rivals,	and	
we	would	 not	 feel	we	were	 contradicting	 each	 other.’	(2013,	 49)	 Furthermore,	 although	we	
each	say	that	the	facts	we	cite	explain	why	the	carpet	is	wet,	neither	fact	is	what	we	might	call	
‘the	whole	story’	of	why	the	carpet	is	wet.		
It	 seems	 natural	 to	 think	 that	 the	 reason	 why	 the	 explanations	 that	 Joanne	 and	 I	 give	 are	
neither	 rivals	nor,	 individually,	 the	whole	story	of	why	the	carpet	 is	wet,	 is	because	they	are	
each	part	of,	what	Broome	calls,	‘one	big	explanation’	–	where	that	one	big	explanation	is	the	




I	 want	 to	 further	 regiment	 Broome’s	 suggestion.	 I	 suggest	 that	 we	 call	 this	 ‘one	 big	
explanation’	a	 ‘full	explanation’,	and	 the	elements	 (or	 subsets)	of	 it	 ‘partial	explanations’,	 so	
that	 all	 explanatory	 relations	 are	 either	 full	 or	 partial.	 In	 the	 following	 sections	 I	 will	 make	





What	 differentiates	 a	 full	 explanation	 from	 a	 partial	 explanation,	 I	 suggest,	 is	 that	 a	 full	




8	It	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 Ruben	 (2004)	 makes	 much	 use	 of	 the	 distinction	 between	 full	 and	 partial	
explanation,	 which	 is,	 in	 many	 respects,	 similar	 to	 mine	 (though	 I	 am	 perhaps	 more	 prescriptive).	
Schnieder	 (2011)	 draws	 the	 same	 distinction	 between	 what	 he	 calls	 ‘	 complete’	 and	 ‘incomplete’	





However,	 just	 entailing	 the	 truth	 of	 some	 proposition	 is	 obviously	 not	 sufficient	 for	 fully	
explaining	 it	 (hence	the	above	 is	not	a	bi-conditional).	For	 instance,	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 raining	
entails	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 raining,	 but	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 raining	 does	 not	 explain	 (fully	 or	
otherwise)	the	fact	that	it	is	raining.	




these	properties,	 if	at	 least	 some	of	 them	seem	plausible	 then	 that	 should	make	 it	 clear	 the	
extent	to	which	mere	entailment	 falls	short	of	explanation	(as	entailment	 is	a	reflexive,	non-
symmetric,	monotonic	relation).		
Assuming	 that	 full	 explanations	 are	 non-monotonic	 means	 that	 adding	 some	 arbitrary	
proposition	into	what	is	already	a	full	explanation	of	some	fact	does	not	give	you	a	further	full	





arbitrary	 proposition	 into	 a	 full	 explanation	 and	 still	 say	 that	 that	 enlarged	 set	 is	 a	 full	
																																								 																				
9	In	what	way	does	a	set	of	propositions	that	fully	explains	some	other	fact	 ‘entail’	 it?	 I	suggest	that	 it	
logically	 entails	 it,	 so	 that	 full	 explanations	 necessitate	 their	 explananda.	 This	 may	 mean	 that	 a	 full	
explanation	of	the	fact	that	p	may	 include	facts	 (such	as	 facts	about	physical	 laws)	that	are	seemingly	
extremely	peripheral	 (though	not	 irrelevant)	to	the	question	 ‘why	 is	 it	 the	case	that	p?’	However,	 it	 is	






11	Explanatory	 relations	 are	 commonly	 assumed	 to	 have	 these	 properties	 –	 see,	 for	 instance,	 Rosen’s	
(2010)	remarks	about	explanation	(in	general)	in	his	discussion	of	grounding	explanations.	Although	it	is	
worth	 noting	 that	 there	 is	 some	 dissent	 on	 whether	 or	 not	 explanatory	 relations	 respect	 these	
properties	(see	e.g.	Ruben	2004).	
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explanation,	 but	 that	 each	 element	 of	 the	 full	 explanation	 should	 be,	 in	 some	 sense,	








to	 the	 gym	 fully	 explains	 why	 I’m	 tired.	 The	 fact	 that	 it	 fully	 explains	 my	 tiredness	 in	 this	
instance	 clearly	does	not	mean	 that	whenever	 I	 am	 tired	 it	 is	 because	 I’ve	been	 to	 the	gym	
etc.,	which	is	to	say	that	at	least	some	full	explanations	are	not	necessary	for	their	explananda.			3.2 Partial	explanation	



















13 	See,	 for	 instance,	 Raz’s	 (2009,	 185–86)	 remarks	 about	 the	 importance	 of	 non-redundancy	 to	
explanations.	
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or	 not	we	 say	 that	 some	partial	 explanation	explains	 some	other	 is	 a	matter	 of	 background	
knowledge	and	other	features	of	the	context.14		








is	 wet	 given	 other	 facts	 about	 the	 way	 the	 world	 is.	 However,	 even	 though	 that	 fact	 only	






Returning	 to	 our	 example,	 then:	 the	 full	 explanation	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 Joanne’s	 carpet	 is	wet	
includes,	 inter	alia,	 facts	such	as	the	fact	that	 it	rained	last	night,	the	fact	that	her	roof	 leaks	
and	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	 carpet	 beneath	 her	 leaky	 roof.	 That	 full	 explanation	 entails	 that	
Joanne’s	carpet	is	wet.		
Each	of	 the	members	of	 that	 full	 explanation	 (i.e.	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 rained	 last	night,	 etc.)	 is	 a	











overexplanation	 in	 terms	 of	 these	 concepts,	 as	 it	 is	 of	 some	 relevance	 to	 The	 Explanatory	
Exclusion	Problem.	4.1 Overdetermination	
Something	is	said	to	be	overdetermined	if	and	only	if	there	are	two	separate	sets	of	conditions	
that	 are	 each	 individually	 sufficient	 for	 it	 to	 obtain	 and	 those	 conditions	 determine	 that	 it	
obtain.16	Different	kinds	of	determination	 relation	yield	different	 sorts	of	overdetermination.	
Causal	 overdetermination	 (and	 whether	 or	 not	 it	 is	 possible)	 is	 probably	 the	 most	 hotly	
debated	kind	of	overdetermination	–	here	is	a	representative	characterisation:	
Suppose	 that	 a	 certain	 event,	 in	 virtue	 of	 its	 mental	 property,	 causes	 a	 physical	 event.	 The	
causal	 closure	of	 the	physical	 domain	 says	 that	 this	physical	 event	must	 also	have	a	physical	
cause.	We	may	assume	 that	 this	physical	 cause,	 in	 virtue	of	 its	physical	 property,	 causes	 the	
physical	 event…	 Could	 it	 be	 that	 the	 mental	 cause	 and	 the	 physical	 cause	 are	 each	 an	
independent	 sufficient	 cause	 of	 the	 physical	 effect?	 The	 suggestion	 then	 is	 that	 the	 physical	
effect	 is	overdetermined.	So	 if	 the	physical	 cause	hadn't	occurred,	 the	mental	 cause	by	 itself	
would	have	caused	the	effect.	(Kim	1993,	280–81)	
The	principle	is	something	like	this:	something	is	causally	overdetermined	if	you	could	take	one	
of	 its	 causes	 away	 and	 it	 would	 still	 obtain	 (or	 occur,	 or	 exist	 or	 what	 have	 you).	 A	 classic	
example:	 two	vandals	each	 throw	 rocks	 that	 simultaneously	 strike	and	break	a	window.	The	




Definition For	 any	 proposition	p,	 the	 fact	 that	p	 is	 overexplained	 if	 and	 only	 if	
there	are	(at	least)	two	genuinely	different	full	explanations	of	the	fact	
that	p.	
Is	 there	 a	 difference	 between	 overexplanation	 and	 overdetermination?	 If	 you	 are	 an	
explanatory	 realist	 (so	 that	 explanatory	 relations 17 	are	 underpinned	 by	 ontological	
																																								 																				
16	I	 stress	 the	 latter	conjunct	as	 there	being	merely	 two	sets	of	conditions	 that	entail	 some	fact	 is	not	
sufficient	 for	 the	 fact	 to	 be	 over-determined	 (if	 it	 were	 then,	 arguably,	 everything	 would	 be	





are	 independent,19	then	 you	will	 probably	 think	 that	 overdetermination	 and	overexplanation	
are	the	same	thing.	
However,	since	I	want	to	allow	for	the	possibility	of	rejecting	either	explanatory	realism	or	that	
two	 explanations	 are	 genuinely	 different	 only	 if	 they	 are	 independent,	 I	 distinguish	
overexplanation	 from	 overdetermination.	 Distinguishing	 them	 in	 this	 manner	 does	 not	







It	 is	 widely	 believed	 that	 genuine	 causal	 overdetermination	 is	 rare	 (if	 it	 is	 even	 possible).20	
Assuming	 that	 causal	 determination	 relations	 underpin	 causal	 explanatory	 relations,	 causal	
overexplanation	is	presumably	equally	rare.	
However,	bona	fide	cases	of	non-causal	overexplanation	abound.	For	instance,	recall	that	I	said	
that	swimming	will	both	help	me	sleep	better	and	 improve	my	mood.	Swimming	 is	 then,	 for	
me,	 in	 some	 respect,	 worth	 doing	 partly	 because	 it	 will	 help	 me	 sleep	 better	 and	 partly	

















What	differentiates	 these	 two	cases	 is	 seemingly	 this:	while	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 rained	 last	night	
and	the	fact	that	her	roof	leaks	are	part	of	the	same	full	explanation	of	why	her	carpet	is	wet,	




is	 overexplained.	 Whereas,	 in	 contrast,	 since	 there	 are	 not	 two	 genuinely	 different	
explanations	of	why	Joanne’s	carpet	is	wet,	the	fact	that	her	carpet	is	wet	is	not	overexplained.		
The	 characterisation	 of	 overexplanation	 hangs	 on	 what	 it	 is	 for	 two	 explanations	 to	 be	
genuinely	different.	 I	 have	given	what	 I	 take	 to	be	an	unambiguous	example	here,	but	 I	will	
return	to	what	makes	explanations	genuinely	different	in	the	next	chapter	(see	§	(VIII)3.2).	
5 Summary	
I	 have	 said	 that	 there	 are	 two	 kinds	 of	 explanatory	 relation:	 full	 and	 partial,	 and	 I’ve	made	
some	 assumptions	 about	 the	 logical	 properties	 of	 each.	 I	 then	 provided	 an	 analysis	 of	
overexplanation	 in	 terms	of	 full	explanation.	 In	 the	next	chapter	 I	will	put	 these	concepts	 to	





another,	 the	 motivating	 argument	 for	 psychologistic	 theories	 of	 reasons.	 I	
provide	 a	 formal	 construal	 of	 the	 Problem,	 showing	 how	 it	 results	 from	 two	





congratulate	 her.	 Did	 I	 congratulate	 her	 because	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award,	 or	 just	 because	 I	
thought	she	had?		
There	 is	 a	 well-established	 response	 to	 this	 question	 that	 proceeds,	 broadly,	 along	 the	
following	lines:	if	she	hadn’t	won	an	award	but	I	had	believed	that	she	had,	then	I	would	still	
have	congratulated	her,	and	 I	would	have	congratulated	her	because	 I	believed	that	she	had	
won	an	award.	Conversely,	 if	 I	hadn’t	believed	that	she	had	won	the	award	then	even	 if	she	





that	 is,	 I	 did	 not	 really	 congratulate	 my	 friend	 because	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award,	 but	 only	
because	I	thought	she	had.	
An	argument	along	these	lines	is	what	typically	motivates	the	view	that	facts	about	the	world	













‘the	 exclusion	 principle’5.	 In	 particular,	 on	 my	 construal,	 the	 conclusion	 of	 The	 Explanatory	
Exclusion	Problem	can	be	arrived	at	from	two	seemingly	trivial	claims	about	what	explains	an	








I	 should	 note	 that	 other	 construals	 of	 this	 argument	 are	 possible,	 and	mine	 is	 by	 no	means	
definitive	 (though	 I	 hope	 it	 is	 illuminating).	 However,	 I	 do	 not	 think	 one	 can	 construe	 the	
overall	problem	in	a	way	that	makes	it	immune	to	my	eventual	response;	that	is,	I	do	not	think	
that	my	response	to	the	overall	problem	hangs	on	formalising	it	in	the	way	that	I	do.	
Lastly,	 we	 should	 also	 be	 clear	 that	 my	 discussion	 here	 is	 strictly	 about	 what	 explains	 an	
agent’s	action,	and	not	what	their	reason	for	acting	is.	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	only	
bears	upon	what	an	agent’s	reason	for	acting	could	be	to	the	extent	that	we	assume	that	an	
agent’s	 reason	 for	 acting	 always	 explains	 their	 action	 (although	 this	 is	 a	 widely	 held	
assumption	-	see	§	(IV)1.2).	
1 An	overview	







his	argument	 is	 in	 some	respects	 similar	 to	mine,	 the	premises	and	conclusions	of	our	arguments	are	
sufficiently	different	as	to	make	them	different	arguments.	







the	 fact	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award	 is	 neither	 a	 part	 of	 that	 full	
explanation	nor	is	it	part	of	a	genuinely	different	explanation.8	
EXCLUSION	 For	 any	 propositions,	p	and	q,	 if	 there	 is	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	why	q	
such	that	p	 is	neither	a	part	of	that	full	explanation	nor	 is	 it	part	of	a	
genuinely	different	explanation9,	then	p	does	not	partially	explain	q.	
Conclusion	1 The	 fact	 that	 my	 friend	 had	 won	 an	 award	 does	 not	 explain	 why	 I	
congratulated	her.	
The	 focus	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 on	 setting	 out	 the	 argument	 for	 Premise	1	 and	 for	 EXCLUSION.	 In	
§	(IX)	 I	 will	 show	 how,	 by	 altering	 Premise	1,	 The	 Explanatory	 Exclusion	 Problem	 can	 also	
provide	arguments	against	(R2),	(R3)	and	(R4).	1.1 The	argument	for	Premise	1	
Premise	1,	 as	 I	 will	 demonstrate,	 follows	 from	 the	 conclusions	 of	 two	 other	 arguments:	 the	
argument	from	false	belief	and	the	argument	from	impotent	facts.		
The	conclusion	of	the	argument	from	false	belief	is	that	we	can	give	a	full	explanation	of	why	I	






that	 I	 believed	 that	 she	 had.	 I	 show	 how	 this	 conclusion	 can	 be	 arrived	 inferred	 from	 (i)	 a	





explanation	 of	 some	 explanandum	 and	 it	 is	 not	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	 different	 explanation	 of	
																																								 																				
8	That	 is,	a	genuinely	different	explanation	of	why	 I	 congratulated	my	 friend…	 I	omit	 this	qualification	
throughout,	for	brevity.	
















case,	we	cannot	 say	 that	his	 reason	 for	acting	as	he	did	was	 that	p.	We	have	 to	 say	 that	his	




be	 allowed	 to	 affect	 the	 form	 of	 the	 relevant	 explanation.	 Supposing,	 therefore,	 that	 our	
explanation	 should	 take	 the	 same	 form	 whether	 it	 is	 or	 is	 not	 the	 case	 that	 p,	 and	 having	
already	accepted	that	the	correct	explanation	in	cases	where	it	is	not	the	case	that	p	is	‘that	he	




























In	 what	 follows	 I	 provide	 a	 formal	 construal	 of	 this	 argument.	 I	 take	 my	 construal	 to	 be	
plausible	and,	 I	hope,	 informative;	however,	other	 construals	are	available	 (e.g.	 Stout	2009).	
The	 conclusion	 of	 the	 argument	 from	 false	 belief,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 my	 friend’s	 award,	 is	 as	
follows:	
Conclusion	1a There	 is	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	 why	 I	 congratulated	 my	 friend	 that	




The	argument	 from	 false	belief	 starts,	 predictably,	with	an	observation	about	what	happens	




Moreover,	 I	 suggest,	 when	 I	 congratulate	 her	 because	 of	 my	 false	 belief	 that	 she	 won	 an	




that	 she	had13),	 then	 (i)	 the	 fact	 that	 I	believed	 that	 she	had	won	an	
award	would	have	partially	explained	why	I	congratulated	her;	and	(ii)	















false	proposition	 that	 a	 bear	was	 chasing	her	 does	not	 explain	why	 she	 ran.	 Likewise,	 if	my	









In	 what	 follows,	 I	 want	 to	 show	 how	 this	 claim	 can	 be	 motivated	 by	 two	 principles	 of	













Let’s	 start	by	noticing	 this:	when	Sally	 runs	because	 she	mistakenly	 thought	 that	a	bear	was	





(i.e.	 the	 content	 of	 Sally’s	 belief)	 could	not	 partially	 explain	why	 Sally	 ran.	 Furthermore,	 the	
fact	that	a	bear	was	not	chasing	Sally	is	also	not	part	of	any	full	explanation	of	why	she	ran	–	
and,	in	particular,	it	is	not	part	of	the	same	full	explanation	as	the	fact	that	she	believed	that	a	
bear	was	 chasing	 her.15	So,	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 clear	 sense	 in	which,	 when	 Sally’s	 belief	 is	










To	 the	 extent	 that	 this	 line	 of	 reasoning	 is	 persuasive,	 I	 suggest	 that	 that	 is	 just	 because	 it	
accords	 with	 a	 more	 general	 principle	 of	 explanation	 –	 namely	 that	 if,	 ceteris	 paribus,	 a	
proposition	that	is	irrelevant	to	some	explanation	of	some	explanandum	(i.e.	neither	it	nor	its	
negation	 is	 part	 of	 that	 full	 explanation	 of	 that	 explanandum)	 when	 it	 is	 false	 suddenly	
becomes	 true,	 then	 that	 does	 not	 stop	 anything	 that	 partially	 explained	 that	 explanandum	





16	This	 does	 not	mean	 that	 the	 proposition	 is	 irrelevant	 in	 all	 senses	 of	 relevance	 –	 for	 instance,	 it	 is	
certainly	 something	 she	 took	 to	 make	 running	 worth	 doing;	 the	 point	 is	 just	 that	 from	 a	 particular	
explanatory	 perspective,	 it	 is	 seemingly	 irrelevant.	 It	 is	 also	 worth	 stressing	 this:	 just	 because	 the	
proposition	 that	a	bear	 is	chasing	her	 is	 irrelevant	when	 it	 is	 false,	does	not	mean	that	 it	 is	 irrelevant	







ENDURANCE	 For	 any	 propositions	p,	 q	and	 r,	 the	 following	 holds:	 Suppose	 that	q	
partially	explains	the	fact	that	r	when	it	is	not	the	case	that	p.	Suppose	
further	that	neither	p	nor	not	p	is	part	of	the	same	explanation	of	r	as	
q.	 Then,	 if,	 ceteris	 paribus,	 it	 were	 the	 case	 that	 p,	 q	 would	 still	
partially	explain	the	fact	that	r.18	
Although	this	claim	is	long-winded,	I	take	the	principle	to	be	ultimately	intuitive.	However,	 in	
the	 event	 that	 it	 is	 not	 clear,	 the	 next	 section	 discusses	 some	 examples	 and	 a	 failed	
counterexample.		2.3.2 Some	examples	of	the	endurance	principle	
The	reader	who	is	already	comfortable	with	ENDURANCE	may	skip	these	examples.	
Example	 1:	 An	 uncontroversial	 example:	 Suppose	 that	 a	 teacher	 is	 performing	 a	 science	
experiment	 for	 her	 students,	 although	 one	 of	 the	 students,	 Nathan,	 is	 absent.	 She	 heats	 a	
metal	rod	and	it	expands.	The	fact	that	the	rod	was	heated	partially	explains	why	it	expanded,	
and	 the	 false	 proposition	 that	Nathan	 is	 present	 is	 irrelevant	 to	 that	 explanation	 of	 why	 it	
expanded.19	Moreover,	 ceteris	 paribus,	 had	 Nathan	 been	 present,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 rod	was	
heated	would	still	partially	explain	why	it	expanded.	
Example	 2:	Of	 course,	Nathan’s	being	present	 is	 rarely	 likely	 to	 feature	 in	an	explanation	of	
why	the	rod	expanded,	so	here	is	another	example,	in	which	the	proposition	that	is	irrelevant	
when	false,	explains	when	true.	Consider	the	case	in	which	swimming	will	help	me	sleep	better	
but	won’t	 improve	my	mood.	We	already	established20	that	 the	 fact	 that	swimming	will	help	
me	 sleep	better	partially	 explains	why	 swimming	 is,	 for	me,	 in	 some	 respect,	worth	doing.21	
Moreover,	 I	suggest,	neither	the	false	proposition	that	swimming	will	 improve	my	mood,	nor	
the	fact	that	it	won’t	improve	my	mood	explain	why	it	is,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing	–	so	the	




that	 swimming	would	 improve	my	mood	starts	explaining	why	swimming	would	be,	 in	 some	
respect,	 worth	 doing,	 doesn’t	 mean	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 swimming	 will	 help	 me	 sleep	 better	
																																								 																				
18	More	formally:	For	any	propositions	p,	q	and	r,	if,	when	it	is	not	the	case	that	p,	q	partially	explains	the	










breaks,	 while	 Susie	 stands	 and	 watches.	 The	 fact	 that	 Tom	 threw	 a	 rock	 at	 the	 window	









This	 counterexample	 fails	 because	 it	 violates	 the	 ‘ceteris	 paribus’	 condition	 in	 ENDURANCE.	 In	
making	it	the	case	that	Susie	threw	a	rock	at	the	window	and	it	broke	we	are	not	changing	the	
truth-value	of	only	 irrelevant	propositions,	but	of	 relevant	propositions	as	well.	For	 instance,	
the	 fact	 that	 the	 window	 was	 intact	 before	 Tom’s	 rock	 hit	 it	 is	 a	 part	 of	 the	 same	 full	
explanation	of	why	the	window	broke	as	the	fact	that	Tom	threw	the	rock.22	So	of	course	the	
fact	 that	 Tom	 threw	 the	 rock	 stops	 explaining	why	 the	window	broke	 –	 by	 adding	 in	 Sally’s	
rock-throwing	 we	 have	 taken	 away	 an	 element	 of	 the	 full	 explanation	 that	 Tom’s	 rock-
throwing	was	part	of,	so	everything	in	it	stops	explaining.	
In	contrast,	suppose	we	honour	the	 ‘ceteris	paribus’	condition	and	change	only	that	which	 is	
not	 part	 of	 the	 same	 full	 explanation	 of	 the	window’s	 breaking	 as	 Tom’s	 rock	 throwing.	 So,	
let’s	 suppose	 that	 Susie’s	 rock	 harmlessly	 bounces	 off	 the	 window.	 In	 this	 circumstance	 it	
should	still	be	clear	(given	that	all	other	things	are	equal)	that	Tom’s	rock	breaks	the	window	
and	Tom’s	rock-throwing	explains	why	the	window	broke.	ENDURANCE	perseveres.	2.3.3 The	Sufficiency	Principle	
Now:	 another	 principle	 of	 explanation	 –	 the	 sufficiency	 principle.	 Recall	 that	 I	 interpreted	
Williams’s	remark	as	the	claim	that	the	same	full	explanation	of	an	agent’s	action	is	available	
whether	 their	 belief	 is	 true	 or	 false.	 We	 need	 more	 than	 just	 ENDURANCE	 to	 reach	 that	
conclusion.	
																																								 																				





her	 action	when	 her	 belief	 is	 false	would	 also	 partially	 explain	 if,	 ceteris	 paribus,	her	 belief	
were	 true.	 So,	 the	 same	 set	of	partial	 explanations	 that	 fully	 explained	her	 action	when	her	
belief	was	false	would	still	be	a	set	of	partial	explanations	of	her	action	if	her	belief	were	true.	




suffices	 to	 explain	 it	 when	 their	 belief	 is	 true.	 And,	 again,	 I	 suggest	 that	 this	 is	 just	 a	
consequence	of	 an	 intuitively	 plausible,	 and	more	 general	 principle	of	 explanation	 –	namely	
that	if	some	set	of	partial	explanations	suffices	to	explain	(i.e.	is	a	full	explanation	of)	some	fact	
in	 some	 situation,	 then	 whenever	 those	 partial	 explanations	 all	 explain	 that	 fact,	 they	 will	
suffice	to	explain	it.	Thus:		
SUFFICIENCY	 For	any	proposition	q,	and	any	set,	Δ,	 if	Δ	 is	a	 full	explanation	of	 the	
fact	 that	q	 in	 some	circumstance,	 then,	 in	any	circumstance	 in	which	
all	 the	elements	of	Δ	partially	explain	 the	 fact	 that	q,	Δ	 fully	explains	
the	fact	that	q.23				2.3.4 Combining	the	Endurance	Principle	and	the	Sufficiency	Principle	
The	endurance	principle	and	the	sufficiency	principle	provide	us	with	the	conclusion	that	the	
same	 full	 explanation	 of	 an	 agent’s	 action	 is	 available	 whether	 their	 belief	 is	 true	 or	 false.	
How?	By	ensuring	that	 just	changing	the	truth-value	of	some	proposition	that	 is	outside	of	a	
full	 explanation	 of	 some	 explanandum	 (i.e.	 which	 is	 irrelevant	 to	 the	 explanation	 of	 that	
explanandum)	cannot	affect	whether	or	not	that	 full	explanation	 is	available.	So,	 if	you	think	
that	neither	the	proposition	that	a	bear	is	chasing	her,	nor	the	fact	that	a	bear	is	not	chasing	




















fact	 that	 she	 had	 not	 won	 an	 award	 nor	 the	 false	 proposition	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award	
would	have	been	part	of	that	explanation	(from	Premise	1a	and	FACTIVITY).		
We	should	make	two	observations	from	these	remarks	about	what	would	have	been	the	case	
if	 my	 belief	 had	 been	 false:	 firstly,	 there	 would	 have	 been	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	 why	 I	
congratulated	my	friend	that	would	have	included	the	fact	that	I	believed	that	she	had	won	an	
award	 but	 not	 the	 (false)	 proposition	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award.	 Secondly,	 the	 (false)	
proposition	that	she	had	won	an	award	would	have	been	irrelevant	to	the	explanation	of	my	
action.	
From	 the	 second	observation,	we	can	 conclude	 (from	ENDURANCE)	 that	whatever	would	have	





Now	 recall	 the	 first	 observation:	 had	 my	 belief	 been	 false	 there	 would	 have	 been	 a	 full	
















that	 she	 had),	 then	 (i)	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 believed	 that	 she	 had	won	 an	
award	would	have	partially	explained	why	I	congratulated	her;	and	(ii)	




ENDURANCE	 For	 any	 propositions	p,	 q	and	 r,	 the	 following	 holds:	 Suppose	 that	q	
partially	explains	the	fact	that	r	when	it	is	not	the	case	that	p.	Suppose	
further	that	neither	p	nor	not	p	is	part	of	the	same	explanation	of	r	as	
q.	 Then,	 if,	 ceteris	 paribus,	 it	 were	 the	 case	 that	 p,	 q	 would	 still	
partially	explain	the	fact	that	r.	
SUFFICIENCY	 For	any	proposition	q,	and	any	set,	Δ,	 if	Δ	 is	a	 full	explanation	of	 the	
fact	 that	q	 in	 some	circumstance,	 then,	 in	any	circumstance	 in	which	
all	 the	elements	of	Δ	partially	explain	 the	 fact	 that	q,	Δ	 fully	explains	
the	fact	that	q.	
Conclusion	1a	 There	 is	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	 why	 I	 congratulated	 my	 friend	 that	
includes	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 believed	 that	 she	had	won	an	 award	but	 not	
the	fact	that	she	had	won	an	award.	
The	conclusion	of	 the	argument	 from	 false	belief	provides	 the	 first	part	of	 the	argument	 for	
Premise	1.	 The	 argument	 from	 impotent	 facts,	 which	 is	 the	 subject	 of	 the	 next	 section,	
provides	the	second	part	of	that	argument.	
3 The	Argument	from	Impotent	Facts	
The	argument	from	impotent	facts	 is,	mercifully,	simpler.	 It	 is,	 in	some	sense,	summarised	 in	
the	following	remark:	
Whenever	the	agent	acts	in	light	of	the	fact	that	p	[i.e.	because	p],	the	agent	must	take	it	that	
p,	 and	 I	 understand	 this	 sort	 of	 ‘taking	 it	 that’	 as	 a	weak	 form	of	 belief…	 The	 psychologised	
explanation	of	the	action	is	to	be	understood	as	the	same	explanation	as	the	non-psychologised	
one.	(Dancy	2000,	126)	











of	 a	 genuinely	 different	 explanation	 from	 another	 if	 the	 explanatory	 power	 of	 the	 former	
depends	on	the	truth	of	the	latter.	Therefore:	
Conclusion	1b The	 fact	 that	 my	 friend	 won	 an	 award	 is	 not	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	




































So,	 the	 explanatory	 power	 of	 that	 which	 an	 agent	 believes	 typically	 depends	 upon	 their	
believing	it.	3.2 The	Difference	Principle	
When	 is	 one	 proposition	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	 different	 explanation	 from	another?	 Recall	 the	
case	of	 overexplanation	 considered	 in	 §	(VII)4.3:	we	 said	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 swimming	would	
improve	my	mood	and	the	fact	that	swimming	would	help	me	sleep	better	were	each	parts	of	
genuinely	 different	 explanations	 of	 why	 swimming	 was,	 in	 some	 respect,	 worth	 doing.	 In	
contrast,	we	 said	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 Joanne’s	 roof	 leaks	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 rained	 last	 night	
were	not	parts	of	genuinely	different	explanations.	
Why	did	we	 reach	 these	 conclusions?	 It	was	 because	 even	 if	 it	 stopped	being	 the	 case	 that	
swimming	 would	 help	 me	 sleep	 better,	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 would	 improve	 my	 mood	 would	
continue	 to	 explain	 why	 swimming	 was,	 in	 some	 respect,	 worth	 doing;	 and	 vice	 versa.	 In	
contrast,	 if	 Joanne’s	 roof	 didn’t	 leak,	 then,	 ceteris	 paribus,	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 rained	 last	 night	
would	not	explain	why	her	carpet	 is	wet.	 It	was	because	of	 this	difference	between	 the	 two	





the	carpet	 is	wet	from	the	fact	that	the	roof	 leaks	because,	ceteris	paribus,	 if	 the	roof	didn’t	
leak	 then	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 rained	 last	night	would	 stop	explaining	why	 the	 carpet	was	wet	 (it	
wouldn’t	be	wet	anymore).29	Thus:	





29	Cf.	 ‘If	 the	 rationalizing	 explanation	 is	 dependent	on	 the	physiological	 explanation	 in	 an	 appropriate	
sense	(e.g.,	by	being	reducible	to	it),	then	in	truth	there	is	only	one	explanation	here.’	(Kim	1989,	80)	
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The	 difference	 principle	 connects	 the	 property	 of	 being	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	 different	
explanation	from	some	other	proposition	with	the	property	of	being	logically	 independent	of	
that	other	that	proposition.30	3.3 Concluding	the	argument	from	impotent	facts	
Here,	then,	 is	what	 I	have	called	 ‘the	argument	from	impotent	facts’:	 the	fact	that	my	friend	
had	won	an	award	would	not	have	explained	why	I	congratulated	her	if	I	hadn’t	believed	that	
she	 had.	 That	 being	 so,	 since	 some	 proposition	 is	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	 different	 explanation	
from	some	other	only	if	its	explanatory	power	does	not	depend	on	the	truth	of	the	latter,	the	











Conclusion	1b	 The	 fact	 that	 my	 friend	 won	 an	 award	 is	 not	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	
different	 explanation	of	why	 I	 congratulated	her	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 I	
believed	that	she	had	won	an	award.		
4 The	argument	for	Premise	1	











31	This	means	 that,	 for	any	 full	explanation,	Δ,	of	why	 I	 congratulated	my	 friend	 that	 includes	 the	 fact	
that	 I	 believed	 that	my	 friend	 had	won	 an	 award,	 there	 is	 no	 full	 explanation	 that	 is	 both	 genuinely	
different	from	Δ	and	includes	the	fact	that	my	friend	won	an	award.	
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that	my	 friend	 won	 an	 award	 cannot	 be	 part	 of	 an	 explanation	 of	 why	 I	 congratulated	my	




Conclusion	1a	 There	 is	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	 why	 I	 congratulated	 my	 friend	 that	
includes	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 believed	 that	 she	had	won	an	 award	but	 not	
the	fact	that	she	had	won	an	award.	
Conclusion	1b	 The	 fact	 that	 my	 friend	 won	 an	 award	 is	 not	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	
different	 explanation	of	why	 I	 congratulated	her	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 I	
believed	that	she	had	won	an	award.		
Premise	1	 There	is	a	full	explanation	of	why	I	congratulated	my	friend	such	that	






proposition	 is	 not	 part	 of	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	 some	 explanandum,	 and	 is	 not	 part	 of	 a	
genuinely	 different	 explanation	 of	 that	 explanandum	 then	 it	 does	 not	 explain	 that	
explanandum.	 In	 this	 section	 I	 set	 out	 the	 argument	 for	 the	 exclusion	 principle	 and,	 as	 an	
aside,	discuss	its	relation	to	Kim’s	well-known	principle	of	causal	exclusion.	5.1 The	argument	for	the	exclusion	principle	
The	 reasoning	behind	 the	exclusion	principle	 is	 straightforward:	 if	 you	 say	 that	 you	can	 fully	
explain	 some	 explanandum	 without	 mentioning	 p,	 then	 p	 can’t	 just	 be	 added	 to	 that	 full	
explanation	 (because	 it	 would	 be	 superfluous	 –	 and	 MINIMALITY	 precludes	 superfluous	
explanans),	so	p	and	that	full	explanation	can’t	together	be	part	of	the	same	full	explanation.	
Moreover,	if	p	 is	also	not	part	of	a	genuinely	different	full	explanation,	then	we	are	drawn	to	
the	conclusion	 that,	by	 the	 law	of	excluded	middle,	p	 is	not	a	part	of	any	 full	explanation	of	
that	explanandum	(since	it	isn’t	part	of	the	same	full	explanation	and	isn’t	part	of	a	genuinely	
different	 explanation).	 But	 if	 it	 isn’t	 part	 of	 any	 full	 explanation,	 then	 it	 isn’t	 a	 partial	
explanation	–	which	means,	as	I	set	out	in	the	previous	chapter,	it	does	not	explain.		
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Thus,	 if	 there	 is	a	 full	explanation	of	 some	explanandum	 that	does	 include	some	 fact	 then	 if	
that	 fact	 is	 not	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	 different	 explanation	 of	 that	 explanandum,	 it	 does	 not	
explain	it.	Or,	in	other	words:	
EXCLUSION	 For	 any	 propositions,	p	and	q,	 if	 there	 is	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	why	q	
such	that	p	 is	neither	a	part	of	that	full	explanation	nor	 is	 it	part	of	a	
genuinely	different	explanation,	then	p	does	not	partially	explain	q.	
This	is	the	second	premise	of	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem.		5.2 The	exclusion	principle	and	the	principle	of	causal	exclusion	
As	 an	 aside,	 before	 we	 conclude,	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 the	 exclusion	 principle	 is	 a	 close	








my	exclusion	principle.	This	difference	 is	particularly	worth	stressing	because	 it	 is	 the	reason	
why	 my	 argument	 against	 the	 exclusion	 principle	 (see	 §	(XI))	 does	 not	 also	 apply	 to	 Kim’s	
principle	of	causal	exclusion.		
																																								 																				
32 	In	 particular,	 much	 of	 the	 conceptual	 apparatus	 of	 Kim’s	 principle	 of	 causal	 exclusion	 has	 an	
explanatory	 analogue	 in	 the	 conceptual	 apparatus	 I	 have	 used.	 For	 instance,	 Kim’s	 (1993,	 280)	












the	 fact	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award	 is	 neither	 a	 part	 of	 that	 full	
explanation	nor	is	it	part	of	a	genuinely	different	explanation.	
EXCLUSION	 For	 any	 propositions,	p	and	q,	 if	 there	 is	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	why	q	
such	that	p	 is	neither	a	part	of	that	full	explanation	nor	 is	 it	part	of	a	
genuinely	different	explanation,	then	p	does	not	partially	explain	q.	





can	 lead	 to	 the	 somewhat	 counterintuitive	 conclusion	 that	 I	 did	 not	 congratulate	my	 friend	
because	she	had	won	an	award,	but	only	because	I	thought	she	did.		



















that	 she	 had),	 then	 (i)	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 believed	 that	 she	 had	won	 an	
award	would	have	partially	explained	why	I	congratulated	her;	and	(ii)	




ENDURANCE	 For	 any	 propositions	p,	 q	and	 r,	 the	 following	 holds:	 Suppose	 that	q	
partially	explains	the	fact	that	r	when	it	is	not	the	case	that	p.	Suppose	
further	that	neither	p	nor	not	p	is	part	of	the	same	explanation	of	r	as	
q.	 Then,	 if,	 ceteris	 paribus,	 it	 were	 the	 case	 that	 p,	 q	 would	 still	
partially	explain	the	fact	that	r.	
SUFFICIENCY	 For	any	proposition	q,	and	any	set,	Δ,	 if	Δ	 is	a	 full	explanation	of	 the	
fact	 that	q	 in	 some	circumstance,	 then,	 in	any	circumstance	 in	which	


















out	 the	 general	 form	 of	 the	 Problem,	 followed	 by	 the	 general	 form	 of	 the	
argument	for	the	first	premise	of	the	Problem.	I	show	the	Problem	can	be	used	
to	argue	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 read	 that	my	 friend	had	won	an	award	does	not	
explain	why	I	congratulated	her,	and	that	neither	that	fact,	nor	the	fact	that	she	
had	 won	 an	 award,	 can	 explain	 why	 it	 was	 pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	 me	 to	
congratulate	her.	








In	 the	 previous	 chapter	 I	 showed	 how	 The	 Explanatory	 Exclusion	 Problem	 provides	 an	
argument	against	(R1).	The	purpose	of	this	chapter	is	to	show	that	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	















EXCLUSION	 For	 any	 propositions,	p	and	q,	 if	 there	 is	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	why	q	








that	 she	 had),	 then	 (i)	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 believed	 that	 she	 had	won	 an	
award	would	have	partially	explained	why	I	congratulated	her;	and	(ii)	















arrive	 at	 Conclusions	 2,	 3,	 and	 4	 we	 need	 only	 show	 that	 the	 appropriate	 specifications	 of	
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Premise	 #a	 and	 Premise	 #b	 are	 true	 of	 those	 cases.	 I	 consider	 the	 argument	 for	 each	
conclusion	in	turn.	
2 The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	for	(R2)	
Does	the	fact	that	 I	 read	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	explain	why	 I	congratulated	her?	




of	 that	 full	 explanation	 nor	 is	 it	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	 different	
explanation.		
Now,	 as	 discussed,	 in	 order	 to	 arrive	 at	 Premise	2	 we	 need	 only	 demonstrate	 that	 the	
appropriate	specifications	of	Premise	#a	and	Premise	#b	are	true.	That	 is	 the	purpose	of	 the	
following	sections.	2.1 The	argument	for	Premise	2a	
Firstly,	 suppose	 that,	 ceteris	 paribus,	 I	 hadn’t	 read	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award,	 but	 I	 still	
believed	 that	 she	 had	 –	maybe	 I	 saw	 her	 win	 it,	 or	 heard	 about	 it	 from	 another	 friend,	 or	




Moreover,	 continuing	 to	 suppose	 that,	 ceteris	 paribus,	 I	 hadn’t	 read	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	
award	(but	nonetheless	believed	that	she	had),	would	the	fact	that	I	hadn’t	read	that	she	had	




I	 still	 believed	 that	 she	had)	 then	 (i)	 the	 fact	 that	 I	believed	 that	 she	
had	won	an	award	would	have	partially	explained	why	I	congratulated	
her;	 and	 (ii)	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 had	not	 read	 that	 she	had	won	an	award	
would	not	have	partially	explained	why	I	congratulated	her.	2.2 The	argument	for	Premise	2b	
Now	consider:	if,	ceteris	paribus,	I	had	not	believed	that	she	had	won	an	award	even	though	I’d	




to	congratulate	her	 (again,	 I	didn’t	 see	anything	else	of	worth	 in	congratulating	her,	and	 I’m	
not	a	sarcastic	sort).		
But	 if	 I	wouldn’t	 have	 congratulated	 her	 then	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 had	 read	 that	 she	 had	won	 an	




had	 read	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award	 would	 not	 have	 partially	
explained	why	I	congratulated	her	(since	I	wouldn’t	have).	2.3 The	argument	for	Premise	2	
To	 run	 through	 the	argument,	 for	 clarity:	we	know,	 from	condition	 (i)	of	Premise	2a,	 that	 if,	
ceteris	paribus,	I	had	not	read	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	(but	had	still	believed	that	she	
had	 won	 an	 award)	 then	 there	 would	 have	 been	 a	 full	 explanation,	 call	 it	 ∆*,	 of	 why	 I	











won	 an	 award	 then	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 had	 read	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award	 would	 not	 have	
explained	why	I	congratulated	her	(since	I	wouldn’t	have).	So,	from	DIFFERENCE,	we	know	that	
the	 fact	 that	 I	 read	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award	 cannot	 be	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	 different	
explanation	 of	 why	 I	 congratulated	 her	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 believed	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	












of	 that	 full	 explanation	 nor	 is	 it	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	 different	
explanation.	
EXCLUSION	 For	 any	 propositions,	p	and	q,	 if	 there	 is	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	why	q	





Does	 the	 fact	 that	my	 friend	won	an	 award	explain	why	 it	was	pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	me	 to	
congratulate	her?	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	 for	 (R3)	 concludes	 that	 it	does	not.	 To	
reach	that	conclusion	we	need	to	establish	the	following:	
Premise	3 There	 is	a	 full	explanation	of	why	 it	was	pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	me	to	
congratulate	my	 friend	 such	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 she	won	 an	 award	 is	



























that	 she	 had),	 then	 (i)	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 believed	 that	 she	 had	won	 an	
award	would	have	partially	explained	why	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	
me	to	congratulate	her;	and	(ii)	the	fact	that	she	did	not	win	an	award	

























Premise	3	 There	 is	a	 full	explanation	of	why	 it	was	pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	me	to	
congratulate	my	 friend	 such	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 she	won	 an	 award	 is	
neither	 a	 part	 of	 that	 full	 explanation	 nor	 is	 it	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	
different	explanation.	
EXCLUSION	 For	 any	 propositions,	p	and	q,	 if	 there	 is	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	why	q	





Finally:	does	the	 fact	 that	 I	 read	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	 in	 the	newspaper	explain	
why	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	congratulate	her?	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	
for	(R4)	says	it	does	not.	This	is	what	we	need	to	show	to	get	there:	
Premise	4 There	 is	a	 full	explanation	of	why	 it	was	pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	me	to	
congratulate	my	friend	such	that	the	fact	that	I	read	that	she	had	won	
an	 award	 is	 neither	 a	 part	 of	 that	 full	 explanation	 nor	 is	 it	 part	 of	 a	
genuinely	different	explanation.	4.1 The	argument	for	Premise	4a	










due	 to	 crazed	 conviction,	 say,	 or	 wishful	 thinking.	 Irrationality	 cannot	 beget	 rationality!	 A	
subject’s	 beliefs	 contribute	 to	making	 it	 rational	 for	 her	 to	 act	 in	 certain	 ways	 only	 if	 those	
beliefs	are	themselves	rational.	(Whiting	2014,	4)	
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If	 this	 is	 so,	 then	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 way	 that	 one	 acquires	 one’s	 beliefs	 is	 relevant	 to	 the	
rationality	 of	 one’s	 actions;	 that	 is,	 we	 cannot	 so	 easily	 omit	 mention	 of	 them	 in	 the	
explanation	of	why	it	is	rational	for	an	agent	to	do	some	action.	
In	some	respect,	I	disagree	–	I	think	that	an	irrational	belief	can	nonetheless	explain	why	it	was	
pro	 tanto	 rational	 (but	 probably	 not	 all	 things	 considered	 rational)	 for	 someone	 to	 do	
something,2	as	do	others.3	Nonetheless,	even	if	irrational	beliefs	can’t	explain	why	actions	are	




So,	 if	ceteris	paribus,	 I	hadn’t	read	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award,	but	 I	still	believed	that	
she’d	won	an	award	and	that	belief	was	(still)	rational,	would	it	have	been	pro	tanto	rational	
for	me	 to	 congratulate	my	 friend?	Of	 course!	And	 it	would	have	been	pro	 tanto	 rational,	 in	
part,	because	I	believed	that	she	had	won	an	award.	
Moreover,	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 did	not	 read	 that	my	 friend	 had	won	 an	 award	 clearly	would	 not	
explain	why	it	would	have	been	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	congratulate	her.	Thus:	
																																								 																				









it	 is,	 I	 submit,	 at	 least	 pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	 him	 to	 go	 into	 hiding.	 	 Some	 resistance	 to	 this	 view	 is	
understandable:	to	believe	that	the	FBI	is	chasing	you	is	certainly	outlandish,	and	Ornard	only	believes	it	
because	he	is	crazy	–	so	surely	going	into	hiding	can’t	be	even	a	pro	tanto	rational	thing	for	him	to	do?	If	
Ornard	 goes	 into	 hiding	 it’s	 because	 he’s	 not	 rational,	 it’s	 not	 the	 rational	 thing	 for	 him	 to	 do!	 The	
problem,	however,	with	saying	that	it	isn’t	even	pro	tanto	rational	for	Ornard	to	go	into	hiding	is	that	we	
are	seemingly	 forced	to	question	whether	or	not	 it	 is	pro	tanto	rational	 for	Bernard	to	go	 into	hiding.	
Why?	Because	of	 the	widely	held	view	that	what	 it	 is	 rational	 for	an	agent	 to	do	supervenes	on	 their	
mental	states	(e.g.	Broome	2013,	151),	which	is	to	say	that	there	can	be	no	change	in	what	it	is	rational	
for	 an	 agent	 to	 do	 without	 a	 change	 in	 their	 mind.	 Now,	 since	 Bernard	 and	 Ornard	 are	 mental	
duplicates,	given	that	what	it	is	rational	for	an	agent	to	do	supervenes	on	their	mental	states,	there	can	
be	no	difference	between	Bernard	and	Ornard	 in	what	 it	 is	 rational	 for	 them	 to	do,	 since	 there	 is	no	
difference	in	their	brain	states.	
3	‘Given	my	irrational	belief	that	smoking	will	protect	my	health,	it	would	be	rational	for	me	to	smoke.	





I	 still	 believed	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award)	 then	 (i)	 the	 fact	 that	 I	
believed	 that	 she	 had	won	 an	 award	would	 have	 partially	 explained	
why	 it	was	pro	tanto	 rational	 for	me	to	congratulate	her;	and	 (ii)	 the	






an	award.	And	perhaps,	 further,	 you	 insist	 that	given	 the	ceteris	paribus	 clause	 it	 can’t	have	
been	rational.	Well,	I	disagree.	
Supposing	 that	 pathological	 jealousy	makes	me	withhold.	 The	 all	 things	 considered	 rational	
thing	for	me	to	do	is	to	cease	withholding	(and	perhaps	seek	treatment).	Then,	once	I’ve	done	
that,	 it	would	be	pro	 tanto	rational	 for	me	to	congratulate	my	 friend.	But,	given	that	 I	don’t	
believe	that	she	has	won	an	award	(that	 is,	before	 I	cease	withholding),	 I	suggest,	 it	can’t	be	
pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	congratulate	her.	I	see	nothing	of	any	worth	in	doing	so	–	and	not	
because	I	don’t	like	her,	or	don’t	care	about	her	feelings	–	but	because	I	don’t	believe	that	she	









had	 read	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award	 would	 not	 have	 partially	
explained	why	 I	 it	was	pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	me	 to	 congratulate	her	
(since	it	wouldn’t	have	been	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	congratulate	
her).	4.3 The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	for	(R4)	




Premise	4	 There	 is	a	 full	explanation	of	why	 it	was	pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	me	to	
congratulate	my	friend	such	that	the	fact	that	I	read	that	she	had	won	
an	 award	 is	 neither	 a	 part	 of	 that	 full	 explanation	 nor	 is	 it	 part	 of	 a	
genuinely	different	explanation.		
EXCLUSION	 For	 any	 propositions,	p	and	q,	 if	 there	 is	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	why	q	





Many	 have	 observed 5 	a	 similarity	 between	 the	 problem	 that	 I	 have	 formalised	 as	 The	
Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	and	the	argument	from	illusion	in	the	literature	on	perception.		
To	the	extent	 that	we	conceive	of	 the	argument	 from	 illusion	as	a	problem	for	 the	 idea	that	
the	 external	 world	 could	 explain	why	we	 believe	what	we	 believe	 then	 the	 argument	 from	




tomato	were	 there	would	partially	explain	why	 I	believed	 that	a	 tomato	was	 there.	And	 the	




there	was	a	tomato	wouldn’t	have	explained	why	 I	believed	that	there	was	 (since	 I	wouldn’t	
have	believed	that	there	was).	This	provides	us	with	the	relevant	specification	of	Premise	#b.		
From	these	specifications	of	Premise	#a	and	Premise	#b,	together	with	the	relevant	principles	




claim	 about	 what	 explains	 an	 agent’s	 beliefs.	 For	 instance,	 one	 interpretation	 of	 it	 is	 as	 a	




When	 the	 argument	 from	 illusion	 is	 conceived	 in	 that	 manner,	 it	 cannot	 be	 so	 simply	
characterised	 as	 The	 Explanatory	 Exclusion	 Problem.	 Although,	 I	 submit,	 the	 problems	 are	
nonetheless	related.	
6 Conclusion	
I	 have	 now	 shown	 how	 The	 Explanatory	 Exclusion	 Problem	 can	 provide	 arguments	 against	
(R1)-(R4).		
Since	explanatory	 rationalism	requires	 the	 truth	of	 (R1)-(R4)	 if	 it	 is	 to	be	consistent	with	 the	
prima	facie	reasonable	claims	set	out	in	earlier	chapters,	I	will	need	to	find	some	way	to	reject	





Before	 then,	 however,	 I	 wish	 to	 consider	 the	 other,	 more	 commonplace	 responses	 to	 The	










took	my	umbrella	either	 ‘elliptically’,	 ‘directly’	or	 ‘indirectly’.	 I	note	 that	which	
answer	one	accepts	will	depend	on	one’s	response	to	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	
Problem:	 elliptical	 theorists	 accept	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 Problem,	 direct	




because	 his	 daughter	 is	 on	 the	 7	 o’clock	 train.	 How	 are	 we	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 these	
commonplace	explanations?	
If	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	is	to	be	believed,	we	should	not	interpret	them	literally.	
That	 is,	 the	purported	 explanantia	 (i.e.	 that	which	 follows	 the	 ‘because’)	 in	 such	 statements	
are	not	the	actual	explanantia;	the	fact	that	it	is	raining	does	not	really	explain	why	I	took	my	
umbrella.	Instead,	whatever	explanatory	power	these	statements	have	is	due	to	there	being	a	

















inter	 alia,	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 believe	 that	 it	 was	 raining.	 Thus	 they	 deny	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	




my	umbrella	because	 it	was	 raining.’	 There	 are	 three	possible	 accounts:	 the	 fact	 that	 it	was	
raining	either	explains	my	action	elliptically,	or	it	explains	it	directly,	or	it	explains	it	indirectly.	
In	what	 follows	 I	will	 set	 out	 the	 problems	with	elliptical	 and	direct	 theories,	which	 are	 the	
typical	responses	to	this	problem.	In	subsequent	chapters	I	will	defend	my	own	indirect	theory.	





























my	 umbrella,	 it	 is	 not	 the	 explanans	 of	 why	 I	 took	 it.	 It	 is	 in	 that	 sense	 of	 the	 word	
‘explanation’	that	I	suggest	that	we	call	sentences	in	which	a	normative	reason	for	an	agent	to	
act	 appears	 in	 the	 position	 of	 an	 explanans	 of	 why	 they	 acted, 2 	‘normative	 reason	
explanations’.	
It	 is	 a	 fact	 that	 we	 often	 give	 normative	 reason	 explanations	 of	 our	 actions.	 I	 gave	 a	 few	
examples	in	my	opening	remarks,	here	are	some	more3:	Sandra	is	going	to	the	shops	because	
she	 is	 out	 of	milk;	 I’m	 flying	 to	 Bodrum	because	 that’s	where	my	 father	 lives;	 Theresa	May	
made	a	deal	with	the	DUP	in	2017	because	that	was	the	only	way	for	her	to	form	a	majority	






my	umbrella	when	 I	said	that	 I	 took	my	umbrella	because	 it	was	raining.	The	remarks	of	 the	




3 	For	 the	 following	 examples,	 assume	 that	 the	 relevant	 supporting	 conditions	 (desires,	 evaluative	
judgements,	evaluative	facts…)	are	in	place	such	that:	the	fact	that	Sandra	is	out	of	milk	is	a	normative	
reason	for	her	to	go	to	the	shops;	the	fact	that	my	father	lives	in	Bodrum	is	a	normative	reason	for	me	




question:	 how	 do	 we	 manage	 to	 explain	 our	 actions	 when	 we	 give	 a	 normative	 reason	
explanation	 of	 them?	 Answering	 this	 question	 is	 the	 job	 of	 what	 I	 will	 call	 a	 ‘theory	 of	
normative	reason	explanation’.		
Which	 theory	of	normative	 reason	explanation	one	holds	depends	on	one’s	 response	 to	The	
Explanatory	 Exclusion	 Problem:	 those	who	 accept	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 Problem	 insist	 that	





explanation	 of	 an	 agent’s	 action,	 the	 normative	 reason	 explains	 the	 agent’s	 action	 directly;	










Elliptical	 theories5	accept	 the	 conclusion	of	 The	Explanatory	 Exclusion	Problem;	 they	 suggest	
that	when	I	say	that	I	took	my	umbrella	because	it	was	raining,	the	purported	explanans	(the	
fact	 that	 it	was	 raining)	 is	not	 the	actual	 explanans.	Nonetheless,	when	 I	 say	 that	 I	 took	my	
umbrella	because	it	was	raining,	you	understand	why	I	took	it	–	that	is,	in	spite	of	the	apparent	
inaccuracy	of	what	I	said,	you	still	understood	why	I	took	my	umbrella.	The	question	is:	how?	
How	do	we	manage	 to	explain	our	actions	 if	 the	purported	explanans	 in	a	normative	 reason	
explanation	is	not	the	actual	explanans?		




5	The	 name	 for	 these	 theories	was	 inspired	 by	Maria	 Alvarez’s	 (2010,	 180)	 related	 (but	 not	 identical)	
discussion	of	what	she	calls	‘Humean	explanations.’		
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my	psychology,	which	 is	what	 really	does	 the	explaining.	 That	 is,	when	we	give	a	normative	
reason	 explanation,	 ‘we	 suppose	 that,	 properly	 understood,	 it	 should	 be	 seen	 as	






What	 feature	 of	 our	 psychology	 is	 it	 that	 normative	 reasons	 are	meant	 to	 be	 elliptical	 for,	
when	we	give	a	normative	reason	explanation?	Opinions	diverge.	One	view	is	that	if	I	say	that	I	
took	 my	 umbrella	 because	 it	 was	 raining	 the	 conversational	 implicature7	is	 the	 fact	 that	 I	
believed	that	it	was	raining,8	another	view	is	that	it	is	the	fact	that	I	acted	for	the	reason	that	it	










10	Gibbons	 (2010,	359)	 comes	 close	 to	advocating	 this	 view	–	although	 I	 think	his	 eventual	position	 is	
closer	 to	 the	 indirect	 theory	 that	 I	 advocate	 in	 §	(XII),	 since,	 on	 the	 same	 page,	 he	makes	 clear	 that	
normative	reasons	can	explain.	



















Elliptical	 theories	 claim	 that	 normative	 reason	 explanations	 provide	 some	 explanation	 of	 an	
agent’s	action	only	because	they	imply	that	the	agent	knew	that	normative	reason.	Critically,	
elliptical	theorists	insist,	the	normative	reason	does	no	explanatory	work	of	its	own.	
I	 raise	 two	 related	 concerns	 with	 this	 view:	 first,	 it	 makes	 normative	 reasons	 explanatorily	
inert,	contrary	to	the	prevailing	view	that	they	ought	to	have	explanatory	power;	and	second,	
it	 renders	 ordinary	 language	 explanations	 of	 our	 actions	 thoroughly	 unsuited	 to	 the	 task	 to	
which	we	habitually	put	them.	
On	the	first:	the	‘explanatory	constraint’,	so	named	by	Jonathan	Dancy	(2000),12	and	to	which	
many13	subscribe,	 says	 that	 any	 theory	 of	 reasons	 must	 account	 for	 someone	 doing	 some	
action	because	of	a	normative	reason	that	there	is	for	them	to	do	it.	This	constraint	seems	like	
a	 modest	 one:	 assuming	 that	 normative	 reasons	 indeed	 have	 some	 normative	 import,	 the	
explanatory	 constraint	 requires	 only	 that	 normative	 reasons	 have	more	 than	 just	 normative	
significance.	As	Ulrike	Heuer	succinctly	puts	it,	this	requirement,	‘expresses	nothing	more	than	
the	everyday	assumption	 that	we	 sometimes…	do	 something	because	 it	 is	 right	or	 justified.’	






The	 second	 problem:	 denying	 that	 normative	 reasons	 explain	 our	 actions	 contradicts	 our	
habitual	patterns	of	speech.	We	routinely	cite	normative	reasons	by	way	of	explanation	of	our	
actions	 and	 it	 does	 quite	 severe	 disservice	 to	 our	 ordinary	 language	 expressions	 to	 suppose	
that	when	I	say,	‘Laura	threw	away	the	milk	because	it	had	gone	off’	the	real	explanans	is	not	
what	 I	 say	 it	 is15	but	 only	 what	 is	 implied	 by	 it.	 Ordinary	 language	 may	 be	 occasionally	






required	 that	 an	 agent	 should	 be	 able	 to	 do	 something	 for	 reasons	 that	 make	 it	 worth	 doing,	 this	
argument	requires	that	an	agent	should	be	able	to	do	something	because	of	what	makes	it	worth	doing,	





The	 only	 way	 to	 satisfy	 the	 explanatory	 constraint	 and	 to	 accept	 the	 literal	 form	 of	 our	
everyday	expressions	is	to	concede	that	(non-psychological)	normative	reasons	can	explain	our	





Now,	as	we	established	 in	§	(VIII),	 it	 seems	as	 though	whenever	we	give	a	normative	 reason	
explanation	 we	 can	 make	 a	 claim	 that	 fits	 the	 Premise	 #	 form	 about	 the	 explanatory	
contribution	of	the	normative	reason	to	the	explanation	of	the	action16;	that	is,	for	any	action	
and	any	normative	 reason	 to	do	 that	action,	 there	 is	always	a	 full	explanation	of	 that	action	
such	 that	 that	 normative	 reason	 is	 neither	 a	 part	 of	 that	 full	 explanation	 nor	 is	 it	 part	 of	 a	
genuinely	different	full	explanation.	Direct	theories	deny	this	claim.	4.1 How	normative	reasons	directly	explain	actions	
Direct	theories	say	that	when	a	normative	reason	explains	an	action	it	adds	something	to	the	




But	how	are	 facts	about	 the	world	 supposed	 to	directly	explain	our	action?	Here	 is	a	 typical	
response:	following	Gilbert	Ryle	(1949),	one	can	conceive	of	knowledge	as	a	capacity	or	ability.	













Thus,	 knowing	 some	 fact	 engenders	 a	 special,	 direct	 connection	between	 the	agent	 and	 the	





normative	 reason	need	even	be	 true	 in	order	 to	explain	an	agent’s	 action,	 so	 long	as	 it	was	
believed.	More	generally,	even	amongst	knowledge-based	direct	theories,	 the	precise	nature	
of	 how	 the	 normative	 reason	 explains	 depends	 on	 the	 way	 in	 which	 one	 rejects	 the	 first	
premise	 of	 The	 Explanatory	 Exclusion	 Problem.	 I	 consider	 the	 main	 ways	 of	 being	 a	 direct	
theorist	in	the	Appendix	to	this	chapter.	4.2 The	problems	with	direct	theories	4.2.1 What’s	weird	about	direct	normative	reason	explanation	
How	exactly	does	‘responding’	to	a	normative	reason,	being	‘guided’	by	one	or	‘acting	in	light	
of	 it’	 make	 that	 normative	 reason	 directly	 explanatory?	 The	 nature	 of	 the	 explanation	 that	
knowledge	 is	 supposed	 to	engender	 is	 thoroughly	mysterious,	and	accounts	of	 it	are	 replete	
with	metaphors	but	thin	on	detail.	If	the	concept	of	‘responding	to	the	fact’	is	not	causal	(and	
none	 seem	 to	 think	 it	 is),	 what	 exactly	 is	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 direct	 connection	 between	 the	
agent	and	the	fact,	when	they	respond	to	the	fact,	that	makes	that	fact	explain	their	action?17	
Now,	 if	 it	were	 self-evident	 that	 there	 is	 such	a	direct	 connection	 then	 the	use	of	metaphor	
might	 well	 be	 unproblematic.	 For	 instance,	 we	 can	 say	 that	 maglev	 trains	 are	 ‘guided’	 by	
magnets	without	needing	to	be	literal	about	the	relation	between	the	magnets	and	the	train	
because	 it	 is	 seemingly	 clear	 that	 something	 the	magnets	 are	 doing	 is	 directly	 affecting	 the	
train.	 However,	 it	 is	 very	 much	 not	 clear	 that	 normative	 reasons	 are	 directly	 affecting	 my	
action	–	so	we	need	an	account	of	what	is	occurring	that	is	not	couched	in	metaphors	in	order	
to	convince	us	that	the	normative	reason	really	is	directly	related	to	the	action.	I	am	concerned	
that	 no	 such	 account	 is	 available	 because	 there	 is	 no	 such	 direct	 relation.	 This	 is	 the	 first	
problem	for	direct	theories.	
																																								 																				












First,	 recall	 that	 Premise	1	 followed	 from	 four	 principles	 of	 explanation	 together	 with	 the	
following	two	claims:	
Premise	1a	 If,	ceteris	paribus,	my	friend	had	not	won	an	award	(but	I	still	believed	
that	 she	 had),	 then	 (i)	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 believed	 that	 she	 had	won	 an	
award	would	have	partially	explained	why	I	congratulated	her;	and	(ii)	








of	 explanation.	 I	 provide	 a	 full	 account	 of	 my	 reasoning	 in	 the	 Appendix	 to	 this	 chapter,	
however,	by	way	of	overview	here:	denying	FACTIVITY	comes	at	the	cost	of	denying	something	
that	is	seemingly	obviously	true	(i.e.	that	explanation	is	factive).	Denying	DIFFERENCE	makes	the	
concept	 of	 being	 a	 genuinely	 different	 explanation	 obscure,	 and	 relying	 on	 the	 denial	 of	
difference	 to	 account	 for	 normative	 reason	 explanation	 results	 in	 an	 implausibly	 ubiquitous	
level	of	overexplanation.	Meanwhile,	theories	that	deny	ENDURANCE	seemingly	stretch	credulity	
by	 insisting	 that,	 in	 some	 cases,	 the	 mind	 plays	 no	 explanatory	 role	 in	 action.	 And	 lastly,	






The	 upshot,	 I	 suggest,	 is	 that	 there	 is	 no	 credible	 way	 to	 reject	 the	 first	 premise	 of	 The	




reason	 explanation,	 elliptical	 theories	 and	 direct	 theories.	 I	 suggested	 that	 both	 of	 these	
theories	are	deeply	problematic.	
If	normative	reasons	don’t	explain	elliptically,	and	don’t	explain	directly,	then,	 I	suggest,	they	
must	 explain	 indirectly,	 that	 is,	 by	 explaining	 those	 features	 of	 the	 agent’s	 psychology	 that	





Direct	 theories	of	normative	 reason	explanation	 reject	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 first	premise	of	The	








ENDURANCE	 For	 any	 propositions	p,	 q	and	 r,	 the	 following	 holds:	 Suppose	 that	q	
partially	explains	the	fact	that	r	when	it	is	not	the	case	that	p.	Suppose	
further	that	neither	p	nor	not	p	is	part	of	the	same	explanation	of	r	as	
q.	 Then,	 if,	 ceteris	 paribus,	 it	 were	 the	 case	 that	 p,	 q	 would	 still	
partially	explain	the	fact	that	r.	
SUFFICIENCY	 For	any	proposition	q,	and	any	set,	Δ,	 if	Δ	 is	a	 full	explanation	of	 the	
fact	 that	q	 in	 some	circumstance,	 then,	 in	any	circumstance	 in	which	
all	 the	elements	of	Δ	partially	explain	 the	 fact	 that	q,	Δ	fully	explains	
the	fact	that	q.	
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Since	 any	 direct	 theory	must	 reject	 one	 of	 these	 principles,	we	 can	 categorise	 the	 different	
direct	theories	according	to	which	of	these	principles	they	reject,	as	follows19:	- Non-factivist:	 Theories	 that	 reject	 FACTIVITY	 and	 insist	 that	 when	 normative	 reasons	
explain	an	agent’s	action	they	do	so	qua	the	content	of	the	agent’s	belief.	- Inclusive	 disjunctivist:	 Theories	 that	 reject	 DIFFERENCE	 and	 insist	 that	when	 normative	
reasons	 explain	 what	 an	 agent	 does	 they	 do	 so	 as	 part	 of	 an	 explanation	 that	 is	
genuinely	different	from	the	explanation	in	terms	of	the	agent’s	psychology.	- Exclusive	disjunctivist:	Theories	 that	 reject	ENDURANCE	and	 insist	 that	when	normative	
reasons	explain	what	an	agent	does	they	do	so	as	part	of	the	full	explanation	instead	of	
the	facts	about	what	an	agent	believes.	- Supplementarist:	 Theories	 that	 reject	 SUFFICIENCY	 and	 insist	 that	 when	 a	 normative	
reason	explains	an	agent’s	 action	 they	do	 so	as	part	of	 the	 full	 explanation	 together	
with	the	facts	about	what	an	agent	believes.		
In	what	 follows	 I	will	 set	out	 the	account	of	how	normative	reasons	explain	 in	each	of	 these	
strategies,	followed	by	the	problems	they	face.	
A	 caveat	 regarding	 all	 these	 theories:	 they	 are	 all	 to	 a	 greater	 or	 lesser	 extent,	 of	my	 own	
construction.	 Most	 of	 the	 literature	 from	 which	 these	 theories	 are	 drawn	 is	 actually	 a	
discussion	 of	 whether	 or	 not	 (and	 how)	 normative	 reasons	 can	 be	 the	 reason	 for	 which	 an	
agent	acts.	 I,	however,	am	answering	a	simpler	question:	can	normative	 reasons	explain	our	
actions?	 The	 theories	 below	 have	 been	 inspired	 by	 responses	 to	 the	 former	 question,	 and	
while	I	suggest	that	certain	authors	hold	some	forms	of	the	theories	below,	nothing	in	what	I	




Non-factivist	 theories	 reject	 the	 factivity	 principle.	 According	 to	 non-factivist	 theories	 (e.g.	
Dancy	 2000;	 Comesaña	 and	McGrath	 2014),	 saying	 that	 I	 took	my	 umbrella	 because	 it	 was	
raining	has	 the	conversational	 implicature	that	 it	was	raining,	but	does	not	entail	 that	 it	was	
raining;	indeed,	they	stress,	that	implicature	is	cancellable.	
																																								 																				
19	There	 is	a	 fourth	strategy	that	 I	haven’t	considered	here.	One	could	differentiate	the	explanantia	of	












The	 idea	 seems	 to	 be	 this:	 a	 normative	 reason	 cannot	 explain	 an	 agent’s	 action	 unless	 the	
agent	believes	it20	–	so	the	fact	that	the	agent	believes	it	must	at	least	enable	the	explanation.	














The	 first	 problem	 with	 non-factivist	 theories	 is	 that	 they	 are	 absurd.	 If	 we	 admit	 that	















what	 an	 agent	 believes	 are	 aptly	 categorised	 as	 enabling	 conditions.22	And	 if	 they	 aren’t	
enabling	conditions,	concerns	about	what	normative	reasons	really	do	by	way	of	explanation	
return.		




Fourthly,	 it	 is	worth	 noting,	 from	 a	 rhetorical	 perspective,	 that	 even	 the	 progenitor	 of	 non-
factivist	theories,	Jonathan	Dancy,	has	since	abandoned	them	(see	Dancy	2014).		
A.3 Inclusive	disjunctivist	theories	
Inclusive	disjunctivist	 theories	 reject	 the	difference	principle.	 They	accept	 that	 there	 is	 a	 full	
explanation	of	why	 I	congratulated	my	friend	that	does	not	 include	the	fact	that	she	won	an	
award. 25 	Nonetheless,	 they	 say,	 there	 is	 a	 genuinely	 different	 explanation	 of	 why	 I	
congratulated	my	friend	that	does	 include	the	fact	that	she	won	an	award.	They	suggest	that	
even	 though	 the	 explanation	 in	 terms	 of	 normative	 reasons	 would	 not	 exist	 without	 the	
explanation	in	terms	of	beliefs,	it	is	nonetheless	genuinely	different	from	it.26	
What	would	make	you	believe	 this?	Well,	as	already	noted,27	there	are	structural	 similarities	
between	the	argument	 from	 illusion	 in	 the	 literature	on	perception	and	 the	problem	for	 the	
																																								 																				
22	Turri	(2009,	505–6)	argues	that	it	is	normally	odd	to	ask	why	an	enabling	condition	for	an	explanation	




25	This	 is	 what	 makes	 them	 inclusive	 disjunctivists	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 exclusive	 disjunctivists,	 to	 be	
considered	in	the	next	section.	I	have	adopted	the	inclusive	vs.	exclusive	distinction	from	Ruben	(2008)	
and	Stout	(2009);	they	say	that	inclusive	disjunctivists	accept	some	role	for	the	highest	common	factor,	
while	 exclusive	 disjunctivists	 do	 not.	 Note	 Pautz	 (2010,	 298–99)	 draws	 the	 same	 distinction	 between	
different	types	of	disjunctivism,	but	he	calls	inclusive	disjunctivism	the	‘overdetermination	version’;	and	
exclusive	disjunctivism	and	‘the	restrictive	version’.	
26	This	 is,	 I	 think,	 the	 view	 that	 John	Hyman	 sets	 out:	 ‘If	 James	merely	 believed	 that	 going	 to	 church	
would	please	his	mother	but	did	not	know	that	it	would,	we	can	say	that	he	went	to	church	because	he	
believed	that	 it	would	please	his	mother,	but	we	cannot	say	that	he	went	to	church	because	 it	would	
please	his	mother.	But	 if	he	knew	that	 it	would	please	his	mother,	we	can	say	either	 that	he	went	 to	





inspired	 by	 disjunctivist	 responses	 to	 the	 former,	 adopt	 a	 disjunctivist	 view	 of	 action	
explanation	as	a	response	to	the	latter.	The	idea	is	this:	although	it	is	always	explanatory,	the	
highest	common	factor	of	all	action	explanations	(explanation	in	terms	of	the	facts	about	what	
the	 agent	 believes)	 is	 not	 the	 limit	 of	 the	 resources	 available	 for	 action	 explanation29	–	
sometimes	we	 can	also	 explain	 an	 agent’s	 action	 directly,	 and	 differently,	 with	 a	 normative	
reason.	So	while	 the	action	 is	already	 fully	explained	by	 facts	about	what	 the	agent	believes	
(and	 relevant	 supplementary	 facts	 (e.g.	 facts	 about	 what	 they	 want,	 judge	 good	 etc.))	 the	
normative	reason	adds	another,	additional	explanation	of	it.	A.3.1 The	problems	for	inclusive	disjunctivist	theories	
The	 first	 problem	 with	 inclusive	 disjunctivist	 theories	 is	 that,	 in	 rejecting	 the	 difference	






other	 set	 of	 facts	 is	 also	 sufficient	 for	me	 to	 congratulate	my	 friend	 and	which	 explains	my	
doing	so	directly?	I	cannot	think	of	any.	
And	 lastly,	 and	 perhaps	most	 obviously,	 the	 inclusive	 disjunctivist	 accepts	 that	my	 action	 is	
overexplained,	because	there	are	two	genuinely	different	explanations	of	it.	This	is	problematic	








always	 in	one	of	 two	states	–	acting	on	the	knowledge	that	 it	 is	 raining	or	merely	acting	on	the	belief	
that	it	is	raining.	Acting	on	the	belief	that	it	is	raining	is	seemingly	the	highest	common	factor	of	these	
two	states.	








overexplained.	 But	 if	 this	 sort	 of	 overexplanation	 is	 meant	 to	 occur	 whenever	 we	 give	 a	
normative	 reason	 explanation,	 then,	 given	 the	 ubiquity	 of	 such	 explanations,	 inclusive	
disjunctivism	seems	to	require	a	really	implausible	incidence	of	overexplanation.		
Maybe	 you	 want	 to	 insist	 that	 overexplanation	 should	 not	 trouble	 us	 as	 much	 as	
overdetermination,	 because	 there	 aren’t	 independent	 determining	 factors,	 there	 are	 only	
different	explanatory	factors.	However,	I	think	this	response	is	more	trouble	than	it’s	worth	–	
it’s	not	clear	to	me	that	it	makes	overexplanation	unproblematic	and,	as	I’ve	noted,	we	start	to	




congratulate	my	 friend,	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 believed	 that	 she	 had	won	 an	 award	 explains	 why	 I	
congratulated	her.	According	to	this	stronger	sort	of	disjunctivism	(hence	exclusive	rather	than	
inclusive)	either	an	agent	acts	because	they	believe	the	world	to	be	a	certain	way	or	they	act	
because	 the	 world	 is	 that	 way,	 but	 never	 both.	 On	 this	 account,	 when	 a	 normative	 reason	
explains	an	agent’s	action	it	does	so	instead	of	the	facts	about	what	an	agent	believes.31	




hence	our	explanation,	and	say	she	went	 to	 the	room	because	she	believed	 the	meeting	was	
there.	Her	belief	becomes	an	explanatory	 factor,	 that	 is	 to	say,	 just	 in	case	she	was	mistaken	
about	 the	 situation	 originally	 appealed	 to	 as	 justification.	 This	 is	 the	 general	 case:	 beliefs	
become	explanatory	factors	when	agents	are	mistaken	about	the	situations	originally	taken	to	
justify	them.	
The	situation	 is	analogous	to	someone’s	 flipping	a	switch	to	 turn	on	a	 light,	without	 the	 light	
going	on.	In	this	case	he	tried	to	turn	on	the	light,	just	because	he	failed,	which	would	not	be	
																																								 																				
31 	Both	 Collins	 (1997)	 and	 Stoutland	 (1998)	 adopt	 this	 response	 to	 the	 Problem.	 I	 may	 have	
mis-interpreted	Hyman’s	 (2011)	 view	 in	 fn.	26,	 in	which	 case	 I	 think	 this	 is	his	position.	 Sandis	 (2012,	
119)	also	attributes	this	view	to	Alvarez	(2010),	though	I’m	not	convinced	it	is	her	position.	In	particular,	
Alvarez	 agrees	 that	 beliefs	 still	 explain	 in	 veridical	 cases	 (cf.	 ‘It	 is	 always	 possible	 (and	 sometimes	
necessary,	 namely	 when	 the	 agent	 acted	 on	 a	 false	 belief)	 to	 give	 explanations	 in	 the	 psychological	
form.’	 (Alvarez	 2013,	 149)).	 More	 generally,	 it’s	 not	 clear	 to	 me	 that	 Alvarez	 is	 responding	 to	 The	
Explanatory	 Exclusion	 Problem	 as	 I	 have	 characterised	 it	 –	 her	 discussion	 focuses	 on	 the	 pragmatic	
considerations	that	determine	whether	or	not	one	gives	a	normative	reason	explanation	or	one	in	terms	
of	 psychological	 facts.	 However,	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 she	 does	 respond	 to	 the	 redundancy	 objection,	 I	
think	she	is	better	characterised	as	adopting	the	supplementarist	theory.	
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true	 if	he	succeeded	 in	 turning	 it	on	without	difficulty.	From	the	 fact	 that	what	someone	did	
when	he	 failed	 to	 turn	on	a	 light	 is	 that	he	 tried,	 it	doesn't	 follow	that	what	he	did	when	he	
succeeded	 also	 included	 trying.	 Analogously,	 given	 that	 what	 explains	 my	 going	 to	 a	 room	
where	I	do	not	find	my	friend	is	that	I	believed	my	friend	was	there,	it	does	not	follow	that	what	













However,	even	 if	 it	 turns	out	 that	 the	endurance	principle	 is	 false,	 the	exclusive	disjunctivist	
theory	is	a	difficult	position	to	maintain	because	there	is	widespread	support	for	the	view	that	
beliefs	always	play	some	role	in	explaining	what	an	agent	does.	
Exclusive	disjunctivism	 insists	 that	 there	 is	 no	highest	 common	 factor	 that	 is	 relevant	 to	 the	








the	way	 they	 take	 things	 to	be.	So	while	 I	 take	Stoutland	to	be	a	disjunctivist	about	 the	same	thing,	 I	
don’t	 invoke	 them	 here	 since	 his	 disjunctivism	 is	 far	 stauncher.	 There	 is	 also	 an	 alternative	 reading	
(perhaps	truer	to	his	precise	statements)	on	which	Stoutland	embraces	an	exclusive	disjunctivism	about	
action	explanation	(i.e.	an	exclusive	version	of	the	disjunctivism	considered	in	the	previous	section).	All	
that	 such	 a	 disjunctivism	 insists	 is	 that	 the	 facts	 about	what	 an	 agent	 believes	 do	not	 always	 explain	
their	action,	 it	 is	 silent	on	 the	question	of	whether	or	not	an	agent	always	acts	on	 the	way	 they	 take	
things	to	be.	This	latter	sort	of	disjunctivism	is	weaker	than	the	former	in	so	far	as	it	is	entailed	by	it.	I	
find	the	latter	sort	less	coherent	without	the	former	since	it	is	not	clear	to	me	how	one	could	act	on	the	
way	one	takes	 things	 to	be	without	 the	 fact	 that	one	 takes	 them	to	be	 that	way	playing	some	role	 in	
explaining	what	one	does;	for	that	reason	I	don’t	consider	it	further.	
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Consider:	when	 I	 believe	 that	 it’s	 raining	 I	 am	either	 in	 a	 situation	 in	which	 I	 know	 that	 it’s	
raining	 or	 I	 merely	 believe	 (i.e.	 without	 knowing)	 that	 it	 is	 raining.	 Given	 that	 I	 take	 my	
umbrella	whichever	of	the	two	situations	I	am	in,	doesn’t	the	possibility	that	the	two	situations	
may	 be	 indistinguishable	 to	me	 just	mean	 that	 I	 act	 on	 the	way	 I	 take	 things	 to	 be	 in	 both	
situations?33	And	given	that	I	act	on	the	way	I	take	things	to	be,	the	fact	that	I	take	them	to	be	
that	 way	 must	 explain	 my	 action.	 I	 find	 positions	 that	 deny	 this	 reasoning	 impossible	 to	
believe.		
Moreover,	Stoutland’s	supposed	argument	by	analogy	is	not	so	much	an	argument	for	his	view	
as	 it	 is	merely	the	application	of	 it	 to	another	area.	 It	seems	clear	to	me	(and	to	others	(e.g.	
O’Shaughnessy	 1973),	 that	 someone	 who	 goes	 to	 turn	 on	 a	 light	 tries	 to	 turn	 on	 the	 light	
whether	or	not	they	end	up	doing	so.34	Stoutland’s	rejection	of	that	view	is	just	the	same	sort	
of	 (exclusive)	disjunctivism	as	his	 rejection	of	 the	view	 that	one	always	acts	on	 the	way	one	
takes	 things	 to	be.35	And	one	who	 is	not	persuaded	of	his	view	 in	 the	 latter	 is	unlikely	 to	be	
persuaded	by	the	application	of	it	somewhere	else.		
Of	course,	my	incredulous	stare	may	do	nothing	to	alter	the	opinion	of	someone	who	believes	




facts	about	what	an	agent	believes	play	a	 role	 in	explaining	 their	action	 that	does	not	mean	
that	 normative	 reasons	 are	 not	 needed	 for	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	 the	 agent’s	 action;	 indeed,	
they	 argue,	 normative	 reasons	 are	 an	 independent	 (and	 necessary)	 part	 of	 the	 same	
explanation	as	the	facts	about	what	an	agent	believes.36	
Supplementarist	 strategies	 differ	 from	 non-factive	 strategies	 in	 that	 they	 insist	 that	 the	
normative	 reason	 can	 explain	 the	 agent’s	 action	 only	 if	 it	 is	 true;	 for	 instance,	 the	
supplementarist	might	insist,	the	normative	reason	only	explains	an	agent’s	action	if	the	agent	
knows	 it.	What	 the	 supplementarist	 rejects	 is	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 same	 full	 explanation	 of	 an	
																																								 																				
33	This	is	not	a	denial	of	disjunctivism	tout	court	–	for	instance,	an	inclusive	disjunctivist	(e.g.	McDowell	





36As	 noted	 in	 fn.	 31	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 Alvarez	 (2010)	 gives	 a	 response	 to	 The	 Explanatory	 Exclusion	
Problem,	I	think	this	may	be	her	view.	
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agent’s	 action	 is	 available	whether	 or	 not	 the	 agent	 knows	what	 they	believe.	 Instead,	 they	
say,	the	normative	reason	is	an	indispensable	part	of	the	explanation	when	(and	only	when)	it	





is	 sufficient	 to	 explain	 some	 explanandum	 in	 one	 case,	 given	 that	 whenever	 those	 partial	
explanations	all	explain	an	explanandum	 they	are	sufficient	 to	entail	 it,	why	would	 they	also	
not	be	sufficient	to	explain	it?	
However,	even	 if	 there	were	a	good	argument	for	rejecting	the	sufficiency	principle,	 it	 is	not	
clear	why	it	should	be	false	in	this	case.	That	is:	it’s	not	clear	why	knowing	a	normative	reason	
makes	 that	 normative	 reason	 an	 indispensable	 part	 of	 the	 full	 explanation	 of	 the	 agent’s	
action.	 Given	 that	 what	 I	 believe	 doesn’t	 explain	 my	 action	 when	 I	 am	 mistaken,	 so	 an	
explanation	 in	 terms	of	psychological	 facts	 suffices,	why	 is	 that	 explanation	 insufficient	 (and	
the	normative	reason	indispensable)	when	my	belief	happens	to	knowledgeable?	











In	 which	 I	 show	 that	 the	 exclusion	 principle	 is	 false.	 I	 provide	 two	
counterexamples	 to	 the	 exclusion	 principle,	 one	 involving	 causal	 explanation	
and	 another	 involving	 non-causal	 explanation.	 I	 suggest	 that	 they	 are	
counterexamples	 because	 in	 each	 case	 the	 purportedly	 excluded	 fact	 explains	
the	 explanandum	 by	 explaining	 something	 that,	 in	 turn,	 explains	 the	
explanandum.	 I	suggest	that	the	problem	with	the	exclusion	principle	 is	that	 it	
discriminates	 against	 all	 but	 the	 most	 proximal	 explanations	 of	 any	 given	
explanandum,	 and	 that	 this	 is	 problematic	 at	 least	 partly	 because	 we	 are	
typically	 interested	 in	more	distal	 explanations.	 I	 explain	where	our	 reasoning	
went	wrong	and	which	full	explanation	an	apparently	excluded	fact	is	part	of.	
In	the	previous	chapter	I	argued	that	we	should	not	accept	the	conclusion	of	The	Explanatory	
Exclusion	 Problem	 (at	 least	 as	 far	 as	 normative	 reason	 explanations	 are	 concerned).	 I	 also	
argued	that	we	should	not	reject	the	first	premise	of	the	Problem.	If	we	should	not	accept	the	
conclusion	 and	 we	 should	 not	 reject	 the	 first	 premise,	 the	 only	 remaining	 response	 to	 the	
Problem	is	to	reject	the	second	premise,	the	exclusion	principle.	The	purpose	of	this	chapter	is	
to	 show	 that	 the	 exclusion	 principle	 is	 false	 and	 to	 explain	why	 it	 is	 false.	 The	 next	 chapter	




EXCLUSION	 For	 any	 propositions,	p	and	q,	 if	 there	 is	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	why	q	
such	that	p	 is	neither	a	part	of	that	full	explanation	nor	 is	 it	part	of	a	
genuinely	different	explanation,	then	p	does	not	partially	explain	q.	









and	 it	 went	 untreated.	 The	 fact	 that	 he	 had	 HIV	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 went	 untreated	 are,	 I	
suggest,	 parts	 of	 a	 single	 full	 explanation	 of	 why	 he	 developed	 AIDS.	 Is	 the	 fact	 that	 he	






Moreover,	 the	 fact	 that	 Jean	 was	 transfused	 with	 HIV-infected	 blood	 only	 explains	 why	 he	
developed	AIDS	given	 that	he	had	HIV.5	So,	 from	DIFFERENCE,	 the	 fact	 that	he	was	 transfused	




was	 transfused	with	HIV-infected	blood	 is	neither	a	part	of	 that	 full	explanation	
nor	is	it	part	of	a	genuinely	different	explanation.	
Now	 notice	 that	 (b)	 is	 the	 antecedent	 condition	 of	 EXCLUSION	 while	 (a)	 is	 the	 denial	 of	 the	












he	 contracted	 it),	 then	he	would	 still	 have	developed	AIDS,	 and	 the	 fact	 that	he	had	HIV	would	have	
(partially)	 explained	why	 he	 developed	 AIDS.	Moreover,	 in	 this	 counterfactual	 circumstance,	 the	 fact	
that	he	had	not	been	transfused	with	HIV-infected	blood	would	not	have	been	part	of	the	explanation	of	
why	 he	 developed	 AIDS.	 This	 supplies	 us	 with	 the	 appropriate	 specification	 of	 Premise	 #a,	 which,	











causal,	 then	 The	 Explanatory	 Exclusion	 Problem	 for	 normative	 reason	 explanation	 would	









her	king’s	 side	because	of	 the	bishop	 (on	 f1)	between	 the	king	and	 the	kingside	 rook,	which	
obstructs	the	move.	That	is:	




















(d) There	 is	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	 why	White	 cannot	 castle	 such	 that	 the	 fact	 that	
there	 is	 a	 piece	 between	 the	 king	 and	 the	 rook	 is	 neither	 a	 part	 of	 that	 full	
explanation	nor	is	it	part	of	a	genuinely	different	explanation.	
Now	notice,	again,	 that	 (d)	 is	 the	antecedent	condition	of	EXCLUSION	while	 (c)	 is	 the	denial	of	
the	consequent	condition.	So,	given	that	 (c)	and	 (d)	are	 true,	and	given	that	 the	explanatory	
relations	involved	are	non-causal,	EXCLUSION	must	be	false	of	even	non-causal	explanation.	
2 Why	these	are	counterexamples	to	the	exclusion	principle	
Why	 are	 these	 cases	 counterexamples	 to	 the	 exclusion	 principle?	 Answering	 that	 question	
















there	 is	a	bishop	between	 the	king	and	 the	 rook	would	not	have	explained	why	White	wouldn’t	have	









Of	 course,	 the	 fact	 that	 Jean	has	HIV	 is	 the	more	 immediate	explanation	of	 the	 fact	 that	he	
developed	AIDS.	And,	of	course,	the	way	one	contracts	HIV	makes	no	difference	to	whether	or	
not	one	develops	AIDS	given	that	one	has	HIV.	 If	your	question	were	why,	given	that	he	had	
HIV,	 did	 Jean	 develop	 AIDS,	 then	 the	 relevant	 explanation	 includes	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 went	
untreated,	and	the	facts	about	how	a	sustained,	untreated	HIV	 infection	 leads	to	AIDS	–	and	







partially	 explains	 r.	 The	 question	 is:	why	 does	p	 partially	 explain	 r?	 I	 think	 the	 simplest	 and	
most	natural	answer	is	that	the	explanatory	relations	involved	are	transitive.	
Given	the	transitivity	of	the	(partial)	explanation	relations	involved,	the	fact	that	p	explains	q	
together	with	 the	 fact	 that	q	 explains	 r	 ensures	 that	p	 explains	 r.	 So,	 the	 fact	 that	 Jean	was	
transfused	with	HIV-infected	blood	explains	why	he	developed	AIDS	because	 it	explains	 that	
which	 explains	 why	 he	 developed	 AIDS	 and	 because	 of	 the	 transitivity	 of	 the	 explanatory	
relations	involved.		2.2 Revisiting	the	non-causal	counterexample	









So,	why	 is	 there	a	piece	between	 the	king	and	 the	kingside	 rook?	Because	 there	 is	 a	bishop	





on	her	king’s	side,	and	the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	a	piece	between	the	king	and	the	kingside	rook	
also	 explains	why	White	 cannot	 castle.	 Symbolically,	 again:	p	 partially	 explains	q,	q	 partially	
explains	r	and	p	partially	explains	r.	And,	again,	 I	think	the	most	natural	explanation	of	these	
facts	 is	 that	 the	explanatory	relations	 involved	are	 transitive.	 	That	 is:	p	explains	r	because	p	
explains	q	and	q	explains	r.	
3 What’s	wrong	with	the	exclusion	principle	
Having	 understood	 how	 the	 apparently	 excluded	 facts	 of	 these	 two	 counterexamples	
nonetheless	 explain,	 we	 are	 now	 in	 position	 to	 see	 what	 was	 wrong	 with	 the	 exclusion	
principle.	
First,	 some	basic	 terminology:	 if	p	explains	q	 and	q	 explains	 r	and	 the	 explanatory	 relations	
involved	are	 transitive	 then	we	 can	 say	 that	p	 is	 a	distal	 explanation	of	 r,	while	q	 is	 a	more	
proximal	 explanation	 of	 r.	 So,	 the	 suggestion	 of	 the	 previous	 section	was	 this:	 the	 fact	 that	
Jean	 was	 transfused	 with	 HIV-infected	 blood	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	 a	 bishop	 between	





It	will	always	be	true	of	any	distal	 (partial)	explanation	of	some	explanandum	 that	 there	 is	a	
full	 explanation	 of	 that	 explanandum	of	which	 it	 is	 not	 part.	Moreover,	 a	 distal	 explanation	
does	not	explain	the	explanandum	in	a	way	that	is	genuinely	different	from	the	more	proximal	
explanation.	 So	 it	will	 seemingly	 always	be	 true	of	 any	distal	 explanation	 that	 there	 is	 a	 full	




That	being	 so,	 the	only	way	 to	preserve	EXCLUSION	 is	 to	deny	 the	explanatory	 status	of	distal	
explanations	–	but	 that	 it	 is	 a	 very	heavy	price	 to	pay.	 It	means	 insisting	 that	only	 the	most	
proximate	explanation	of	some	explanandum	explains	it.	And	this	is	absurd!	
Suppose	we	say	that	Franz	developed	lung	cancer	because	he	smoked.	This	explanation	is,	 in	
some	 sense,	 an	 extremely	 distal	 explanation	 of	 why	 he	 developed	 lung	 cancer.	 A	 more	
proximal	 explanation	 would	 be	 that	 he	 regularly	 inhaled	 carcinogens.	 A	 more	 proximal	
explanation	still	would	be	the	fact	that	cells	in	his	lungs	mutated.9		
What	each	of	these	more	proximal	explanations	have	in	common	is	that	a	full	explanation	of	





of	 carcinogen	 inhalation	 or	 exposure	 to	 radiation.	 So,	 if	 the	 exclusion	 principle	 is	 to	 be	
believed,	 we	 can’t	 even	 say	 that	 Franz	 developed	 cancer	 because	 he	 regularly	 inhaled	
carcinogens.	 According	 to	 the	 exclusion	 principle,	 only	 the	most	proximal	 explanation	 of	 his	
lung	cancer	explains	it.	This	is	surely	absurd.10	
The	 absurdity	 of	 the	 exclusion	 principle	 should	 be	 clear	 when	we	 see	 that	 even	 an	 agent’s	
beliefs	 can	 be	 excluded	 from	 the	 explanation	 of	 their	 actions.	 Suppose	 that,	 when	 I	
congratulate	my	friend,	I	believe	that	congratulating	her	will	make	her	happy	and,	say,	I	desire	
to	make	her	happy	(or	what	have	you).	Given	that	I	believe	that	congratulating	her	will	make	
her	 happy,	 the	 explanation	 of	 why	 I	 believe	 it	 is	 excluded	 from	 the	 explanation	 of	 why	 I	
																																								 																				
9	‘The	formation	of	covalent	bonds	between	the	carcinogens	and	DNA	producing	DNA	adducts,	and	the	
resulting	 permanent	mutations	 in	 critical	 genes	 of	 somatic	 cells	 is	 the	major	 established	 pathway	 of	
cancer	causation	by	cigarette	smoke.’		(Hecht	2006,	609)	
10	Yablo	(2008)	makes	an	analogous	criticism	of	Russel’s	remarks	about	causation,	which	follow:		
If	 the	 cause	 is	 a	 process	 involving	 change	 within	 itself,	 we	 shall	 require…	 causal	 relations	
between	 its	 earlier	 and	 later	parts;	moreover	 it	would	 seem	 that	only	 the	 later	parts	 can	be	
relevant	to	the	effect…	Thus	we	shall	be	led	to	diminish	the	duration	of	the	cause	without	limit,	








intuitive	 causal	 powers.’	 (2008,	 298)	 My	 point	 is	 that	 the	 exclusion	 principle	 has	 exactly	 the	 same	
implication	for	explanation:	 if	 it	were	true	then	essentially	everything	would	be	robbed	of	 its	 intuitive	
explanatory	power.		
	 166	
congratulate	her.	That	 is,	 I	don’t	need	 to	believe	 that	 she	has	won	an	award	 to	believe	 that	
congratulating	her	will	make	her	happy,	and	if	 I	don’t	believe	that	it	would	make	her	happy	I	
wouldn’t	congratulate	her,	even	if	I	believed	that	she	had	won	an	award.	The	fact	that	I	believe	





the	 explanations	 that	 we	 ordinarily	 give,	 because	we	 are	 typically	 interested	 in	more	 distal	
explanations	of	any	given	explanandum	than	the	most	immediately	proximal	explanation.	For	





Supposing	 you	 accept	 my	 reasoning,	 some	 questions	 still	 remain:	 if	 the	 fact	 that	 Jean	 was	
transfused	with	HIV-infected	blood	explains	why	he	developed	AIDS	 then	 it	must	 be	part	 of	
some	full	explanation	of	why	he	developed	AIDS.	However,	as	established	in	(b),	there	is	a	full	
explanation	 of	why	 he	 developed	 AIDS	 such	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 he	was	 transfused	with	 HIV-
infected	 blood	 is	 neither	 a	 part	 of	 that	 explanation	 nor	 is	 it	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	 different	
explanation.	So	how	could	 it	be	part	of	any	explanation?	 It	was	exactly	this	 line	of	reasoning	
that,	in	§	(VIII)5,	led	us	to	the	exclusion	principle.	Since	we	have	established	that	the	exclusion	
principle	is	false,	we	should	see	what	was	wrong	with	this	reasoning.		
The	 mistake,	 I	 suggest,	 was	 the	 implicit	 assumption	 that	 if	 two	 full	 explanations	 of	 some	
explanandum	 are	 not	 identical	 then	 they	 must	 be	 genuinely	 different	 explanations	 of	 that	
explanandum.	The	point	to	recognise	is	that	for	two	full	explanations	to	be	genuinely	different	





















[Transfusion].	Finally,	 let	 ‘Δ2’	stand	for	the	set	obtained	by	substituting	Γ	for	[HIV]	 in	Δ1.12	My	
suggestion	is	this:	Δ2	is	a	full	explanation	of	why	Jean	had	AIDS.		
That	 is,	 if	we	substitute	 the	 full	explanation	of	why	 Jean	had	HIV,	Γ,	 for	 the	 fact	 that	he	had	
HIV,	[HIV],	 into	the	full	explanation	of	why	he	developed	AIDS,	Δ1,	that	produces	another	full	
explanation	 of	why	 he	 had	AIDS,	 Δ2.	Now,	 Δ2	 is	 clearly	 not	 identical	 to	 Δ1,	 but	 it	 is	 also	 not	
genuinely	 different	 from	 it.	 Moreover,	 since	 [Transfusion]	 is	 included	 in	 Δ2,	 and	 Δ2	 is	 a	 full	
explanation	 of	 why	 he	 developed	 AIDS,	 [Transfusion]	 is	 a	 partial	 explanation	 of	 why	 Jean	
developed	AIDS.	









12	That	is:	Δ! = Γ ∪ Δ! ∖ 𝐻𝐼𝑉 .	
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(XII)		Explaining	why	we	act	
In	 which	 I	 say	 how	 normative	 reasons	 (and	 the	 appearance	 of	 them)	 explain	
why	 we	 act.	 I	 suggest	 that	 normative	 reasons	 explain	 an	 agent’s	 action	 by	
explaining	 their	belief	 that,	 in	 turn,	explains	 the	agent’s	action.	 I	 suggest	 that	
they	 explain	 an	 agent’s	 belief	 by	 explaining	 the	 appearance	 of	 them	 that,	 in	
turn,	 explains	 the	 agent’s	 belief.	 I	 set	 out	 the	 implications	 of	 this	 view	 for	
explanatory	 rationalism	 and	 for	 anti-psychological	 theories	 of	 reasons	 more	
generally.	
In	 light	of	 the	remarks	of	 the	previous	chapter,	my	proposed	answer	to	the	question	of	how	
normative	reasons	explain	our	actions	is	perhaps	clear:	
Facts	about	an	agent’s	[normative]1	reasons	explain	an	agent’s	actions	whenever	they	explain	
why	 she	 has	 the	 (true)	 beliefs	 she	 has	 about	 her	 [normative]	 reasons,	 beliefs	 that	 in	 turn	
explain	her	actions.	(Smith	1998,	38)	
This	 is	 the	 indirect	 theory	of	normative	reason	explanation.	According	to	this	 theory	the	fact	
that	 my	 friend	 won	 an	 award	 explains	 why	 I	 congratulated	 her	 because	 it	 explains	 why	 I	
believed	that	she	had	won	an	award,	which,	in	turn,	explains	why	I	congratulated	her.		
The	indirect	theory	of	normative	reason	explanation	has	been	variously	considered,	endorsed	




Moreover,	 as	 I	 will	 show,	 the	 indirect	 theory	 applies	 equally	 well	 as	 an	 account	 of	 how	
experiences	explain	actions	–	that	is,	an	experience	explains	an	agent’s	action	if	it	explains	the	
belief	that	explains	the	agent’s	action.	










The	principle	behind	the	 indirect	theory	 is	that	when	an	agent	acts	for	a	reason	‘there	 is	the	
“proximal”	explanation	of	the	action,	given	by	specifying	the	psychological	state	of	the	agent.	
Then	there	is	the	“distal”	explanation	of	the	action,	given	by	specifying	what	is	responsible	for	





But	how	does	a	fact	about	the	world	explain	one’s	belief	 in	 it?	That	explanatory	relation	 is,	 I	
suggest,	also	indirect.	1.1 How	normative	reasons	explain	beliefs	in	them	









which	 the	 previous	 chapter	 discredited.	 In	 short:	 even	 though	 how	 things	 appear	 to	 be	




appear	 to	 be	 that	 way	 because	 they	 are	 that	 way,	 then,	 given	 the	 transitivity	 of	 the	

































3	We	 could	 spell	 out	 the	 chain	 further:	 I	 read	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award,	 in	 part,	 because	 the	
newspaper	printed	an	article	about	 it,	and	they	printed	an	article	about	 it,	 in	part,	because	a	reporter	





















in	 Gettier	 cases	 –	 we	 say	 that,	 in	 those	 cases,	 the	 normative	 reason	 does	 not	 explain	 the	
agent’s	 action.	 The	 indirect	 theory	of	normative	 reason	explanation	 tells	us	why:	because	 in	
both	 false	belief	 cases	and	Gettier	 cases,	 the	normative	 reason	does	not	explain	 the	agent’s	
belief	in	it.	
First,	 a	 false	 belief	 case:	 when	 Sally	 ran	 because	 she	 (mistakenly)	 believed	 that	 a	 bear	 was	
chasing	her,	we	don’t	say	that	she	ran	because	a	bear	was	chasing	her.	Why	not?	Because	the	








Now,	 as	 it	 turns	 out,	 it	 actually	 was	 thin.	 However,	 as	 we	 have	 already	 acknowledged	 (see	
§	(IV)1.4),	the	fact	that	the	ice	in	the	middle	of	the	lake	was	thin	does	not	explain	why	Edmund	
skated	at	the	edge.	Why	not?	Well	according	to	the	 indirect	theory	tit	 is	because	 it	does	not	
explain	why	he	believed	 that	 it	was	thin;	and	 it	does	not	explain	why	he	believed	that	 it	was	













































In	 the	 next	 chapter	 I	 will	 discuss	 (R3)	 and	 (R4),	 but	 before	 then	 I	 want	 to	 discuss	 the	






















explain	 our	 actions.	 This	 theory	 does	 not	 deny	 the	 primacy	 of	 the	 psychological,	 on	 which	
psychologism	insists,	but	it	nonetheless	provides	a	role	for	the	world	in	explaining	what	agents	
do.	 The	 indirect	 theory	 of	 normative	 reason	 explanation	 thus	 provides	 a	 response	 to	
psychologism	for	all	anti-psychological	theories,	and	not	merely	explanatory	rationalism.	
4 Conclusion	
One	 of	 the	 challenges	 I	 set	 myself	 was	 showing	 how	 it	 was	 that	 normative	 reasons	 could	
explain	 an	 agent’s	 action.	 I	 take	 that	 challenge	 to	 have	 now	 been	met.	 In	 particular,	 I	 have	
argued	that,	 regardless	of	whether	or	not	you	accept	explanatory	rationalism	(and	the	other	













drop	 in	 temperature?	 These	 are	 not	 themselves	 to	 be	 explained	 by	 its	 being	 about	 to	 rain.	 The	
clouds	are	not	black	because	it	will	shortly	rain.	(Dancy	2000,	112) 












have	 some	 sympathy	 for	 that	 response;	 however,	 it	may	 not	 fare	 so	well	 with	 facts	 known	
from	 inference,	 and	 may	 rely	 on	 a	 causal	 analysis	 of	 the	 explanatory	 relations	 involved.	
Regardless,	 to	 my	mind	 there	 is	 a	 more	 compelling	 response:	 I	 do	 not	 know	 how	 one	 can	
consistently	maintain	both	(b)	and	(c).	
The	only	reason	that	Dancy	gives	in	defence	of	(c)	is	that	the	blackness	of	the	clouds	etc.	is	not	





explain	 the	 blackness	 of	 the	 clouds	 etc.	My	 concern	 is	 that	 I	 don’t	 know	why	we	 should	 be	
indirect	theorists	about	belief	explanation	but	not	about	action	explanation.	
Of	course,	if	one	were	to	deny	(c),	and	insist	that	the	fact	that	it	is	about	to	rain	does	explain	
why	 Jim	 believes	 that	 it	 is	 about	 to	 rain,	 then	 one	 might	 wonder	 what	 the	 explanatory	












fact	 that	 p).	 Alvin	 Goldman	 (1967)	 considered	 	 these	 sorts	 of	 examples	 in	 his	 causal	 theory	 of	










these	 circumstances	 then	 (at	 least	 on,	 for	 instance,	 a	 difference-making	 account	 of	
explanation)	one	might	say	that	the	fact	that	your	friend	won	an	award	does	not	really	explain	
why	you	believed	that	she	had,8	and	it	consequently	does	not	explain	why	you	congratulated	
her.	Thus,	 in	 spite	of	your	 indirect	 theory	of	normative	 reason	explanation,	 (R1)	may	still	be	
false.	
Response I	have	 three	 responses	 to	 this	objection.	First,	 I	 could	 just	accept	 that	 (R1)	 is	
not	 true	when	my	 discovering	 about	my	 friend’s	 award	 is	 so	 chancy.	 There	might	 be	 other	





I	 had	 only	 found	out	 about	 it	 because	 I	 stumbled	 upon	 an	 article	 about	 it	 in	 a	 newspaper	 I	
wouldn’t	normally	read,	I	still	think	that	the	fact	that	my	friend	won	the	award	(partly)	explains	
why	I	believed	that	she	did	and,	therefore,	why	I	congratulated	her.	So,	to	the	extent	that	your	
account	 of	 explanation	 implies	 that	 it	 doesn’t,	 it	 is	 not	 really	 the	 sort	 of	 account	 that	 I	 am	
anyway	inclined	to	accept.9	
																																								 																				
8	Since	 there	 are	 very	 nearby	 possible	 worlds	 in	 which	 you	 don’t	 see	 the	 article,	 but	 in	 which	 she	
nonetheless	wins	the	award.	
9	What	may	be	at	work	here	 is	an	explanatory	analogue	of	Ned	Hall’s	 (2004)	claim	that	 there	are	 two	
















why	 I	believed	that	she	had.10	Since	 I	do	 think	that	 (even	 in	the	chancy	case)	 I	knew	that	my	
friend	had	won	an	award,	I	am	also	inclined	to	think	that	the	fact	that	she	had	won	an	award	
explains	 why	 I	 believed	 that	 she	 had,	 and,	 thereby,	 explains	 why	 I	 congratulated	 her.		
However,	if,	in	the	chancy	case,	you	don’t	think	that	I	knew	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award,	
then	 you	 could	 (as	we	did	 for	 the	 first	 response)	 just	 restrict	 (R1)	 to	 a	 claim	 about	 cases	 in	
which	I	knew	that	my	friend	won	an	award,	without	much	loss	for	my	theory.	
																																								 																				





In	which	 I	 say	when	 something	 explains	why	 it’s	 rational	 to	 act,	 and	when	 it	
doesn’t.	 I	 suggest	 that	 normative	 reasons	 or	 appearances	 explain	 why	 it	 is	
rational	 to	 act	 only	 if	 they	 explain	 those	 beliefs	 that	 in	 turn	 explain	why	 it	 is	
rational	to	act.	I	note	that	it	is	tempting	to	infer	that	if	an	agent’s	belief	explains	
why	it	is	rational	for	them	to	do	some	action	then	whatever	explains	that	belief	
also	 explains	 why	 it	 is	 rational	 for	 them	 to	 do	 that	 action.	 I	 show	 how	 that	
inference	 leads	 to	an	apparent	dilemma	for	explanatory	 rationalism.	 I	 counsel	
against	 that	 inference,	 by	 noting	 that	 different	 kinds	 of	 explanatory	 relations	
may	not	be	transitive	with	each	other.	 I	 then	set	out	 the	task	ahead:	showing	




rational	 for	an	agent	 to	act:	we	can	say	 that	a	normative	 reason	 (or	 the	appearance	of	one)	




that	 it	was	 raining.	This	proposal	vindicates	explanatory	 rationalism’s	claim	that	 things	other	

























Likewise,	 as	 we	 established	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 the	 fact	 that	my	 friend	won	 an	 award	
explains	why	 I	 read	 that	 she	had	won	an	award,	which	explains	why	 I	believed	 that	 she	had	
won	an	award,	which	explains	why	 it	was	pro	tanto	rational	 for	me	to	congratulate	her.	And	





rational	 for	an	agent	to	do	some	action	only	 if,	and	because,	 they	explain	one	of	the	agent’s	
beliefs,	which,	in	turn,	explains	why	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	them	to	do	that	action.		
As	I	have	noted,	this	indirect	manner	of	explanation	relies	on	the	transitivity	of	the	explanatory	












In	what	 follows	 I	will	argue	that	 the	naïve	theory	 is	 false.	Before	 I	do	so,	however,	 I	want	 to	











aneurism	explains	why	an	agent	has	some	belief,	and	they	act	 rationally	on	 that	belief,	 then	
their	reason	for	acting	is	that	they	had	a	brain	aneurism.	This	is	an	undesirable	conclusion.1	
And	yet,	 if	 the	naïve	 theory	 isn’t	 true,	 then	explanation	 is	not	a	generally	 transitive	 relation.	
But	the	 indirect	theory	of	normative	reason	explanation,	and,	more	generally,	my	account	of	
why	(R1)	to	(R4)	are	true,	relies	on	the	transitivity	of	explanation.	
Here,	 then,	 is	 the	 apparent	 dilemma:	 either	 (i)	 we	 accept	 the	 naïve	 theory,	 which	 means	











my	 umbrella	 was	 that	 I	 had	 a	 brain	 aneurism.	 I	 take	 this	 to	 be	 worse	 than	 rejecting	 explanatory	
rationalism.	












A	more	nuanced	but,	as	 I	will	argue,	equally	mistaken	approach	 is	 to	maintain	 that	although	
there	 are	 different	 kinds	 of	 explanatory	 relation,	 if	 any	 explanatory	 relations	 are	 transitive	
then	they	are	all	transitive	with	each	other.	I	suggest	that	it	 is	this	fallacious	assumption	that	
led	to	the	naïve	theory.	
My	argument	 against	 this	 assumption	proceeds	 in	 two	 stages:	 firstly	 I	will	 demonstrate	 that	
some	explanatory	relations	are	transitive;	secondly	I	will	give	an	example	in	which	explanatory	
relations	are	not	 transitive.	Together	 these	amount	 to	a	counterexample	 to	 the	claim	 that	 if	
any	explanatory	relations	are	transitive	then	they	all	are.		3.1 Some	explanatory	relations	are	transitive	
Firstly,	as	§	(XI)	demonstrated,	we	have	good	reasons	to	think	that	some	explanatory	relations	
are	 transitive:	 if	 they	 weren’t	 then	 distal	 explanations	 of	 some	 explanandum	would	 never	
really	be	explanations	of	that	explanandum.5	Since,	in	both	ordinary	and	scientific	life,	we	are	
mostly	 interested	 in	 somewhat	 distal	 explanations,	 and	 since	 the	 explanations	 we	 normally	
give	are	somewhat	distal,	our	ordinary	and	scientific	explanatory	practice	assumes	that	at	least	






















heard	 a	 bear-like	 noise	 (it	 appeared	 to	 her	 as	 though	 a	 bear	 was	 chasing	 her),	 and	 what	
explains	 that	was	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 trees	 rustled	 (in	 the	way	 that	 they	 did).	 Thus,	 there	 is	 a	
chain	of	explanatory	relations	from	the	fact	that	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	Sally	to	run	to	the	
fact	 that	 the	 trees	 rustled.	 But	 should	we	 say	 that	 it	was	pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	 Sally	 to	 run	
(even	partly)	because	the	trees	rustled?	
I	don’t	 think	we	should.	 It	seems	as	though	even	 if	one	were	to	give	this	sort	of	explanation	
one	 would	 then	 be	 forced	 to	 add	 that	 Sally	 believed	 that	 a	 bear	 was	 chasing	 her.	 And,	 I	
suggest,	that	is	because	it	is	only	really	the	belief	that	is	doing	the	explaining.6	


















The	 rustling	 in	 the	 trees	explained	 the	noise	 that	Sally	heard,	 the	noise	explained	her	belief,	
and	 her	 belief	 explained	 why	 it	 was	 rational	 for	 her	 to	 run.	 However,	 I’ve	 suggested,	 the	
explanatory	relations	here9	aren’t	all	transitive	with	each	other.	Why	not?	Because,	I	suggest,	
they	are	different	sorts	of	explanatory	relation.	
What	sort	of	explanation	 is	the	explanation	of	why	 it	was	pro	tanto	rational	 for	Sally	to	run?	
Well,	 it	 isn’t	causal.	Even	 if	we	allow	that	our	beliefs	cause	our	actions,	 it’s	 still	not	 the	case	
that	 they	 cause	 it	 to	 be	 rational	 for	 us	 to	 act	 –	 any	more	 than	 the	 fact	 that	 a	 person	 is	 in	
trouble	causes	 it	 to	be	right	 to	save	them.	Causation	 just	seems	to	be	the	wrong	concept	 to	











the	 assumption	 that	 if	 any	explanatory	 relations	 are	 transitive	 then	all	 explanatory	 relations	
are	 transitive	 with	 each	 other.	 The	 argument	 of	 the	 previous	 two	 sections	 disproves	 that	
assumption	–	while	some	kinds	of	explanatory	relations	are	transitive,	 it	does	not	follow	that	
different	kinds	of	explanatory	relations	are	transitive	with	each	other.	
Thus,	 there	 is	 no	 dilemma	 for	 explanatory	 rationalism	 because	 the	 naïve	 theory	 and	 the	
consequent	 apparent	 dilemma	were	based	on	 the	mistaken	 assumption	 that	 all	 explanatory	
relations	must	be	transitive	with	each	other.		
																																								 																				
9	That	 is:	between	 (i)	 the	 trees	and	 the	noise;	 (ii)	 the	noise	and	 the	belief;	 and	 (iii)	 the	belief	and	 the	
rationality	of	running.	
10	That	 is,	 there	may	be	other	 kinds	of	 causal	 and	non-causal	 explanatory	 relations	 that	 are	 transitive	
with	each	other.	
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However,	 explanatory	 rationalism	 is	 not	 out	 of	 difficulty	 yet,	 in	 the	 next	 section	 I	 will	




We	 are	 talking	 about	 three	 sets	 of	 explanatory	 relations:	 the	 relation	 from	 the	world	 to	 an	
appearance,	 from	 an	 appearance	 to	 a	 belief,	 and	 then	 the	 relation	 of	 that	 belief	 to	 the	
rationality	of	an	agent’s	action.	What	I	seem	to	be	saying	about	these	explanatory	relations	is	
this:	sometimes	they	are	transitive	with	each	other,	and	sometimes	they	aren’t.	In	particular,	I	






Isn’t	 this	 just	 ad-hoc?	 Why	 should	 we	 suppose	 that	 the	 relations	 are	 transitive	 when	
explanatory	rationalism	needs	them	to	be,	but	aren’t	when	 it	needs	them	not	to	be?	That	 is	
the	remaining	challenge	for	explanatory	rationalism.	
I	 want	 to	 consider	 one	 response	 to	 this	 challenge	 that	 is	 natural,	 but	 won’t	 work,	 before	
setting	the	stage	for	my	own	response.	
5 The	unsuccessful	natural	strategy	
A	 natural	 strategy	might	 be	 to	 reason	 as	 follows:	 perhaps	 in	 the	 second	 case	 the	 failure	 of	
transitivity	 is	 not	 in	 the	 explanatory	 relation	 per	 se,	 but	 in	 the	 putative	 explanans	 (i.e.	 the	
rustling	of	the	trees);	it’s	neither	the	content	of	Sally’s	belief	nor	is	it	something	that	her	belief	
was	 based	 on	 –	 it’s	 of	 no	 epistemic	 importance.	 And	 perhaps	 because	 it’s	 of	 no	 epistemic	
importance,	 it’s	 just	 the	wrong	 sort	 of	 thing	 to	 do	 the	 right	 sort	 of	 explaining.	 I	 could	 then	



























explanans	 for	 some	 principled	 reason,	 and	 I	 could	 then	 insist	 that	 whatever	 met	 those	
conditions	and	explained	my	belief	thereby	also	explained	what	the	belief	explained.	
There	 are	 two	problems	with	 this	 strategy:	 firstly,	 it	 is	 not	 at	 all	 clear	 to	me	 that	 one	 could	




monoxide.	 Suppose	 further	 that,	 after	 a	 short	 while,	 the	 carbon	 monoxide	 causes	 me	 to	
hallucinate,	and,	by	sheer	chance,	 I	have	a	hallucination	of	a	reliable	 friend	bursting	 into	the	
room	and	warning	me	that	it	is	filling	up	with	carbon	monoxide.	It	is	rational	for	me	to	leave,11	
and	I	duly	do	so.12	
The	 fact	 that	 the	 room	 was	 filled	 with	 carbon	 monoxide	 (partly)	 explains	 why	 I	 had	 the	
hallucination.	Of	course,	it	is	only	a	part	of	that	explanation	–	other	factors	of	my	psyche	and	
the	 like	will	do	more	 to	explain	 the	 content	 of	my	hallucination,	but	 the	 fact	 that	 there	was	
carbon	monoxide	 in	 the	 room	 is,	 I	 suggest,	 a	 part	 of	 the	 full	 explanation	 of	why	 I	 had	 that	
hallucination.		
Moreover,	the	fact	that	I	had	that	hallucination	explains	why	I	believed	that	there	was	carbon	
monoxide	 in	 the	 room.	And	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 believed	 that	 there	was	 carbon	monoxide	 in	 the	
room	explains	why	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	leave.	
Again,	we	have	an	explanatory	chain	connecting	the	fact	 that	 there	was	carbon	monoxide	 in	




the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	 carbon	monoxide	 in	 the	 room	because	my	belief	 is	 just	 true	by	happy	





12	Thanks	 for	 this	example	are	owed	to	 John	Roberts,	who	put	 it	 to	me	 in	a	seminar.	This	 is	what	one	
might	call	a	‘deviant’	Gettier	case,	involving	both	a	justified,	true	belief	that	falls	short	of	knowledge	and	
a	 deviant	 causal	 chain	 linking	 the	 fact	 itself	 with	 the	 belief.	 This	 sort	 of	 case	 is	 a	 well-established	









The	 next	 section	 sketches	 out	 my	 strategy,	 which	 will	 be	 developed	 in	 detail	 in	 the	 next	
chapter.	
6 The	mysterious	strategy	




the	 ‘award’	 case	 from	 the	 others	 nicely	 thus:	 ‘we	 can	 say	 that	 the	 fact	 itself	 is	 exerting	 a	











This	 argument	 provides	 a	 principled	 reason	 for	 saying	 why	 the	 explanatory	 relations	 are	




In	 which	 I	 introduce	 the	 mystery	 relation.	 I	 suggest	 that	 a	 mysterious,	 non-
causal	relation	obtains	between	a	belief	and	the	justification	that	it	is	based	on	





for	 the	 belief	 that	 p	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 p	 when	 that	 justification	 affords	 the	
opportunity	for	knowledge;	and	an	action	to	some	belief	that	explains	why	it	is	
rational	when	 that	action	 is	done	 intentionally.	 I	argue,	 furthermore,	 that	 this	
mystery	relation	is	a	transitive,	explanatory	relation.	
Here	are	 some	questions:	what	distinguishes	a	 justified	belief	 from	a	merely	 justifiable	one?	
What	separates	a	knowledgeable	belief	from	a	belief	that	one	holds,	when	one	is	in	a	position	
to	know	it,	without	knowing	it?	What	is	the	difference	between	a	justification	that	affords	the	
opportunity	 for	 knowledge	 from	 one	 that	 doesn’t?	 And,	 lastly,	what	 distinguishes	 an	 action	
done	intentionally	from	a	mere	bodily	movement?	
I	do	not	claim	to	know	the	answer	to	these	questions.	However,	in	what	follows	I	want	to	see	
what	 can	 be	 said	 without	 offering	 a	 theory	 of	 the	 difference	 between	 these	 cases.	 For	
instance,	 the	 difference	 between	 a	 justified	 belief	 and	 a	 merely	 justifiable	 one	 is	 already	









when	 that	 justification	 affords	 the	opportunity	 for	 knowledge;	 and	 an	action	 to	 some	belief	





relation	 that	obtains	between	the	 fact	 that	 I	believed	that	my	 friend	had	won	an	award	and	
the	fact	that	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	to	congratulate	her.		
I	offer	the	following	analysis	modestly.	There	is	no	sense	in	which	I	take	myself	to	have	solved	










in	 the	 right	 way	 what	 he	 already	 believes.	 To	 illustrate,	 a	 woman	 might	 have	 adequate	
evidence	 for	 believing	 that	 her	 husband	 is	 unfaithful	 to	 her,	 but	 systematically	 ignore	 that	
evidence.	However,	when	her	father,	whom	she	knows	to	be	totally	unreliable	in	such	matters	
and	biased	against	her	husband,	tells	her	that	her	husband	is	unfaithful	to	her,	she	believes	it	
on	 that	 basis.	 Then	 her	 belief	 that	 her	 husband	 is	 unfaithful	 is	 unjustified	 but	 justifiable.		
(Pollock	and	Cruz	1999,	79)	
The	 woman	 in	 this	 example	 has	 some	 justification	 for	 believing	 that	 her	 spouse	 has	 been	
unfaithful	(we	don’t	know	what	it	 is),	which	she	ignores.	In	spite	of	ignoring	the	justifications	
she	 has	 for	 believing	 it,	 she	 still	 ends	 up	 forming	 the	 belief	 that	 her	 husband	 has	 been	
unfaithful,	but	bases	 it	on	 the	 fact	 that	her	 father	 told	her	 that	her	husband	was	unfaithful,	
which	 is	 not	 a	 justification	 for	 believing	 it	 (because	 her	 father	 is	 known	 to	 be	 biased	 and	
unreliable).	
Her	belief	is	merely	justifiable,	and	not	justified,	because	a	justifiable	belief	is	a	belief	for	which	
one	 has	 some	 justification	 (which	 she	 does),	 but	 a	 justified	 belief	 is	 one	 that	 is	based	 on	 a	
justification	one	has	for	it	(which	hers	is	not).	
As	an	aside:	I	am	straying	into	epistemology	here.	To	restrain	the	bounds	of	my	assertions,	let	

















husband	 is	 faithful.	Her	 father	 is	out	of	 the	picture	 this	 time,	but	 suppose,	 instead,	 that	 the	
stress	of	ignoring	what	she	has	seen	(it	is	a	difficult	thing	to	ignore)	causes	a	brain	aneurism	(in	
spite	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 she	 does	 manage	 to	 ignore	 what	 she	 has	 seen)	 that,	 by	 incredible	
coincidence,	causes	her	to	believe	that	her	husband	has	been	unfaithful	to	her.3	Believing	that	
her	husband	has	been	unfaithful	to	her,	she	sues	for	divorce.4	
In	 this	 case	 her	 belief	 that	 her	 husband	 has	 been	 unfaithful	 is	 justifiable,	 and	 it	 is	 caused	
(albeit,	in	a	roundabout	way)	by	the	justification	she	has	for	believing	it.	But	it	seems	wrong	to	
say	either	 that	her	belief	was	based	on	 the	 justification	 that	she	had,	or,	 indeed,	 that	 it	was	
really	a	justified	belief.5		





2	This	 will	 mean	 excluding	 the	 more	 extreme	 forms	 of	 internalism	 about	 epistemic	 justification	 (e.g.	
Davidson	 2001d)	 but,	 adherents	 to	 that	 view	 are	 in	 the	 minority,	 as	 Littlejohn	 notes:	 ‘most	 statist	
internalists	defend	the	view	that	experiences	constitute	our	reasons	for	belief.’	(Forthcomming,	4)	














Thus,	 if	a	belief	 is	based	on	some	 justification	 for	 it	 (i.e.	 if	 it	 is	 justified)	 then	there	 is	a	non-
causal	 relation	 (as	 well	 as,	 perhaps,	 a	 causal	 relation)	 between	 the	 belief	 and	 the	
justification(s)	it	is	based	on	–	let’s	call	it	the	mystery	relation.		













and	an	agent’s	belief	 that	p	when	 they	know	that	p.	 In	order	 to	maintain	a	 causal	 theory	of	
knowledge,	one	must	insist	that	the	fact	causes	the	belief	in	the	right	way.	
																																								 																				
6	McCain	 (2012)	 offers	 a	 purely	 causal	 solution	 by,	 as	 Korcz	 (2015)	 puts	 it,	 ‘removing	 the	 chain’	 and	
denying	that	the	basing	relation	is	transitive.	However,	 I	share	Korcz’s	concern	that	this	theory	fails	to	






still	 necessary	 for	 such	 relations,	 but	 that	 non-deviancy	 is	 only	 guaranteed	 by	 a	 further	 non-causal	
relation:	‘the	manifestation	of	a	competence’.	
8	There	need	be	nothing	significant	about	this	move:	if	the	relata	of	genuine	basing	relations	or	mystery	
relations	 are	 the	 truth-makers	 of	 propositions	 (e.g.	 Sally’s	 believing	 that	 a	 bear	 is	 chasing	 her	 to	 the	










In	 this	 convoluted	way,	 the	 fact	 that	 her	 husband	has	been	unfaithful	 causes	her	 to	believe	






causal	 terms11	we	 can	 say	 that	 if	 an	 agent	 knows	 that	p	 then	 there	 is	 a	 non-causal	 relation	
between	their	belief	that	p	and	the	fact	that	p.		




the	 mystery	 relation	 that	 basing	 relations	 entail?	 Because,	 I	 suggest,	 the	 cases	 are	 directly	
analogous:	the	distinction	between	a	justified	belief	and	a	merely	 justifiable	one	is	analogous	
to	 the	 distinction	 between	 knowing	 that	 p	 and	merely	 believing	 that	 p12	when	 one	 is	 in	 a	
position	to	know	that	p.		














We	 said	 that	 Eva	was	 in	 a	position	 to	 know	 that	her	husband	was	 cheating	on	her.	 Sally,	 in	
contrast,	 is	not	 in	a	position	to	know	that	a	bear	 is	chasing	her	(not	 least	because	one	 isn’t).	
Likewise	(recalling	the	example	from	the	previous	chapter),	when	I	am	in	a	room	that	is	slowly	




p,	only	Eva	has	a	 justification	 that	affords	 the	opportunity	 for	knowledge.	Characterising	our	
question	 in	 these	 terms,	 and	 generalising	 it	 beyond	 these	 cases,	 we	 can	 ask:	 what	
differentiates	 a	 justification	 for	 believing	 that	p	 that	 affords	 the	 opportunity	 for	 knowledge	
from	 one	 that	 doesn’t?	 I	 think	 it	 is	 the	 mysterious	 relation	 that	 a	 knowledge-affording	




Suppose	someone	 is	presented	with	an	appearance	 that	 it	 is	 raining.	 It	 seems	unproblematic	
that	if	his	experience	is	in	a	suitable	way	the	upshot	of	the	fact	that	it	is	raining,	then	the	fact	
itself	 can	 make	 it	 the	 case	 that	 he	 knows	 that	 it	 is	 raining.	 (McDowell	 1982,	 474	 emphasis	
added)	
What	 is	 this	 suitable	 way?	 What	 is	 the	 relation	 between	 the	 ‘fact	 itself’	 and	 the	 man’s	
experience	that	makes	it	possible	for	the	fact	to	‘make	it	the	case	that	the	he	knows	that	it	is	
raining’?	Well,	it	isn’t	merely	causal.		
Suppose	 that	 another	 version	 of	me,	 call	 him	 ‘Twinny’,	 on	 some	 other	 very	 similar	world	 is	




Now,	what	 Twinny	 and	 I	 experience	 is	 subjectively	 indistinguishable	 (ex	 hypothesi),	 and	 our	






would	 be	 in	 a	 position	 to	 know	 that	 the	 room	was	 full	 of	 carbon	monoxide	 –	 but	 there	 and	 then,	 in	
circumstances	as	they	were	originally	described,	I	would	not	be	in	a	position	to	know.	
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the	 fact	 that	 p	 and	 a	 justification	 for	 believing	 that	 p	 if	 that	 justification	 is	 to	 afford	 an	
opportunity	for	knowing	that	p.	









A	 climber	might	want	 to	 rid	 himself	 of	 the	weight	 and	 danger	 of	 holding	 another	man	 on	 a	
rope,	 and	he	might	 know	 that	 by	 loosening	his	 hold	on	 the	 rope	he	 could	 rid	 himself	 of	 the	
weight	and	danger.	This	belief	and	want	might	so	unnerve	him	as	 to	cause	him	to	 loosen	his	
hold,	 and	 yet	 it	might	 be	 the	 case	 that	 he	 never	 chose	 to	 loosen	 his	 hold,	 nor	 did	 he	 do	 it	
intentionally.		(Davidson	2001b,	79)	
In	this	example	the	fact	that	the	climber	believes	that	 loosening	his	grip	would	rid	himself	of	
danger	 (partially)	explains	why	 it	 is	pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	 the	climber	 to	 loosen	his	grip,	and	
that	 belief	 also	 causes	 him	 to	 loosen	 his	 grip.	 However,	 he	 does	 not	 loosen	 his	 grip	
intentionally.	 This	 example	 thus	 (famously)	 creates	a	problem	 for	 a	purely	 causal	 analysis	of	
what	 it	 is	 to	 act	 intentionally:	 although	 there	 is	 a	 causal	 chain	 between	 the	 belief	 and	 the	
action,	the	agent	does	not	act	intentionally	because	the	causal	chain	is	‘deviant’.	







intentionally	 from	 someone	 (like	 the	 climber)	 who	 is	 in	 a	 position	 to	φ	 intentionally,	 and,	
indeed,	φs	but	does	not	do	so	intentionally?	
The	traditional	‘answer’	to	this	question	is	to	say	that	if	an	agent	acts	intentionally	then,	inter	
alia,	 a	 belief	 that	 explains	why	 their	 action	 is	 rational	must	 cause	 them	 to	do	 it	 in	 the	 right	
way.15	So,	 again,	 assuming	 that	 this	 elusive	 ‘right	 way’	 cannot	 be	 analysed	 in	 purely	 causal	
terms,	we	can	say	that	if	an	agent	acts	intentionally	then	there	is	a	non-causal	relation	(as	well	
as,	 perhaps,	 a	 causal	 relation)	 between	 features	 of	 their	 psychology	 that	 explain	 why	 their	
action	is	rational	and	their	action.16	
And	again,	owing	to	the	analogousness	of	this	case	to	the	others	already	considered,	I	suggest	






I	have	suggested	 that	what	distinguishes	deviant	causal	 chains	 from	non-deviant	ones	 in	 the	
contexts	 considered	 is	 that,	 in	 the	 non-deviant	 cases,	 the	 relata	 are	 not	 merely	 causally	
related.	In	particular,	I	have	argued,	the	same	non-causal	‘mystery’	relation	is	present	in	each	
case,	so	that:	










necessarily	 exclude	 causal	 relations.	 That	 is,	 for	 instance,	 it	 is	 quite	 possible	 that	 a	 justified	
																																								 																				








depending	on	your	views	 in	these	areas	 it	might	be	that	a	causal	relation	 is	a	necessary	 (but	
not	sufficient)	condition	for	the	presence	of	a	mystery	relation.		
In	 the	 following	 sections	 I	 will	 argue	 further	 that	 the	 mystery	 relation	 is	 a	 transitive,	
explanatory	relation.	
6 Mystery	relations	are	explanatory	relations	
Now	 I	 want	 to	 convince	 you	 that	mystery	 relations	 are	 explanatory	 relations.	 They	may	 be	





If	 we	 accept	 that	 the	 basing	 relation	 is	 partly	 a	 causal	 relation	 then,	 even	 though	 a	 causal	
analysis	 is	 insufficient	 for	establishing	 it,	 it’s	 still	 possible	 that	 the	explanatory	 import	of	 the	
basing	 relation	 is	 merely	 causal.	 So,	 is	 the	 way	 that	 a	 justified	 belief	 is	 explained	 by	 the	
justification	on	which	it	is	based	merely	causal?	
The	 fact	 that	 Sally	 heard	 a	 bear-like	 sound	 headed	 her	 way	 (in	 a	 forest	 that	 she	 knew	 to	




Now	 notice	 that	 for	 Eva	 a	 justification	 for	 her	 to	 believe	 something	 also	 explains	 why	 she	
believed	 it:	 she	believes	 that	her	husband	has	been	unfaithful	because	 it	appeared	to	her	as	
though	he	was	kissing	another	woman	(which,	indeed,	he	was).	That	is,	for	both	Eva	and	Sally	a	
justification	 for	 their	 belief	 explains	 their	 belief.	 However,	 the	 sense	 of	 the	 explanation	







So,	 there	 is	 a	 seemingly	 non-causal	 explanation	of	 Sally’s	 belief	 that	 is	 lacking	 in	 Eva’s	 case,	













the	 chase:	 wherever	 we	 compare	 a	 deviant	 causal	 case	 with	 a	 non-deviant	 case	 (in	 the	
contexts	considered),	it	seems	as	though	there	is	a	non-causal	explanatory	relation	in	the	non-




relation,	 and	 since	mystery	 relations,	 as	we	 have	 established,	 are	 non-causal,	 I	 suggest	 that	
mystery	relations	are	non-causal	(partial)	explanatory	relations.	
Thus,	what	separates	Eva	from	Sean	is	the	fact	that	the	justification	Sean	has	for	his	belief	non-
causally	 (as	well	as,	perhaps,	causally)	explains	his	belief,	whereas,	 for	Eva	 it	merely	causally	
explains	it.		
Likewise,	what	separates	me	in	my	carbon	monoxide	filled	room	from	Twinny	is	that	the	fact	
that	 the	 room	was	 filled	 with	 carbon	monoxide	 non-causally	 (as	 well	 as,	 perhaps,	 causally)	




Finally,	 I	 want	 to	 convince	 you	 that	 mystery	 relations	 are	 transitive.	 I	 will	 show	 that	 the	
conditions	for	transitivity	are	satisfied	in	all	of	the	above	examples,	and	I	will	argue	further	that	











explanatory	character.	And	that	 is,	 I	 suggest	because	the	 fact	 that	 the	room	 is	 full	of	carbon	
monoxide	 is	mysteriously	 related	 to	 his	 belief,	 which,	 in	 turn,	 is	mysteriously	 related	 to	 his	
action.	That	is,	I	suggest	that	we	can	conclude	that	our	respective	normative	reasons	to	act	are	








in	 which	 the	 expression	 would	 be	 conventionally	 understood	 from	 this	 one	 is,	 as	 I	 have	
suggested,	the	presence	of	this	non-causal	explanatory	relation;	the	mystery	relation.	
Why	is	the	normative	reason	not	related	to	my	action	in	the	carbon	monoxide	case	but	it	is	to	






















































My	 suggestion	 is	 this:	 in	 any	 circumstance	 in	 which	 a	 chain	 of	 transitive	 mystery	 relations	






should?	f⇝j j⇝b b⇝a f⇝b? j⇝a? f⇝a? 
Award	case	 ü	 ü	 ü	 ü	 ü	 ü	 ü 
CO	case	 û	 ü	 ü	 û	 ü	 û	 ü 
Eva	case	 ü	 û	 ü	 û	 û	 û	 ü 







not	amount	to	proof	that	 it	 is	always	transitive,	but	 is	at	 least	evidence	for	that	claim.	 In	the	
next	section	I	provide	a	different	defence	of	the	claim	that	mystery	relations	are	transitive.			7.2 Knowledge	and	knowledge	affording	justification	
My	 second	 argument	 for	 the	 transitivity	 of	 mystery	 relations	 is	 that	 it	 provides	 the	 best	
account	of	why	it	is	that	knowledgeable	beliefs	are	mysteriously	related	to	the	believed	facts.	
To	 start	 with,	 consider	 that,	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 knowledge	 entails	 justified	 belief, 21 	a	
knowledgeable	belief	must	be	based	on	a	justification	for	it.	That	being	so,	it	strikes	me	that	if	




Summarising:	 for	 any	 p,	 a	 knowledgeable	 belief	 that	 p,	 being	 based	 on	 a	 justification	 that	
affords	 the	 opportunity	 for	 knowledge	 that	 p,	 must	 therefore	 be	 mysteriously	 related	 to	 a	
justification	for	the	belief	that	p	that	is,	in	turn,	mysteriously	related	to	the	fact	that	p.	That	is,	








evidence	 that	 the	 lawyer's	 client	 is	 guilty	 of	 the	 first	 seven	murders.	 Everyone,	 including	 the	
lawyer,	is	convinced	that	the	man	in	question	has	committed	all	eight	crimes,	though	the	man	
himself	 says	 he	 is	 innocent	 of	 all.	 	 However,	 the	 lawyer	 is	 a	 gypsy	with	 absolute	 faith	 in	 the	
cards.	One	evening	he	consults	the	cards	about	his	case,	and	the	cards	tell	him	that	his	client	is	
innocent	 of	 the	 eighth	 murder.	 He	 checks	 again,	 and	 the	 cards	 give	 the	 same	 answer.	 He	
becomes	convinced	that	his	client	is	innocent	of	one	of	the	eight	murders.	As	a	result	he	studies	
the	 evidence	 with	 a	 different	 perspective	 as	 well	 as	 greater	 care,	 and	 he	 finds	 a	 very	
complicated	though	completely	valid	line	of	reasoning	from	the	evidence	to	the	conclusion	that	
his	 client	 did	 not	 commit	 the	 eighth	 murder…	 This	 reasoning	 gives	 the	 lawyer	 knowledge.	
Though	the	reasoning	does	not	increase	his	conviction	–	he	was	already	completely	convinced	
by	the	cards	–	it	does	give	him	knowledge.	(Lehrer	1971,	311–12)		
I	 share	Goldman’s	 intuition	 that,	 ‘To	 the	 extent	 that	 I	 clearly	 imagine	 that	 the	 lawyer	 fixes	 his	 belief	
solely	as	a	result	of	the	cards,	it	seems	intuitively	wrong	to	say	that	he	knows—or	has	a	justified	belief—	





Do	we	have	reason	to	think	that	the	mystery	relation	 is	 transitive	wherever	 it	appears?	Well	
we	don’t	have	any	reason	to	doubt	it,	but	here	is	another	reason	to	think	that	it	might	be:	the	
transitivity	 of	 the	 mystery	 explanation	 would	 explain	why	 the	 belief	 that	 p	 is	 mysteriously	
related	to	the	fact	that	p	when	the	agent	knows	that	p.	
Although	our	 intuition	 seems	 to	 suggest	 that	 a	 belief	 that	p	 is	 non-causally	 (if	 also	 causally)	
explained	by	the	fact	that	p	if	an	agent	knows	it,	it’s	not	clear	to	me	how	the	fact	that	p	could	
directly	explain	an	agent’s	belief	that	p	in	much	the	same	way	as	it	is	was	not	clear	to	me	how	
the	 fact	 that	p	 could	directly	 explain	an	agent’s	action.23	However,	given	 that	our	perceptual	
experiences	 intermediate	 the	 explanatory	 relations	 between	 the	 world	 and	 beliefs	 the	
transitivity	 of	 the	 relation	 that	 links	 them	 would	 ensure	 the	 connection	 that	 our	 intuitions	
suggest	 between	 the	 belief	 and	 the	 fact	 itself.	 So,	 I	 suggest,	 the	 best	 explanation	 of	 why	
knowledgeable	beliefs	are	mysteriously	related	to	the	believed	facts	is	that	there	is	a	transitive	
chain	of	mysterious	relations	that	links	the	belief	to	the	facts	via	the	justifications.24	7.3 On	whom	is	the	burden	of	proof?	
There	 are	perhaps	numerous	points	 in	 these	 arguments	 to	which	one	 could	object	 –	 but	 all	
they	would	do	is	undermine	the	arguments	for	the	claim	that	mystery	relations	are	transitive,	
they	would	not	undermine	the	claim	itself.	Which	leads	me	to	my	final	point,	in	defence	of	the	
assumption	 that	mystery	 relations	 are	 transitive:	 since	 I	 do	 not	 take	 it	 to	 be	 clear	 that	 the	
burden	of	proof	is	solely	on	me	to	prove	that	they	are,	it	would	need	a	further	argument	still	to	
demonstrate	 that	 they	aren’t.	 In	particular,	 since	my	view	 is	 that	our	working	assumption	of	
any	particular	sort	of	explanatory	relation	should	be	that	it	is	transitive	until	proven	otherwise,	




24	It’s	 worth	 noting	 that	 McDowell	 would	 reject	 this	 account.	 He	 notes	 that	 in	 the	 knowledge	 case	
‘appearances	are	no	 longer	conceived	as	 in	general	 intervening	between	the	experiencing	subject	and	















I	 have	 argued	 that	 the	mysterious	 relation	 in	 each	 case	 is	 the	 same	 relation,	 and	 that	 this	
relation	is	a	non-causal,	transitive,	explanatory	relation.	
I	 should	note:	 this	 is	not	a	 solution	 to	 the	problem	of	deviant	causal	 chains	 for	any	of	 these	
cases.	I	take	the	interesting	questions	for	each	case	to	be	what	this	explanatory	relation	is,	why	
it	 obtains,	 and	when	 it	obtains:	 I	 have	 called	 this	 the	mystery	 relation	precisely	because	 the	
answers	to	those	questions,	the	interesting	questions,	remains	shrouded	in	mystery.	All	that	I	
take	 myself	 to	 have	 done	 here	 is	 to	 offer	 some,	 hopefully,	 bland	 observations	 about	 this	
relation.	Nonetheless,	I	hope	that	even	these	bland	observations	will	be	sufficient	to	make	my	
case.	






involved	in	explaining	why	it	 is	rational.	 I	 label	the	sort	of	explanatory	relation	
that	obtains	between	(i)	the	fact	that	I	believe	that	it	is	raining	and	(ii)	the	fact	
that	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	take	an	umbrella,	the	‘E’-relation’.	I	argue	





connecting	the	two	facts.1	So,	 if	 I	am	to	say	what	I	want	to	say,	as	noted	in	§	(XIII)4,	 I	need	a	
















many	 properties	 in	 common,	 and	 that	 the	 best	 explanation	 of	 why	 they	 share	 so	 many	
																																								 																				
1	That	is,	the	fact	that	my	friend	won	an	award	explains	why	I	read	that	she	had	won	an	award,	which	











umbrella.	 The	 fact	 that	 Sally	 believes	 that	 a	 bear	 is	 chasing	 her	 explains	why	 it	 is	pro	 tanto	
rational	for	her	to	run.	Each	of	these	cases	involves	a	particular	sort	of	explanatory	relation	–	
for	expositional	convenience	it	will	help	if	we	name	it.	Let	us	say	the	following:	
Definition For	 any	 proposition	 p,	 p	 is	 E’-related	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 pro	 tanto	
rational	for	A	to	φ	 if	and	only	if	p	explains	why	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	
for	A	to	φ.	
A	 clarification:	 the	E’-relation	 is	not	 a	 relation	between,	 say,	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 believe	 that	 it	 is	
raining	and	the	act	of	taking	my	umbrella.	The	E’-relation	relates	the	fact	that	I	believe	that	it	is	
raining	to	the	fact	that	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	take	my	umbrella.	The	E’-relation	is	just	























and	A	 believes	 that	ψing	 is	 a	means	 to	φing,	 then	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 rational	 for	A	 to	φ	will	





which	 explains	 why	 it	 is	 pro	 tanto	 rational	 to	 do	 some	 action	 are	 ontologically	prior	 to	 the	
rationality	 of	 actions.	 Consider:	 it’s	 possible	 that	 someone’s	 beliefs	 and	 desires/evaluative	
judgements	 (delete	 or	 replace	 as	 appropriate)	may	 never	 align	 in	 a	way	 that	 is	 sufficient	 to	
make	 any	 action	 rational	 (perhaps	 they	have	 very	odd	desires,	 or	 normal	 desires,	 but	weird	
beliefs,	or	normal	desires	and	normal	beliefs	but	 just	 live	 in	a	dreadfully	 limited	world)	–	the	
fact	that	no	action	is	rational	does	not	impinge	on	their	ability	to	have	beliefs	and	desires.	So	










I	 want	 to	 convince	 you	 that	 the	 mystery	 relation	 (a	 non-causal	 explanatory	 relation)	 is	
transitive	with	the	E’-relation	(also	a	non-causal	explanatory	relation).	That	is,	I	will	argue	that:	
(M5) For	any	propositions,	p,	q	 and	 r,	 if	p	 is	mysteriously	 related	 to	q	 and	q	 is	 E’-
related	to	r	then	p	is	E’-related	to	r.	
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Why	 should	 you	 believe	 this?	 Because,	 I	 argue,	 these	 relations	 are	 both	 the	 same	 sort	 of	
transitive,	 non-causal	 explanatory	 relations.	 I	 put	 forward	 three	 arguments	 for	 this	 claim:	
firstly,	 the	 pervasive	 similarities	 between	 the	 mystery	 relation	 and	 the	 E’-relation	 are	 best	
explained	by	 the	presence	of	 a	 common	 relation.	 Secondly,	 the	best	 account	of	 explanatory	
relations	of	this	sort,	grounding,	takes	them	to	be	(i)	unitary	(at	least	until	proven	otherwise)	






fact	 the	 same	 explanatory	 relation,3	however,	 it	 is	 likewise	 consistent	 with	 this	 claim	 to	
suppose	 that	 they	 aren’t.	 I	 take	 no	 particular	 stance	 on	whether	 or	 not	 they	 are	 the	 same	
explanatory	relation	just	because	I	don’t	need	to	for	my	argument.	2.1 These	relations	are	similar	because	they	are	of	a	common	kind	2.1.1 There	are	a	host	of	similarities	between	the	relations	
What	are	the	similarities	between	the	mystery	relation	and	the	E’-relation?	We	have	already	
noted	 that	 they	 are	 both	non-causal	 explanatory	 relations.	 Associated	with	 their	 both	being	
explanatory	 relations	 comes	 their	 both	 being	 asymmetric,	 irreflexive	 and	 non-monotonic.	
What	else?	
First,	 they	 are	 both	 transitive	 relations.	 In	 the	 previous	 chapter	 I	 demonstrated	 that	 the	
mystery	 relation	 is	 transitive.	 In	 the	 previous	 section	 I	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 E’-relation	 is	
transitive.	
Second,	 they	 are	both	 relations	of	 ontological	 priority.	 I	 have	 already	noted	 that	 that	which	
explains	why	an	action	 is	 rational	must	be	ontologically	prior	 to	the	rationality	of	 the	action.	








of	 the	 former	 kind	 are	 ontologically	 prior	 to	 the	 latter.4	That	 is,	 presumably:	 the	 world	 is	




Third,	 they	 both	 entail	 ‘in	 virtue	 of’	 claims.	 Again,	 I	 have	 already	 noted	 that	 the	 E’-relation	
relation	always	entails	an	‘in	virtue	of	claim’,	and	so	too	does	the	mystery	relation.	Consider:	it	
seems	right	to	say	that	Sean	believes	that	his	wife	has	been	unfaithful	to	him	 in	virtue	of	the	
fact	 that	 she	has	been	unfaithful	 to	him	and	 that	Sally	believes	 that	a	bear	 is	 chasing	her	 in	
virtue	of	 the	fact	that	she	heard	a	bear-like	sound	–	 in	contrast	 it	does	not	seem	right	to	say	
that	Eva	believes	that	her	husband	has	been	unfaithful	to	her	in	virtue	of	the	fact	that	she	saw	
him	kissing	another	woman.5		2.1.2 They	are	similar	because	they	have	some	explanatory	relation	in	common	
I	 think	 that	 the	 best	 explanation	 of	 these	 similarities	 is	 that	 the	 two	 relations	 both	 are	 the	
same	sort	of	transitive,	non-causal,	explanatory	relation.	
You	might	object	to	this.	Perhaps	you	are	sceptical	of	talk	of	ontological	priority6	or	‘in	virtue	
of’7	relations.	 In	 which	 case	 you	 will	 doubt	 that	 there	 is	 much	 in	 the	 way	 of	 similarity	 that	
needs	 explaining.	 So	 be	 it.	 I,	 like	 many	 others,8	increasingly	 take	 these	 to	 be	 meaningful	
concepts,	 and	 I	 suggest	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 same	 form	of	words	 can	 be	 used	 in	 different	
cases	 is,	 at	 least,	 a	prima	 facie	 reason	 for	 thinking	 that	 there	 is	 a	 common	 relation	at	work.	
Since	 there	 is	 a	prima	 facie	 reason	 for	 thinking	 that	 there	 is	 a	 common	 relation	 I,	 following	
Audi,	‘take	the	burden	of	proof	to	be	on	those	who	think	there	are	different	relations	at	work	
to	show	why.’	(P.	Audi	2012b,	689)	
Another	 objection:	 perhaps	 you	 say	 that	 these	 similarities,	 at	 best,	 characterise	 a	 genus	 of	
non-causal	explanation	of	which	the	mystery	relation	and	the	E’-relation	are	different	species	–	
their	membership	of	 the	genus	accounts	 for	 their	 similarity,	but	 they	are	 separated	by	 their	
species-hood.	That	is,	perhaps	all	of	these	similarities	derive	from	there	being	an	‘E-relation’,	
where	 an	 E-relation	 is	 a	 non-causal	 explanatory	 relation	 that	 is	 not	 transitive	 with	 other	
																																								 																				









E-relations,	 even	 if	 it	 is	 transitive	with	 itself.	 Nothing	would	 then	 force	 us	 to	 conclude	 that	
mystery	relations	and	the	E’-rational	relation	are	the	same	sort	of	E-relation,	which	is	what	is	
required	for	us	to	admit	the	truth	of	(M5).	




There	 is	 a	 readily	 available	 analysis	 of	 the	 ontological	 underpinnings	 of	 these	 explanatory	
relations	 according	 to	 which	 they	 are	 the	 same,	 transitive	 explanatory	 relation:	 namely,	
grounding.	2.2.1 What	are	grounding	relations?	



























A	 is	 a	partial	 ground	 for	C	 if	A,	on	 its	own	or	with	 some	other	 truths,	 is	 a	ground	of	C.	 (Fine	
2012,	50)	
Now,	although	full	grounds	are	typically	taken	to	necessitate	that	which	they	ground13,	merely	
partial	 grounds	 are	 not.	 For	 instance,	 the	 possibility	 of	 castling	 with	 one’s	 kingside	 rook	 is	






Grounding	 theorists	aim	to	explain	why	a	variety	of	 relations	 in	seemingly	different	contexts	
exhibit	the	same	properties	by	suggesting	that	they	all	share	the	common	‘grounding’	relation	
(and	then	providing	an	analysis	of	that	relation).	As	Audi	remarks:	
Such	 pervasive	 similarity	 among	 such	 diverse	 subject	 matters	 cries	 out	 for	 explanation.	 I	
propose	that	what	accounts	for	the	similarity	is	simply	that	there	is	a	single	relation	at	work	in	
each	case.	(P.	Audi	2012b,	689)	
In	§	2.1.1,	 I	argued	that	 the	mystery	 relation	and	the	E’-relation	have	a	host	of	properties	 in	
common.	Having	set	out	the	properties	of	grounding	relations	above,	we	can	now	see	that	the	
properties	that	these	relations	have	in	common	just	are	the	properties	of	grounding	relations.	
Like	 grounding	 relations,	 these	 explanatory	 relations	 are	 non-causal,	 transitive,	 explanatory	
relations;	 they	 can	 be	 characterised	 by	 locutions	 like	 ‘in	 virtue	 of’;	 they	 involve	 claims	 of	
ontological	 priority;	 and	 they	 contribute	 to	 necessitating	 that	 to	which	 they	 relate	 although	
they	need	not	be	necessary	 for	 it	 to	obtain.	Following	Audi’s	 logic,	 then,	 the	best	account	of	
why	these	relations	share	those	properties	is	because	they,	too,	are	grounding	relations.		
																																								 																				
13	For	example,	 see	Rosen	 (2010),	Fine	 (2012)	and	Audi	 (2012b).	There	 is	 some	dissent	 from	this	view	
(for	example,	see	Chudnoff	(2011)	and	Leuenberger	(2014)).	
14	The	 analogousness	 of	 the	 concepts	 of	 full	 and	 partial	 grounds	with	 the	 concepts	 of	 full	 and	 partial	
explanation	invoked	throughout	this	discussion	is	presumably	clear.	
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Moreover,	 the	 distinction	 between	 full	 and	 partial	 grounds	 readily	 accommodates	 what	 we	
earlier	observed	about	the	strictly	partial	contribution	of	the	fact	that	Sally	believes	that	a	bear	
is	chasing	her	to	the	explanation	of	why	it	is	rational	for	her	to	run:	we	can	say	that	the	partial	
explanation	 partially	 grounds	 that	 which	 it	 explains.	 It	 similarly	 provides	 us	 with	 a	 ready	
characterisation	 of	 the	 strictly	 partial	 way	 in	which	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 raining	 explains	why	 I	
believe	that	it	is	raining	even	when	I	know	that	it	is	raining	(for	it	does	not	do	so	on	its	own):	
again	we	can	say	that	the	former	fact	partially	grounds	the	latter.15	
So	 here	 is	 another	 reason	 to	 believe	 (M5):	 there	 is	 a	well-developed	 analysis	 of	 the	 sort	 of	




A	 final	 consideration	 in	 support	 of	 (M5)	 is	 that,	 provided	 that	 you	 agree	with	 (M1)-(M4),	 it	




that	 my	 friend	 won	 an	 award	 at	 least	 partially	 explains	 why	 it	 was	 rational	 for	 me	 to	
congratulate	her.	It	was	rational	for	me	to	take	my	umbrella	because	it	was	raining.	
As	with	normative	reason	explanations	of	action,	there	are	three	possible	accounts	of	what	is	
going	 on	 in	 these	 sorts	 of	 explanations:	 either	 the	 purported	 explanans	 explains	 the	
explanandum	elliptically,	directly	or	indirectly.	Now,	I	suggest	that	the	same	arguments	against	
the	elliptical	 and	direct	accounts	of	normative	 reason	explanation	also	apply	 to	 the	elliptical	
and	direct	 accounts	of	 the	explanation	of	why	 it	 is	 rational	 (see	§	(X)).	 In	 contrast,	 provided	
that	you	agree	with	my	account	of	mystery	relations,	the	claim	that	they	are	transitive	with	the	







Recall	 the	 challenge	 set	 out	 in	 §	(XIII)4:	 I	 need	 a	 principled	 account	 of	 why	 it	 is	 that,	 for	
instance,	 the	explanatory	relations	 from	the	believed	 fact	 to	 the	rationality	of	 the	action	are	
transitive	in	the	‘award’	case	but	not	in	the	‘carbon	monoxide’	case.	What	is	that	account?	
It	 is	 this:	 something	 that	 isn’t	a	direct	 feature	of	an	agent’s	psychology	can	explain	why	 it	 is	
rational	 for	 them	 to	 do	 some	 action	 only	 if	 it	 is	 mysteriously	 related	 to	 a	 feature	 of	 their	
psychology	that	explains	why	that	action	is	rational.	In	particular,	a	merely	causal	explanatory	
relation	is	not	sufficient.		3.1 Some	examples	
It	will	 help	make	 the	account	 clear	 if	we	 revisit	 some	of	 the	different	 cases	 considered.	The	









I	will	 run	 through	each	of	 these	examples	 in	 turn.	 In	 the	award	case	 (Figure	XV-1)	 there	 is	a	
chain	of	non-causal	explanatory	relations	of	a	common	sort	that	 links	the	fact	that	my	friend	






















































believed	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award,	 which	 is	 E’-related	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 was	 pro	 tanto	
rational	for	me	to	congratulate	her.		
Now,	 since	 the	mystery	 relation	 is	 transitive,	 and	 transitive	with	 the	E’-relation	 (from	 (M5)),	
that	means	that	the	fact	that	my	friend	won	an	award	is	E’-related	to	the	fact	that	it	was	pro	















it	 appeared	 to	her	 as	 though	he	was	 kissing	 another	woman),	 since	 that	 justification	 is	 only	
merely	causally	related	to	her	belief,	 the	non-casual	explanatory	chain	does	not	extend	from	
the	fact	in	the	world,	through	the	justification,	to	the	rationality	of	the	action.	That	is,	neither	





the	 rustling	 of	 the	 trees	 does	 not	 explain	 why	 it	 is	 (pro	 tanto)	 rational	 for	 Sally	 to	 run.	 That	 is,	 the	
rustling	 of	 the	 trees	 is	 merely	 causally	 related	 to	 her	 hearing	 a	 bear-like	 sound,	 so	 the	 explanatory	






f	 Her	husband	was	unfaithful	to	her	 û 
j	 It	appeared	as	though	her	husband	was	kissing	another	woman	 û 
CO	case	
f	 The	room	was	full	of	carbon	monoxide	 û 








why	 their	 action	 is	 pro	 tanto	 rational	 only	 if	 it	 is	 mysteriously	 related	 to	 a	 feature	 of	 their	
psychology	that,	in	turn,	explains	why	their	action	is	pro	tanto	rational.	I	have	argued	for	this	
on	 the	 basis	 that	 the	mystery	 relation	 is	 transitive	with	 the	 E’-relation,	while	merely	 causal	
relations	are	not.	I	consider	some	objections	to	this	proposal	in	the	Appendix	to	this	chapter.	















More	 generally,	 however,	 I	 am	not	 trying	 to	 answer	 the	 question	 of	why	 the	 relationship	 is	
present.	The	question	I	am	trying	to	answer	is	why	the	explanatory	chain	in	(i)	is	transitive	and	
why	it	isn’t	in	(ii).	My	answer	is	that	there	is	a	chain	of	(mysterious)	explanatory	relations	in	(i)	
that	 there	 isn’t	 in	 (ii)	and	 that	 these	mystery	 relations	are	 transitive	with	 the	E’-relation	 (i.e.	
(M5)).	If	you	accept	these	two	claims	that	is	enough	to	answer	the	question	that	I	am	trying	to	
answer.	
The	question	as	to	why	 there	 is	a	mystery	relation	is	present	 in	(i)	but	 isn’t	 in	(ii)	 is	a	deeper	
(more	 distal)	 and	 perhaps	 more	 interesting	 question	 than	 the	 one	 I	 am	 answering.	 But	
answering	 it	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	what	 I	 need	 to	 do	 to	make	my	 case.	 In	 identifying	 the	
mystery	 relation	 as	 an	 explanatory	 relation,	 and	 showing	 that	 it	 is	 transitive	 with	 the	
E’-relation,	and	showing	that	it	obtains	in	(i)	but	not	in	(ii),	 I	have	an	answer	to	the	challenge	
posed,	and	I	don’t	need	more	than	that.		
Objection	2 If	 grounding-based	 formulations	of	physicalism	are	 true,	 then	you	are	 forced	








Grounding-based	 formulations	 of	 physicalism	 (e.g.	 Correia	 2010;	 Kroedel	 and	 Schulz	 2016)	
hold	that	all	mental	 facts	are	grounded	 in	physical	ones.	Now,	grounding-based	formulations	
of	 physicalism	 take	 the	 relation	 between	mental	 and	 physical	 facts	 to	 exhibit	 exactly	 those	
properties	that	you	said	that	the	E’-relation	and	mystery	relation	exhibit.17	Thus:	
(b) All	mental	 facts	stand	 in	a	particular	explanatory	 relation	 to	some	physical	 facts	
and	that	explanatory	relation	exhibits	grounding-like	properties.	
Thus,	 from	 (a)	 and	 (b),	 together	with	 your	 claim	 that	 the	 E’-relation	 exhibits	 grounding-like	



















Recall	 that	 in	my	argument	 for	 (M5),	 I	 considered	 the	possibility	 that	 the	E’-relation	and	 the	
mystery	 relation	 involve	 different	 species	 of	 a	 genus	 of	 non-causal	 explanatory	 relations,	 E-
relations,	and	that	it	is	their	belonging	to	that	genus	that	accounts	for	the	properties	they	have	




With	 respect	 to	mystery	 relations,	 I	 can	 think	of	no	 compelling	 reason	as	 to	why	we	 should	















E’-relation	 involves	–	and	that	this	 is	a	reason	for	thinking	that	they	do	not	 involve	the	same	
relation.	
Let	us	introduce	a	distinction	(which	is	meant	to	be	intuitive,	but	which	will	be	substantiated	




need	 to	 demonstrate	 is	 that	 horizontal	 explanatory	 relations	 are	 not	 transitive	with	 vertical	
explanatory	relations	(i.e.	that	(a)	is	false).	
To	start:	consider	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 this	 slice	of	cake	 is	 the	biggest	explains	why	 it	would	be	
impolite	to	take	it.	This,	I	submit,	is	a	horizontal	explanatory	relation	–	the	fact	that	the	cake	is	
biggest	makes	taking	 it	 impolite	 in	the	same	way	that	a	belief	that	 it’s	cold	explains	why	it	 is	
rational	to	turn	on	the	heating.	
Now	given	that	reduction	 is	an	explanatory	relation,	as	the	 ‘conceptual	reduction’	physicalist	






fact	 that	 facts	 about	 the	 microphysical	 structure	 of	 the	 cake	 (partly)	 explain	 why	 it	 is	 the	
largest	slice;	and	(ii)	 the	fact	that	the	fact	that	 it	 is	the	 largest	slice	(partly)	explains	why	 it	 is	
impolite	 to	 take	 it;	 to	 (iii)	 the	 conclusion	 that	 facts	 about	 the	microphysical	 structure	of	 the	
cake	(partly)	explain	why	it	is	impolite	to	take	it.	In	other	words,	the	transitivity	of	explanation	
breaks	down.	Now,	since	the	Eh-relation	is	a	transitive	relation,	we	have	a	reason	to	think	that	
the	Ev-relation	 is	 not	 transitive	with	 the	Eh-relation,	 so	 they	 are	distinct	 sorts	of	 explanatory	
relation.	
This	 particular	 argument	 relies	 on	 the	 reduction	 of	 macro-physical	 to	 micro-physical	 facts	









In	 contrast,	 as	 I	 have	 argued	 above,	 the	 transition	 from	 a	mystery	 relation	 to	 an	E’-relation	







for	 (M5),	 so	 that	 the	 proponent	 of	 grounding-based	 formulations	 of	 physicalism	 (and	
conceptual	 reduction	 more	 generally)	 can	 accept	 my	 theory	 without	 arriving	 at	 the	 absurd	
conclusion	 that	 Sally’s	 brain	 state	 explains	why	 it	 is	 rational	 for	her	 to	 run.	 The	only	 cost	 to	
such	 a	 physicalist	 is	 that	 they	 must	 admit	 that	 there	 are	 at	 least	 two	 kinds	 of	 grounding	













in	 the	 ‘normal’	way,	 the	carbon	monoxide	causes	a	 creature	 in	 the	 room	to	hallucinate	 that	





pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	 her	 to	 run	 is	 clear	 evidence	 that	 the	 explanatory	 relations	 involved	 are	 not	
transitive.		
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that	 it	appeared	to	you	as	 though	your	 friend	was	warning	you	about	 the	carbon	monoxide.	







(or,	at	 least,	 the	representational).	 In	 the	case	of	cooking	the	chicken,	while	 I	don’t	have	the	
solution	to	the	problem,	I	don’t	think	there	is	the	same	fundamentally	mysterious	problem	at	
work.	Whatever	 the	mystery	 relation	 is,	 it	 is,	 I	 suggest,	 to	 do	 with	 the	 rational	 faculties	 of	
agents,	whereas,	it	seems	to	me,	the	question	of	deviant	causal	chains	in	mere	causal	cases	is	a	
mere	question	of	mechanism.	









says	about	 the	application	of	each	reason	expression	to	the	case	where	 I	 take	
my	umbrella	having	seen	that	it	is	raining.	I	show	how	explanatory	rationalism	
solves	 the	problems	 faced	by	other	 theories.	 I	 suggest	 that	 the	best	 theory	of	
reasons	 is	 a	 pluralist	 theory	 of	 reason	 that	 combines	 explanatory	 rationalism	
and	 favourism;	 I	 call	 this	 theory	 ‘new	 pluralism’.	 I	 show	 how	 explanatory	
rationalism	 enables	 new	 pluralism	 to	 meet	 the	 main	 challenge	 to	 pluralist	
theories.	
In	 §	(V),	 I	 argued	 that	 if	we	are	 to	 solve	all	 of	 the	problems	discussed	 in	§§	(II)-(VI)	 then	we	
need	a	new	family	of	claims	about	reasons.	In	§	(VI),	I	suggested	that	explanatory	rationalism	









reasons,	 and	with	 the	 idea	 that	 they	 sometimes	 also	 act	 for	 normative	 reasons.	 Because	 of	
this,	I	argue,	explanatory	rationalism	is	the	best	univocal	account	of	what	it	is	to	be	a	reason.	
However,	you	will	recall	from	§	(V)	that	I	think	that	our	theory	of	reasons	ought	to	be	pluralist	
because	I	share	the	two	senses	 intuition.	To	that	end,	 I	present	new	pluralism:	 I	suggest	that	
one	sense	of	what	it	is	to	be	a	reason	is	explanatory	rationalist	and	the	other	sense	is	favourist.	
That	is	my	theory	of	reasons.	
In	 what	 follows	 I	 revisit	 explanatory	 rationalism,	 and	 consider	 what	 it	 says	 about	 what	 my	
reasons	were	when	I	saw	that	it	was	raining,	and	consequently	took	my	umbrella.	I	then	show	




















What	 are	 the	 explanatory	 relations	 in	 this	 example?	 Well,	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 was	 raining	 is	
mysteriously	 related	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 appeared	 to	 me	 as	 though	 it	 was	 raining,	 which	 is	
mysteriously	related	to	the	fact	that	I	believed	that	it	was	raining,	which	is	mysteriously	related	













So,	 given	 the	 transitivity	 of	 the	mystery	 relation	with	 the	 E’-relation,	 the	 following	 facts	 all	
(partially)	explain	why	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	take	my	umbrella:	the	fact	that	it	was	













respect,	worth	 doing,	 so	 it	 is	 a	 reason	 for	my	 taking	my	umbrella.	However,	 the	 fact	 that	 it	
appeared	to	me	as	though	it	was	raining,	and	the	fact	that	I	believed	that	it	was	raining	do	not	














































Consider	 also	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 was	 raining	 was	 a	 normative	 reason	 for	 me	 to	 take	 my	
umbrella:	so,	I	acted	for	a	normative	reason.	Some	theorists	hold	that	one	acts	for	a	normative	
reason	only	 if	 one	 knows	 it	 (as	 I	 did	 in	 this	 case);	 in	 §	A.5	 of	 the	Appendix	 to	 this	 chapter	 I	
consider	how	explanatory	rationalism	could	explain	why	that	should	be	so.		1.5 A	summary	




but	not	 all	 things	 considered	 rational	 for	 them	 to	do.	 I	 discuss	 this	 implication	 further	 in	 §	A.4	of	 the	
Appendix	to	this	chapter.	




















It	was	raining	 ü	 ü	 ü	 ü	
It	 appeared	 to	me	 as	 though	
it	was	raining	 ü	 û	 ü	 ü	
I	believed	that	it	was	raining	 ü	 û	 ü	 ü	
Table	XVI-2:	An	application	of	explanatory	rationalism	
The	 facts	 considered	 above	 do	 not	 exhaust	 the	 reasons	 that	 there	 are	 in	 this	 example,6	
however	they	should	hopefully	be	indicative	of	the	sorts	of	claims	that	explanatory	rationalism	
makes.	 For	 reference,	 I	 provide	 the	 same	 table	 for	 several	 of	 the	 examples	 considered	 in	
previous	chapters	in	§	A.1	of	the	Appendix	to	this	chapter.		
2 Solving	the	problems	
Explanatory	 rationalism	 solves	 the	 problems	 considered	 in	 §§	(II)-(VI)	 by	 rejecting	 the	
problematic	 theses	 that	 gave	 rise	 to	 them.	 That	 is,	 explanatory	 rationalism	 rejects	 all	 of	 the	
following	claims:	











Showing	 that	 explanatory	 rationalism	 can	 solve	 the	 problems	 considered	 in	 §§	(II)-(VI)	 is,	 of	
course,	not	a	demonstration	that	it	 is	consistent	with	all	of	the	prima	facie	reasonable	claims	







Against	 that	 possibility	 I	 have	 two	 responses:	 firstly,	 it	 is	 for	 the	 sceptic	 to	 generate	 such	
claims,	not	for	me	to	prove	that	none	exist	(how	could	I	prove	that?).	Secondly,	and	perhaps	
more	 compellingly,	 explanatory	 rationalism	 is	 to	 some	 extent	 inoculated	 from	 the	
conventional	form	of	these	problems	because	it	acknowledges	both	that	agents	always	act	for	
psychological	 reasons,	 and	 that	 agents	 also	 can,	 and	 often	 do,	 act	 for	 normative	 reasons.	
Because	it	can	reconcile	these	seemingly	competing	theses,	 it	 is	 immune	from	problems	that	




that	 our	 theory	 of	 reasons	 ought	 to	 be	 pluralist.	 Recall	 that	 in	 §	(V)	 I	 introduced	 the	 ‘two	
senses’	intuition:	I	suggested	that	there	is	a	sense	in	which	Sally	ran	for	a	reason	and	a	sense	in	
which	she	didn’t;	similarly,	I	suggested	that	if	I	believe	that	there	is	milk	at	home	even	though	
there	 isn’t,	 then	 there	 is	 a	 sense	 in	which	 I	 don’t	 have	 a	 reason	 to	 buy	milk	 and	 a	 sense	 in	
which	 I	 do.	 In	 light	 of	 this	 observation	 I	 suggest	 that	we	 should	 not	 stop	with	 the	 univocal	
account	of	reasons	provided	by	explanatory	rationalism	on	its	own;	instead,	we	ought	to	adopt	
a	pluralist	theory	of	reasons.	
The	 sense	 in	 which	 Sally	 runs	 for	 a	 reason	 is	 the	 sense	 in	 which	 running	 intentionally,	


















































While	 I	 think	 that	 new	 pluralism	 is	 the	 best	 way	 to	 capture	 our	 myriad	 intuitions	 about	









(S1)	 Whenever	 we	 give	 an	 agent’s	 reason	 for	 acting,	whatever	 the	 sense	 of	 the	
expression	 used,	 we	 explain	 their	 action	 in	 a	 way	 that	 makes	 them	 seem	
rational.	
In	 §	(V)7,	 I	 noted	 that	 (S1)	 creates	 a	 problem	 for	 pluralism.	 The	 problem	was	 as	 follows:	 a	
theory	of	reasons	that	is	pluralist	with	respect	to	the	reasons	for	which	an	agent	acts,	takes	the	
‘agent’s	reason	for	acting’	expression	to	have	two	different	senses.	In	particular,	such	a	theory	
holds	 that	 the	 reason-relation	 for	 each	 sense	 (i.e.	 the	 relation	 between	 the	 action	 and	 the	
																																								 																				
7	Of	course,	the	great	virtue	of	explanatory	rationalism	is	that	there	are	occasions	on	which	something	is	





to	 explain	 how	 it	 is	 that,	 if	 the	 reason-relations	 are	 different	 for	 the	 different	 senses,	 it	 is	
nonetheless	 the	case	 that	when	we	give	an	agent’s	 reason	 for	acting,	whatever	 the	 sense	of	
the	expression	used,	we	explain	their	action	in	a	way	that	makes	them	seem	rational.	That	is,	if	
the	expression	‘the	agent’s	reason	for	acting’	has	two	different	senses,	how	is	(S1)	true?	




and	only	 if	p	makes	A’s	φing,	all	 things	 considered,	worth	doing	and	explains	 (in	 the	
right	way)	why	A	φ’d.8	
If	something	makes	an	agent’s	action	all	things	considered	worth	doing	then	it	also	makes	it	in	
some	respect	worth	doing,	so	 it	 is	a	normative	reason	for	them	to	do	 it.	 I	have	suggested,	 in	
previous	chapters,	that	a	normative	reason	to	do	some	action	explains	what	the	agent	did	in	
the	right	way	only	 if	 it	 is	mysteriously	related	to	a	belief	that,	 in	turn,	both	explains	why	the	
agent’s	 action	 is	 pro	 tanto	 rational	 and	 is	 mysteriously	 related	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 they	
(intentionally)	did	it.	Now	recall	that	a	belief	that	explains	both	why	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	




believes	 that	p	 is	 the	agent’s	 reason	 for	acting	 in	 the	explanatory	 rationalist	 sense.	But,	 as	 I	
have	argued,	if	p	is	mysteriously	related	to	the	fact	that	the	agent	believes	that	p,	and	the	fact	
that	the	agent	believes	that	p	 is,	 in	the	explanatory	rationalist	sense,	 their	 reason	for	acting,	









the	right	way	 if	 it	 is	to	explain	their	action	–	and	that	 is	all	that	 is	required	for	them	to	agree	with	my	
characterisation.	
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And	 when	 an	 agent	 acts	 for	 a	 reason	 in	 the	 explanatory	 rationalist	 sense,	 their	 reason	 for	
acting	explains	both	why	they	acted	and	why	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	them	to	act.	So	this	is	
why	giving	an	agent’s	reason	for	acting	always	explains	their	action	in	a	way	that	makes	them	
seem	rational	 (or	at	 least	pro	tanto	 rational):	because	their	reason	for	acting	always	explains	
why	they	did	what	they	did	and	why	it	was	(at	least	pro	tanto)	rational	for	them	to	do	it.	
New	pluralism	thus	meets	the	challenge	that	(S1)	creates	for	all	pluralist	theories	by	insisting	
that	 whenever	 something	 is	 an	 agent’s	 reason	 for	 acting,	 it	 is	 a	 reason	 for	 acting	 in	 the	
explanatory	 rationalist	 sense,	 but	 sometimes	 it	 is	 also	 the	 agent’s	 reason	 for	 acting	 in	 the	
favourist	 sense.	 New	 pluralism	 thus	 provides	 a	 plausible	 account	 of	 the	 truth	 of	 (S1)	whilst	
maintaining	its	pluralist	credentials.	
5 Conclusion	
Explanatory	 rationalism	 provides	 us	 with	 a	 univocal	 account	 of	 what	 it	 is	 to	 be	 a	 practical	
reason	that	does	not	suffer	the	failings	of	most	contemporary	theories	of	reasons.	The	great	
virtue	of	explanatory	rationalism	 is	 thus	that	 it	does	not	generally	compel	us	 to	make	claims	
about	 reasons	 that	 are	 strange,	 counterintuitive	 or	 prima	 facie	 paradoxical,	 unlike	 most	
contemporary	 theories	 of	 reasons.	 In	 this	 respect,	 it	 is,	 I	 suggest,	 superior	 to	 favourism,	
deliberativism,	and	psychologism.	
Moreover,	 I	 have	 suggested	 that	 new	 pluralism,	 a	 theory	 that	 combines	 explanatory	
rationalism	 and	 favourism,	 is	 the	 best	 theory	 of	 reasons;	 it	 combines	 all	 the	 virtues	 of	

















My	friend	won	an	award	 ü	 ü	 ü	 ü	
I	read	that	she	had	won	an	
award	in	the	newspaper	 ü	 û	 ü	 ü	
I	believed	that	she	had	won	an	
award	 ü	 û	 ü	 ü	
Sally	
A	bear	was	chasing	Sally	 û û û û 
She	heard	a	bear-like	sound	 ü û ü ü 
She	believed	that	a	bear	was	
chasing	her	 ü û ü ü 
Eva	
Her	husband	was	unfaithful	 û û û û 
It	 appeared	 to	 her	 as	 though	
her	 husband	 was	 kissing	
another	woman	
û û û û 
She	 believed	 that	 he	 had	 been	
unfaithful	 ü û ü ü 
Climber	
Loosening	 his	 grip	 would	 rid	
him	of	danger	 ü ü ü û 
It	 appeared	 as	 though	
loosening	his	grip	would	rid	him	
of	danger	
ü û ü û 
He	 believed	 that	 loosening	 his	


























the	 right	way.	 For	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 discussion,	 I	 assumed	 that	 it	 is	 sufficient;	 so	 that	 if	 a	
reason	that	an	agent	has	to	act	is	mysteriously	related	to	the	fact	that	they	acted	as	they	did,	








13	Cf.	 ‘What	 distinguishes	 actions	which	 are	 intentional	 from	 those	which	 are	 not?	 The	 answer	 that	 I	
shall	 suggest	 is	 that	 they	 are	 the	 actions	 to	 which	 a	 certain	 sense	 of	 the	 question	 ‘Why?’	 is	 given	













While	 this	may	 sound	 paradoxical,	 in	what	 follows	 I	will	 argue	 that	 this	 is	 actually	 the	 least	
worst	response	to	a	problem	that	affects	all	theories	of	reasons.	A.3.1 What	reason	there	was	for	Sally	to	run	
To	the	extent	that	we	accept	that	 it	 is	prima	facie	 reasonable	to	claim	that	Sally’s	reason	for	
running	is	that	she	heard	a	bear-like	sound	(i.e.	(F6))	and	that	an	agent’s	reason	for	acting	must	
be	a	reason	there	was	for	them	to	so	act	(i.e.	(F9)),	 it	 follows	that	the	fact	that	Sally	heard	a	






















(R8) For	 any	p,	 p	 counts	 in	 favour	 of	A’s	φing	 if	 and	 only	 if	p	makes	 A’s	φing,	 in	
some	respect,	worth	doing.	A.3.5 What	make’s	Sally’s	running	worth	doing	
















reasonable,	 although	 they	 are	 mutually	 inconsistent).	 The	 response	 of	 favourists	 and	
deliberativists	to	this	problem	is	to	reject	(R5).	Psychologism	about	reasons	for	acting	rejects	
(R7).	18	Kearns	 and	 Star	 (2008)	 interpret	 what	 it	 is	 to	 ‘count	 in	 favour	 of	 acting’	 as	 ‘being	
evidence	 that	one	ought	 to	 so	act,’	 so	 they	would	presumably	 reject	 (R8).	 I	 know	of	no	one	
																																								 																				
16	Recall	the	discussion	of	this	point	in	§	(I)4.2	in	particular.	




who	 would	 reject	 (R9).	 For	 reasons	 that	 I	 have	 set	 out	 at	 various	 points	 over	 the	 previous	
chapters,	I	don’t	find	any	of	these	options	palatable.		
In	contrast,	explanatory	rationalism	rejects	(R6).	I	take	this	to	be	the	least	worst	of	the	options	
available.	Does	 it	 sound	odd	to	say	 that	something	could	be	a	 reason	to	act	without	being	a	
reason	for	acting?	Somewhat.	However,	I	think	that	the	oddness	of	saying	this	dissipates	when	




According	 to	explanatory	 rationalism,	 it	 is	possible	 that	an	agent	could	do	some	action	 for	a	
reason	even	 though	 that	action	was	merely	pro	 tanto	 rational,	and	not	all	 things	considered	
rational.	 That	 is,	 explanatory	 rationalism	 suggests	 that	 even	when	 an	 agent	 does	 one	 thing,	





him	 that	 the	 branch	 may	 be	 projecting	 from	 the	 hedge	 and	 so	 still	 be	 a	 threat	 to	 unwary	





outweighs	 the	 former;	 yet	 he	 acts	 on	 the	 former.	 In	 short,	 he	 goes	 against	 his	 own	 best	
judgement.	(Davidson	2004,	172	&	174)	
The	man	in	Davidson’s	example	does	act	for	a	reason:	he	thinks	that	the	stick	may	endanger	a	
passer-by.	 It	 seems	to	me	that	 the	 fact	 that	 the	action	 is	 ‘less	 than	 fully	 rational’,19	does	not	







the	will,	 occurs	when,	 in	 the	 face	 of	 conflicting	 reasons	 for	 and	 against	X-ing	 someone	makes	 an	 all-
things-considered	judgement	that	he	ought	not	to	X,	but	X’s	anyway	and	does	so	for	a	reason,	namely,	







Several	 theorists	 hold	 that	 an	 agent	 acts	 for	 a	 normative	 reason	 only	 if	 they	 know	 it.21	In	




If	 that	 were	 true,	 then	 explanatory	 rationalism	 would	 provide	 us	 with	 an	 account	 of	why	
knowing	a	normative	reason	should	be	necessary	for	acting	on	it:	because	it	is	only	if	an	agent	
knows	a	normative	 reason	 that	 it	 can	mysteriously	 explain	 their	 action	–	 and	 it	 is	 only	 their	
reason	for	acting	if	it	mysteriously	explains	their	action.	Let	me	elaborate.	
A	normative	reason	to	do	some	action	must	be	mysteriously	related	to	the	agent’s	belief	in	it	if	
it	 is	to	explain	either	why	 it	was	pro	tanto	 rational	 for	the	agent	to	do	that	action,	or	(in	the	




So	 this	 is	why	an	agent	 can	only	 act	 for	 a	normative	 reason	 if	 they	 know	 it:	 because	 if	 they	
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